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Abstract. Contributing to a growing debate about ‘symbolic’ or non-policy
effects of gender-balanced legislatures, my thesis sets out to tackle issues of
(a) measurement, combining experimental and observational evidence of the
effect of female politicians as role models on women’s political engagement;
and (b) mediation, considering the underlying mechanisms convincing on the
individual-level of voter psychology, explaining why role models are power-
ful in engaging fellow women in the electorate.
Firstly, I triangulate results from an eye-tracking experiment investigating
attentional bias to gender balance in manipulated picture stimuli of polit-
ical groups; an online experiment investigating measures of psychological
engagement with politics as a function of gender balance in the same pic-
ture stimuli; and British Election Study panel data investigating campaign
effects on psychological engagement with politics as a function of the gender
balance among candidates running in the 2010 and 2015 UK parliamentary
constituencies.
My results suggest two general types of role model effects: one of ‘tokenism’
where women’s striking minority presence impacts political attention and the
probability of learning about politics, and one of ‘linear’ effects where a grad-
ual increase in women’s presence in political groups towards parity translates
into a gradual increase in political self-efficacy and confidence about political
knowledge.
Secondly, I develop and test hypotheses about mediation in terms of implicit
mechanisms not requiring that citizens consider the policy output of their rep-
resentatives, drawing heavily on the stereotype threat literature especially on
the role of affect. Using a more classical, regression-based approach to me-
diation analysis, along with a novel crossover experiment or ‘design-based’
mediation analysis, I present preliminary evidence that, following exposure
to role models, women experienced fewer self-evaluative threats as evidenced
by anxiety, explaining effects on self-efficacy in politics. I present an addi-
tional study scrutinising affect, and show that the action-oriented anger may
result in approach of the source of threat, reversing stereotype threat effects
under ‘men-only’ politics.
Thirdly, I develop and test hypotheses about mediation in terms of instru-
mental mechanisms that do require expectations or associations about pol-
icy output. Through similar approaches to mediation analysis, I show that
though women expect better policy across two domains with more female
politicians on board, greater competency attributed to elites is, if anything,
negatively related to self-efficacy in politics. In a full-experimental study,
I find no evidence that women’s greater self-efficacy is due to expectations
about women-friendly policy pursued by role models.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
To every little girl who dreams big: Yes, you can be anything you want—
even president. Tonight is for you. -H [1]
Many scholars have focused on the policy consequences of women’s underrepresenta-
tion in political life, suggesting that women friendly policies are more likely to be enacted
when more women hold political office. More recently, research has turned to exploring
‘symbolic’ or non-policy effects of more gender balanced legislatures, to investigate an
empowering or ‘role model’ effect increasing women’s political engagement. This grow-
ing body of research has found that where more women hold or contest elective office,
women have greater stores of political knowledge; especially young girls are more likely
to engage in political discussion; and some of these studies report average effects on
political interest, political efficacy, and trust, though failing to replicate in some studies.
Yet a lot of this evidence relies on observational data, making it difficult to disen-
tangle whether contexts where role model effects are detected are simply cultures where
women are more politically engaged. While relevant experimental evidence exists, it is
reported in isolation and outside the context of political engagement as a dependent vari-
able. Studies utilising exposure to varying gender balance on the group level, such as a
cabinet or a national parliament, rather than individual candidate gender, continue to be
relatively rare. Perhaps more importantly, the majority of studies fail to address impor-
tant questions about the underlying mediating mechanisms to explain why political role
models are powerful on the individual level. With the exception of a general hypothesis
about cost-benefit calculations associated with political participation, we currently lack
well defined or competing hypotheses on this level.
My thesis sets out to address these gaps by designing a series of studies taking up
issues of measurement as well as mediation. In the context of my work, ‘measurement’
refers to a more systematic investigation of cause and effect where observational data is
combined with experimental data, and to reporting a wide range of indicators of women’s
political engagement across all these approaches. ‘Mediation’ refers to testing an elab-
orate causal chain where I identify interim variables that explain, rather than condition,
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control or moderate, why exposure to an increasing gender balance in politics is relevant
for the individual in terms of a convincing psychological mechanism.
Chapter 2 is a theoretical treatment of the study of mediation, developing two sets of
hypotheses. Firstly, I draw on specialist literature on stereotype threat, an experimental
paradigm developed to test the impact of harmful stereotypes on academic achievement,
documenting evidence that these often translate into self-evaluative threats, damaging
performance. Using extensions of the original framework across various domains, such
as sports and STEM careers, I arrive at the conclusion that ‘men only’ politics may be
a high threat environment for women, evidenced predominantly by anxiety, which may
turn women away from politics. By contrast, an increasing presence of role models alle-
viates these anxieties resulting in greater political engagement. Secondly, I revisit more
instrumental theories about mediation in which citizens form positive expectations about
the policy output pursued by women in office. My own instrumental hypotheses draw
on literature on stereotypes about issue competencies, on literature regarding gender di-
versity and public perceptions of corporate governance, as well as on the representation
literature on ‘woman friendly’ policies.
Chapter 3, Methodology is a reference chapter of technical details about data collec-
tion, procedures, picture stimuli and notes on effective sample sizes. While describing an
analytical strategy broadly, specific methods and statistical models are described in the
individual study sections.
Chapter 4 sets hypotheses about mediation aside to first present evidence of role
model effects themselves, where the emphasis is on observation and comparison across
measurement approaches. I triangulate results from an eye-tracking experiment inves-
tigating attentional engagement with gender balance in manipulated picture stimuli of
political groups; two rounds of online experiments investigating measures of political
engagement following gender balance in the same picture stimuli; and British Election
Study panel data investigating campaign effects on political engagement following gen-
der balance among all candidates running in the 2010 and 2015 UK parliamentary con-
stituencies. The dependent variable in the eye-tracking study is attentional bias to im-
proved gender balance in pictures, measured through data on the location and duration
of eye fixations and saccades. In all survey studies, dependent variables are political in-
terest, performance on a political knowledge test, confidence and self-efficacy in politics,
external political efficacy, and trust in Members of Parliament.
Gender balance or women’s numerical presence is the key independent variable, or
treatment, in all observational and experimental studies. In my Analytical Framework,
summarised in Section 3.1, I consider the disadvantages of treating numerical balance as a
single continuum ranging from 0% to 100%, which may be appropriate if assuming linear
role model effects, but may also hide an important heterogeneity of effects at discrete pro-
portions where scholarship especially on descriptive representation theorised that women
make a difference. I will therefore introduce discrete values of numerical presence to tap
role model effects beyond linearity, such as the differential impact of women’s ‘token’ or
8
striking minority presence, in larger groups estimated near 20%; women’s critical mass
presence, in line with many studies near 30%; and a parity of men and women thus 50%,
an ideal target of contemporary quota policies.
Chapter 5 is composed of three studies looking at the role of affect in evidencing
and alleviating stereotype threat and role model effects, respectively, on psychological
engagement with politics. In Study 1, I look at self-reported state anxiety and testing-
specific anxiety regarding a political knowledge test to explore if shifts in gender balance
(picture treatment) translate into shifts in anxiety levels, and whether these movements
explain effects on psychological engagement in politics, as reported in Chapter 4. Study
2 is a novel, crossover experimental study where participants receive a sequence of treat-
ments: after manipulation of gender balance in picture stimuli, I introduce negative ma-
nipulation on the mediator variable as well. The hypothesis being that role models alle-
viate anxiety stemming from stereotype threat. To this end, I assign a randomly selected
portion of the treated sample to a ‘re-induced’ state anxiety condition to check if role
model effects diminish on psychological engagement with politics. In Study 3, I scruti-
nise affect by looking at emotions of approach and avoidance, experimentally induced in
the eye-tracking study, to explore if the action-oriented anger about gender stereotyping
reverses stereotype threat effects and results in a confronting the source of threat.
Chapter 6 is composed of two studies exploring instrumental or policy-relevant link-
ages between women politicians and women in the electorate. In Study 1, I test if
women’s policy expectations improve as a function of improving gender balance across
the domains of healthcare and finance policy, and if these explain increased political en-
gagement. These domains are meant to be general enough to measure an overall judge-
ment of the course of policy but specific at the same time in the sense that gender stereo-
types prevail in how well suited female politicians are in managing them. In Study 2,
I design another crossover experiment where negative manipulation is an attempt to re-
move women’s specific expectations that female politicians pursue policy that is woman
friendly, to check if role model effects on political engagement diminish.
With these studies, my thesis aims to make a number of contributions. Firstly, to
make additions to the body of evidence, with often mixed results, that non-negligible
portions of the gender gap in political engagement are due to women’s disproportionate
representation in political office. I aim to do this on different levels of abstraction in
terms of micro-level evidence of attention, on self-reported measures of psychological
engagement with politics. Secondly, taking numerical balance seriously and exploring
effects at discrete proportions of women’s presence, I aim to present findings adding to
lesser-explored benefits of policy remedies such as quotas encouraging women to take
positions in private and public organisations alike. Thirdly, Chapter 5 takes up the sec-
ondary goal of extending the stereotype threat approach for the first time to the domain
of political engagement, an experimental paradigm that has recently been implicated in
the wake of the ‘replication crisis’, with researchers pointing at mixed evidence of effects
across domains. Finally, Chapter 6 aims to encourage an extension of research on policy
9
competencies from the individual candidate to the level collective political bodies such as
a government cabinet or a legislature, to study how (gender) diversity impacts group-level
performance and public expectations.
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Chapter 2
Mediating role model effects:
A theoretical framework
When women look at tech companies and math departments, they see few
women. This activates the stereotype that women aren’t good at math. The
stereotype [...] makes it harder for women to enter those fields. To stay. To
thrive. [2]
The business case for increasing the number of women on corporate
boards is clear. [...] It is clear that boards make better decisions where a
range of voices, drawing on different life experiences, can be heard. That
mix of voices must include women. [3]
This chapter points to key empirical evidence behind an empowering or
‘role model’ effect of women’s presence in diverse fields, and argues for the
need for more work on the underlying mechanisms convincing on the indi-
vidual level. I develop two sets of hypotheses about mediating mechanisms
of symbolic representative linkage: that political role models alleviate self-
evaluative stereotype threats, often revealed by anxiety; and that role models
may be expected to contribute to better policy whether in generalised terms
through competencies or specifically in implementing ‘women-friendly’ poli-
cies.
Gender gaps in political engagement persist across time and jurisdictions. With the ex-
ception of turnout at elections in the United States [4] and most Western European democ-
racies [5],[6], women are found to be comparatively less interested in politics [7],[8],[9],
less knowledgeable about politics [10],[11], less likely to be contacted directly by cam-
paigns [12], and less likely to consider, or to be encouraged to, run for office [13],[14].
In early comparative work, Verba, Nie and Kim [15] consider the disparity in ‘psycho-
logical involvement’ with politics across seven countries and find that higher education
affects women’s political interest more than men’s [pp. 258–259], but also that men’s
baseline level of interest is already about half to one standard deviation above women’s,
making it difficult for women to ‘catch up to the male level of political concern’ [p.262].
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Looking for answers beyond education, Welch [16] employs a more exhaustive set of
controls of socio-economic status on British survey data but obtains a similar residual
gap in political interest between men and women.
Though not tested explicitly, both studies conclude by tapping into psychological pro-
cesses unrelated to socio-economics to explain these differences: the suggestion in Verba
et al. seems to be centered on women’s self-efficacy, that politics would ‘be [seen] outside
of the proper role of women’ by women themselves [15, p.263], while Welch’s to be more
about women’s judgements of the efficacy of politics itself ‘where men are not particu-
larly successful in solving policy problems, but women are largely shut out of attempting
such solutions altogether’ [16, p.44].
Crucially, Welch here points to the possible impact of Margaret Thatcher’s incum-
bency in the UK (at the time, in office for only a year) in shifting these judgements,
speculating that more women in power would send the implicit message that women too
are capable of influencing politics. The first empirical tests of this in the studies of Verba,
Burns, and Schlozman [7] as well as of Burns, Schlozman, and Verba [17] were affirma-
tive: in the United States, women represented by female Senators performed better on
tests of political knowledge, reported to be more politically efficacious, and more politi-
cally interested (in latter but not former report).
Later labelled as the role model effect, studies have followed finding positive associa-
tions between the share of women MPs and respondents’ frequency of political discussion
cross-nationally [18]. Another study reports that adolescents’ anticipated political in-
volvement increased following a surge in the number of women candidates running with
high media visibility, over time, through 25 years [19]. While shifting focus from psy-
chological engagement to participation, these studies further support the hypothesis that
women’s improving numerical balance in politics, or ‘descriptive representation’, may
eventually close the gender gap in political engagement, maintaining that the relationship
is causal [20],[21],
In so doing, they propose the first hypotheses on mediation or underlying mecha-
nisms giving substance to the ‘blank’ causal link between female representatives citizen
engagement. These include shifting perceptions about the appropriateness of politics
for women, and policy responsiveness. State of the art explanations, however, do only
half the job to link women’s numerical representation directly to citizen engagement, or
conversely, their minority position to citizen disengagement. While one observation is
that women candidates stir political discussion in the family [19], in turn mediating role
model effects on young girls’ political ambition, further links between the presence of
women as candidates and parents’ propensity to bring up political topics at home are left
untheorised.
Looking at the idea of mediation in a wider context of numerical representation of
racial and ethnic minorities, many hypothesize some aspect of psychological engagement
with politics, such as political interest or political efficacy, to ‘mediate’ effects on mo-
bilisation [22]. There is, however, little to no explanation provided on why exactly a
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descriptive representative would increase psychological engagement in the first place, be-
ing a dependent variable in its own right. In the same study on mediation, for instance,
perception of ‘government responsiveness’ is studied as mediator to infer on some sort of
cost-benefit calculations associated with women politicians, as the authors intended, itself
however may be broader than that and could be treated as lagged dependent variable on
another aspect of political engagement namely external political efficacy or trust.
Other than a need for a more complete theoretical account, more work on mediating
mechanisms may also be useful to understand sometimes contradictory evidence behind
the role model effects of female politicians in empirical investigations in the past twenty
years. While results converge on a positive impact on political knowledge, women being
more likely to recall political information if living in areas where high visibility offices are
held or contested by women [7],[23],[17],[24],[25]1, and especially on young girls’ fre-
quency of political discussion within networks of friends and family [19],[18],[25],[21],
studies seeking to isolate effects on political interest and political efficacy offer mixed
evidence at best [24],[26],[27]. While some work explains why role models do not work
by pointing at moderating factors such as partisanship [28],[29], understanding why role
models do work when they do may have important implications for where to look and
what kinds of effects to expect through what kind of exposure.
In this chapter, I introduce elements of a theoretical framework to study mediating
mechanisms that are convincing on the individual level. As a point of departure, I con-
sider an apparent dualism of explanations in the literature briefly reviewed above: one
stream of theorists engaging with the role of less tangible and implicit concerns about
women’s self-efficacy in the masculine domain of politics [17],[15]; whereas another
stream highlighting more instrumental concerns about inadequate or irresponsive policy
[16],[22] including Jane Mansbridge’s influential ideas about communication barriers be-
tween male politicians and female citizens, harming substantive representation [30].
While both make sense broadly as components of a causal chain linking represen-
tatives with their constituents, in their current form they also face limitations. On the
one hand, their role in the representation literature has largely been theoretical, merely
motivating studies that seek to detect role model effects, themselves however untested as
mediators. On the other hand, as theoretical constructs they are not specific enough. For
example, significant work in social psychology points to a range of potentially relevant
‘automatic’ or consciously inaccessible responses to stereotypes, including examples of
cognition such as activation of associations [31], examples of affect such as anxiety [32],
or physiological responses such as startle eye blink [33].
The aim of the following sections is to highlight specialist literature that will be used
to develop ideas about mediation in response to these types of mechanisms, namely those
more implicit in the sense that they do not require that citizens judge representatives
consciously regarding their policy output, and those more instrumental that do require
that expectations are formed about policy output2.
The first major section introduces literature on stereotype threat mainly to arrive at af-
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fect, and predominantly anxiety, as a potential mediator of political (dis)engagement un-
der political (mis)representation. It develops a set of hypotheses in which no or minimal
levels of representation are high threat and high anxiety contexts harming self-efficacy as-
sessments (see especially Section 2.1.1) in politics and result in political disengagement.
By contrast, when equipped with an increasing presence of role models, politics does not
induce self-evaluative threats, and the result is greater political engagement.
The second major section focuses on literature about perceptions as well as stereo-
types about women’s competence in policy, to suggest that citizens may expect different
policy outcomes from groups where women contribute in at least two important ways:
first it may be assessed holistically ‘better’, showing diversity of expertise and viewpoints,
and second, it may be expected to deliver policy that is ‘woman friendly’.
There are two important limitations to highlight. Firstly, these mechanisms are meant
to give an account on why role models are powerful on a personal level. When developing
hypotheses about mediation, I do not move on to consider broader and more elaborate
mechanisms that involve external actors and institutions such as the media that may be
useful for a full account on how role models get their message across, that are beyond
the current aims of exploring convincing individual-level mechanisms. Secondly, this
chapter does not set out a full account on role model effects are mediated. Within implicit
mechanisms, there should be a large number of alternative or parallel ideas that may
explain a great deal about voter psychology under different representation setups, and
within instrumental considerations, there should be further policy areas worth exploring
to understand what exactly is expected from the tenure of role models. The current ones
are demonstrative examples of the kinds of literature that future studies could draw on,
aiming to explore the usefulness of the implicit-instrumental distinction in the first place.
2.1 Stereotype threat and affect
Steele and Aronson define [32] stereotype threat essentially as ‘inferiority anxiety’ about
confirming a negative stereotype, which may arise in specific situations where “negative
stereotypes provide a possible framework for interpreting [one’s own] behaviour” [34,
p.415]. Drawing on early research on the underachievement of Black people in academia,
the authors show that the achievement gap can be reinforced or closed by altering partic-
ipants’ threat-perception with very explicit cues. In this first investigation of stereotype
threat effects, experimental manipulation induces threat by informing a sample of par-
ticipants about Blacks’ underachievement on tests such as the upcoming one, relative to
Whites. Other participants receive treatment pre-empting threat by assuring them about
no race differences on tests such as the upcoming one.
Studies following this experimental paradigm show that those reminded of harmful
stereotypes—most often race [35],[36] but extended to gender [37], race and gender [38]
and age [39] related stereotypes as well—perform worse than those who were not, sug-
gesting that an achievement gap in education and careers may be at least partially due
to a series of such responses to stereotypes encountered and internalised through the life
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course. While robust across race and gender, studies typically find moderate effects when
working with stereotypes regarding women’s quantitative skills, however, meta-analysis
points out that women predictably react to even subtle cues whereas Blacks tend to need
very explicit reminders of stereotypes to ‘open up’ the achievement gap [40].
In the present theoretical framework, two extensions of the stereotype threat literature
are used to strengthen the role model hypothesis about women’s symbolic role in political
office, and a third in particular to develop a hypothesis about mediation that is better suited
for empirical testing. Next, I will briefly review some of the work done on the effects of
stereotyping beyond test performance, arriving at the broader concept of self-efficacy,
suggesting that this framework may be used to study women’s psychological engagement
with politics. Then, I will review experimental work where gendered stereotype threats
were successfully alleviated via exposure to visible role models in a number of fields such
as STEM careers, business, and sport, informing hypotheses about the potential effect of
numerical balance in political elites. Finally, I develop ideas about mediation using the
role of affect, most prominently anxiety, making stereotype threat-related mechanisms
detectable.
2.1.1 Effects beyond testing: self-efficacy
Studies synthesising the first results of stereotype threat experiments conclude that a series
of negative experiences under racist stereotype threats ultimately impacts one’s intellec-
tual identity, which may result in academic disidentification altogether (e.g. “Studying is
not for me”) [41],[42].
In terms of academia and jobs, studies tend to hypothesize partial identification or
domain selectivity when looking at gender stereotypes specifically. A novel experimental
design finds that its women participants subjected to sexist television commercials were
consequently less likely to express a preference for careers relying heavily on a quanti-
tative skill set and preferred careers relying on ‘verbal domains’ such as creative writing
and communications [43]. Women’s disproportionate presence in STEM careers remains
the focus of ongoing research [44],[45],[46], drawing heavily on stereotype threat schol-
arship.
Behind these instances of domain avoidance, common theory is that stereotypes harm
individuals’ self-efficacy judgements (“Am I able to succeed?”), resulting in a move away
from the source of threat, though the specific mechanism is still debated [47]. A definition
of self-efficacy in politics is less straightforward, but it has its parallel: election studies of-
ten look at ‘internal political efficacy’, a construct understood partly as confidence about
one’s political awareness on one hand, and as judgements about the benefits of voting
and other participatory efforts, on the other [48],[49]. Applying theory from the extended
stereotype threat paradigm on these constructs, one may hypothesize that masculine pol-
itics induces self-evaluative threats in contexts where women need to assess their own
political skills, a typical solution in turn being political disengagement.
There is no direct application of the stereotype framework on this or any other as-
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pects of psychological engagement with politics, such as political interest or trust, but
two studies come close by looking at simple performance on political knowledge tests.
Relatively recent study demonstrates interviewer gender effects on how participants of a
telephone survey performed on a political knowledge test [50]. The finding, that women
scored higher when interviewed by women, is consistent with the possibility of stereotype
threat effects on confidence, if a correct answer is driven by a greater confidence in one’s
own knowledge instead of opting for refusal or selecting ‘don’t know’—important work
on political knowledge points at a gender gap between men’s and women’s propensity to
guess on these tests [51]. Another, unpublished study looks at similar measures and finds
that the gender gap in test performance is cut by half if participants previously rated a mix
of male and female politicians, rather than only men, on performance thermometers [52].
Another relevant study looks at political ambition, whether women anticipate to run for
office, finding weak evidence of a stereotype threat effect [53].
2.1.2 Role models alleviate stereotype threat
Going beyond the causes of stereotype threat, studies quickly follow up showing ways
that stereotype threats may be successfully alleviated. One such proposition is about
exposure to a visible and competent role model [54] showing that women’s test perfor-
mance is ‘safeguarded’ by a female test administrator, with important effects on con-
fidence about math ability, and self-esteem. In another study, participants read about
gender-manipulated fictitious biographies, finding that exposure to the stories of women
inventors, lawyers, architects, and doctors, without an explicit mention of their quantita-
tive skills, increased female participants’ math scores [55].
Further studies consider variation in gender balance by using visual stimuli. Further
investigating STEM subject selectivity, one study reports that women viewing a (staged)
academic conference video with a 1:3 ratio of women to men were less likely to express
interest to participate at the conference than those viewing a parity of men and women
[45]. Within STEM, recent review highlights inconsistencies across studies in the corre-
lation they report between the proportion of female science faculty and the proportion of
women majoring in science, suggesting that it may a case of non-linear relationship where
a critical mass of women teachers may matter but beyond such a threshold, marginal ef-
fects diminish [46, p.13].
While political engagement has not yet been implicated in these studies as a dependent
variable, exposure to political role models has been considered to alleviate stereotype
threat in other domains. Most notable is the ‘Obama effect’3 coupled with some evidence
that Barack Obama’s visibility and novelty in the highest executive office improved GRE-
style test scores, followed on a small rolling cross-section of Black participants [56]. This
finding, however, is not mirrored in a parallel laboratory experiment, if not casting doubt
on Obama’s power as a role model altogether but qualifying it as ‘less pervasive and more
dependent on test-taker characteristics’ [57, p.960].
First evidence of a more complex ‘Hillary Clinton effect’ comes from a study [58] that
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starts with a free name recall task asking a pilot sample of students to list famous women
who deserved success, understood broadly to include celebrities, and famous women who
did not deserve success, and finding that Hillary Clinton is the only name listed top 3 on
both lists. Thus the researchers proceed to design the main study in which participants
are asked to rate Hillary Clinton on ‘deservingness’, and are then presented with her
biography months later as treatment before taking a GRE test, demonstrating that role
model effects depend on initial ratings.
Another, novel study used picture stimuli while asking participants to deliver a speech
in which they took position against an increase in tuition fees [59]. Speeches were de-
livered in a Virtual Reality environment depicting an audience seated in a room either
without a framed picture on the wall, or one featuring Bill Clinton, Hillary Clinton, or
Angela Merkel. Looking at both objective measures of speech quality in terms of length
and sophistication, and a subjective measure of performance, there were notable gender
gaps both in the control and the Bill Clinton groups, but none under either role models.
Women in the Merkel condition did, however, markedly outperform other women in the
Hillary Clinton condition.
Entirely outside of the stereotype threat framework, one study re-examines individual
women politicians: Hillary Clinton, Nancy Pelosi, and Sarah Palin, by looking at the
effect of their media presence longitudinally on young women’s ‘anticipated political
involvement’ including intention to campaign or donate, and finds only subgroup effects
among Democratic identifiers [60]. Looking at the three investigations together, they may
serve as reinforcement of the Obama effect in that individual politicians enter the public
arena with a number of relevant attributes including personal stories, partisanship, and
contextual characteristics, conditioning or moderating role model effects.
More optimistic results come from studies using non-American political role models.
A very high external validity natural experiment in India reports that one of its state’s
gender quota policies, whereby a randomised third of all village councillor positions
were contestable by women only, increased young girls’ career ambition and efficacy
in numerous fields including leadership roles [61]. Another paper uses the same policy
in West Bengal and Rajasthan to show important effects on women’s political participa-
tion, in terms of contacting the councils as well as showing that policy preferences shifted
in complex ways, but generally away from supporting men’s work to welfare provision
in rural areas [62]. However, randomised quota policies failed to achieve these ends in
other reports. In Leshoto in Southern Africa, quotas turned women away from partic-
ipation, which the authors explain by referring to public opposition to quotas [63]. A
study looking at Latin American quota effects finds small increase in women’s political
interest but not on other indicators of political engagement, although fails to control for
individual-level covariates such as age or education [64].
Parallel studies, especially in education and business psychology, report role model
effects derived from female instructors or supervisors without relying on the stereotype
threat literature explicitly. One such stream of research uses Social Learning as theo-
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retical background, putting emphasis on imitation of behaviours both of mentors and of
role models [65],[66] though some appeal to common sense notions of role models chal-
lenging stereotypes [67]. Perhaps worth noting from this field, an observational study on
students’ module taking behaviour that finds negative role model effects in some subjects,
including political science and natural science, confirmed positive role model effects on
mathematics and statistics subjects [68].
It is thus possible to detect, or to fail to detect, role model effects with or without us-
ing the original stereotype threat framework. While many studies referred to role models
alleviating threat, others used only a general notion of stereotypes, or used different theo-
retical background not mentioning psychological responses to stereotypes. Negative role
model effects were explained by moderators such as leader evaluation (‘deservingness’),
social distance, or partisanship. Some theoretical treatment outside of the scope of this
review implicated harmful or self-deflating social comparisons as possible mechanisms
behind negative effects [69],[70]. Since my argument is about mediation using stereo-
type threat, I will now seek ways to obtain a better understanding of such self-evaluative
threats beyond merely hypothesizing their presence, with the ultimate aim to consider
measurement to infer stereotype threat, in the next chapter. In order to achieve this, the
next paragraphs turn to describing previous research that used affect to derive stereotype
threat and role model effects.
2.1.3 Affective components of stereotype threat
While stereotype threat is used as a possible framework to explain women’s political
(dis)engagement under different representation setups, ranging from men only politics
to women’s token, critical mass, and parity presence, stereotype threat theory itself does
not readily translate into a tangible, measurable mediating mechanism that may be ev-
idenced by survey or physiology data, or other behaviour. The basic paradigm merely
infers stereotype threat, by observing differences in performance, subject to the saliency
of stereotypes. A number of studies, however, make advances in pinpointing elements of
stereotype threat that are used to develop testable hypotheses regarding mediation.
Anxiety has been central to theorising about stereotype threat. Self-reported state anx-
iety (feeling worried, nervous, indecisive at the moment) is pointed at as a key ‘mediator’
of stereotype threat effects themselves in an early study on women’s math performance
[37], the central idea being that threat in the environment translates into greater anxiety,
which decreases test performance. Follow-up studies replicate this mechanism under gen-
dered, racial, and age-based stereotype threats [71],[39] but a number of parallel attempts
fail to detect self-assessed anxiety mediation in ‘old’ [72] and ‘new’ [73] contexts.
Further experimental investigation looks beyond self-reported anxiety. A novel study
using stereotypes about sexual orientation and suitability for childcare finds that while
its survey measures capture no anxiety effects, external judges monitoring nonverbal be-
haviour do find anxiety differences between those in the threat and those in the control
conditions, in turn explaining effects on childcare performance [74]. A cognitive measure
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investigated under exposure to gender stereotypes is vigilance, a state of alertness, with a
study finding that those who viewed videos of gender unbalanced panel discussions with
only a token presence of female panelists recalled a greater number of details about their
surroundings and details from the videos as well [45], a phenomenon with explicit links
to anxiety, e.g. [75], and with ‘political concern’ being also linked to anxiety in political
behaviour [76].
A study on racial stereotypes finds short term (up to 20 minutes) arterial blood pres-
sure differences between stereotyped and nonstereotyped groups, linking these move-
ments to mathematics test performance [77]. Though still indirectly, these results are
suggestive of persistent anxiety effects: short term spikes in blood pressure have already
been pointed at as likely markers of anxiety [78]. Similar dynamics are later reproduced
on a cognitive ability test but using heart rate variability [79], showing activation in stereo-
type threat conditions. Another study finds women subjected to stereotypes have elevated
cortisol levels [80], treated as biomarker of stress, which in turn may be indexed by anxi-
ety, as the authors note. It is thus possible that though in some contexts, anxiety is salient
and accessible for participants to report in a survey, in others it may not be.
An important difference between the above measures and self-report, other than acces-
sibility, is timing. The above studies detect anxiety effects during task completion, while
survey items are typically asked in isolation. While a seemingly methodological consid-
eration, timing may have substantive implications on the kind of anxiety researchers are
capturing. A relevant stream of literature distinguishes diffuse state anxiety approaches
to measurement from more situation-specific anxieties [81], the agenda including the de-
velopment of inventories developed specifically for testing anxiety [82] that proves better
at predicting performance on standardised tests, or other performance anxieties such as
‘sport anxiety’ [83] proving to be better at predicting sport performance.
It is thus possible that mixed evidence of anxiety under stereotype threat is partially
due to some studies trying to capture more diffuse state anxiety while others capture sit-
uation specific anxiety. A very recent study makes this differentiation explicit within
the stereotype threat framework as well [84]. In the framework proposed for my analy-
sis, the two are treated as different approaches to arrive at a singular underlying concept,
namely anxiety, and ask first if they describe individual experiences under varying numer-
ical representation setups, and second if dynamics in anxiety experiences explain political
engagement.
[H1.1] As the proportion of role models in political office increases, women experience fewer
self-evaluative threats in the political domain, evidenced by decreasing anxiety.
[H1.2] In the absence of self-evaluative threats in the political domain, decreasing anxiety im-
proves psychological engagement with politics.
Anxiety’s prominent place in the literature may be due to its extensively researched
link with testing. Outside of the anxiety canon, however, one study seeks to explore po-
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tential diversity of negative emotions relevant for stereotyping [85] based on first-person
accounts (a ‘thought listing’ exercise) of 60 female psychology students taking a difficult
mathematics test, finding that (a) anxiety and uncertainty about self-efficacy in math pre-
vail and that (b) at least hatred and extreme aversion of math may be ruled out as typical
emotion under stereotyping.
Those extremities are, however, observed with a time lag in recent study on ‘stereo-
type spillover’ [86]. Here the authors investigate what happens after putting someone
through gendered stereotype threat, and find that while women provided with adaptive
coping strategies showed no discernible character in a subsequent cooperative game, those
short on adaptive coping strategies showed heightened aggression as typical gaming strat-
egy.
Similarly, further research implicates anger when it comes to stereotypes but directed
at the outgroup: the source of the stereotype (or the source of threat). Importantly, po-
litical psychology literature shows that anger drives protest intention as a function of
identification with the ingroup, which in turn may be increased or decreased by altering
threat perception [87]. An influential study on party identification shows that a limited
number of identifiers continues to rely on programmatic considerations to support cam-
paign involvement, but there is a considerable element of ‘expressive partisanship’ of
which action-oriented emotions, such as anger, are the best predictors [88].
Thus while the majority of studies hypothesise anxiety and disengagement under
stereotype threat, alleviated by relying on role models, there may be greater individual
heterogeneity in emotional reactions where anger is a reaction to stereotype threat which
directly motivates more political engagement. In this case, the emphasis is not so much
on the traditional dichotomy of anxiety and anger as discrete emotions, but on opposing
ends of a more continuous affective dimension that differentiates how people cope with
a negatively-valenced situation [89], namely an action-oriented option and an avoidance-
oriented option. A similar idea is pursued by research in neuroscience looking at approach
and withdrawal processes, often explicit about affect [90].
While not forming hypotheses about why some people adopt one coping strategy over
another, I do consider if such coping strategies exist and whether they make a difference
in terms of political engagement: do those showing anger over stereotypes in the political
domain engage with (confront) politics? Do either action-oriented emotions, such as
anger, or emotions of avoidance, such as helplessness or sadness, have causal primacy in
this mechanism?
[H2] Emotions of sadness and helplessness motivate a move away from the source of threat
and disengagement from politics.
[H3] Action-oriented emotion such as anger motivates approach of the source of threat and
increase political engagement.
20
This concludes my consideration of stereotype threat and affective mechanisms as
mediators of stereotype threat, and female politicians’ role model effects on women cit-
izens’ political engagement. I will restate my hypotheses more formally, with a clear
map of measurement strategy at the end of Chapter 3. My studies of mediation investi-
gating support for these hypotheses are all conducted in Chapter 5. In the remainder of
this chapter, I move on to develop an instrumental link between women as descriptive
representatives and women as constituents.
2.2 Policy competence
Despite its decreasing prominence in recent electoral research, evidence is robust, if
context-dependent, regarding instrumental or policy-based linkages between parties and
supporters. In mature democracies, still large segments of voters support especially well-
established parties based on their policy platforms [91], the news media successfully fa-
cilitates issue voting for those attentive [92], and relatively new experimental evidence at
least partially restores faith in the stability of citizens’ issue positions [93].
In these studies, instrumental links are hypothesised when looking at party support as
a dependent variable, or voting more specifically. Empirical models of voter turnout on
the individual level have long been considering ways perceived benefits may outweigh the
costs associated with voting, the instrumental option being policy return [94]. At least in
the political science mainstream, however, studies have not engaged with the possibility
of an instrumental or policy-based aspect of psychological engagement with politics, such
as political interest, trust, or political efficacy—with the notable exception of scholarship
on ‘issue publics’ [95] who seek political information selectively based on unique policy
concern [96].
There is more about instrumentalism in the symbolic representation literature. Sem-
inal study on Black empowerment extends the instrumental argument from participation
to trust in government, political efficacy, and political awareness, all derived from cues
Black citizens take from Black policy makers [22]. These expectations are more de-
tailed in theoretical work on women’s representation. Though both normative and empir-
ical work finds limited evidence that ‘women act for women’ in American government,
the instrumental hypothesis is that women policy makers open up communicative chan-
nels where citizens’ policy preferences are finally articulated replacing ‘mistrust’, and
that women policy makers may contribute to the crystallisation of policy preferences (of
women) that were thus far not politicised by political elites (men) [30].
Direct support for this hypothesis comes from recent work on newly elected women
village councillors in India receiving and tackling new policy complaints supporting
women’s life and work in rural locations rather than men’s work and commute to ur-
ban areas [62]. Against this participatory aspect, there is little investigation into effects
on psychological engagement with politics, except an American survey study finding that
role models may not have impacted women’s perceptions about government responsive-
ness [18].
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In the next sections, I elaborate on two ways instrumentalism, that is, a consideration
of policy output, may impact women’s political engagement while remaining applicable
to various aspects of psychological engagement with politics as well, such as political in-
terest, trust and external efficacy, and self-efficacy. While termed instrumental for being
policy-relevant considerations, they do not necessarily contrast with ‘implicit’ mecha-
nisms listed in the previous sections in terms of how readily and consciously accessible
they are to voters. First, I develop a hypothesis that politics with role models may signal a
mixture of competencies that lead to better policy output. Competence judgements about
political figures are often formed spontaneously [97] but citizens, especially historically
excluded segments, may be explicitly concerned about inclusivity, which goes beyond
spontaneous judgements. Within this broad expectation about policy output, I also con-
sider if expectations differ across issue areas where stereotypes about competency either
advantage or disadvantage women. Second, I look at the specific idea from the represen-
tation literature that role models are expected to pursue policy that is women-friendly, to
be able to form a hypothesis that an expected women-friendly output motivates greater
political engagement.
2.2.1 Policy output, competencies, and stereotypes
There is a wealth of specialist literature on whether and when stereotypes are triggered,
and ‘applied’ when voting for, a female candidate. Voters associate feminine trait stereo-
types such as compassion or warmth with female candidates to limited degree only [98]
and with limited electoral consequences [99],[100] that often prove difficult to disentan-
gle from cross-cutting effects of partisan stereotypes [101],[102]. More consistent are
findings on feminine issue stereotypes, where women are seen more competent managing
‘compassion’ issues such as health care, education, or social security, as opposed to fi-
nance, military, foreign policy [103],[104],[105],[106], suggesting that the electorate may
use gender cues when evaluating performance in office as well.
Findings about issue stereotypes are suggestive that (a) when moving away from the
individual candidate to politics as a group of actors, such as the governing Cabinet or
the national legislature, gender mix may signal a mixture of policy competencies and
priorities; and that (b) looking at specialised office such as healthcare, citizens may use
gender to infer on the quality of the policy output. The next paragraphs elaborate on
these ideas and specify if policy expectations could be unique to women and men in the
electorate.
While studies often assess attitudes about women in politics in a ‘battle of sexes’
manner on a single domain of competency or a single office (e.g. ‘Are men or women
better suited as political leaders?’, ‘Would a female president anger you?’), few studies
look at group-level assessments as a function of gender balance. Using 2006 American
National Election Studies data, paper reports that the majority of both men and women
would prefer a gender balance of around 50-50% in elective office4 [107].
There are more measurement approaches to group- or organisation-level diversity in
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recent business literature. Relevant studies on corporate board diversity find that external
stakeholder perception of ‘instrumental legitimacy’ in terms of skills and experience in-
creases with improved gender balance [108], that in addition to hard measures of financial
performance [109], public reputation increases with gender balance [110]. Interestingly,
one study breaks with the linearity assumption and finds that, across 122 stock-market
companies in Vietnam, the proportion of female board members beyond 20% has de-
creasing marginal returns in terms of financial performance [111].
These findings on the organisational level also resonate with important philosoph-
ical position on political system legitimacy, namely its feminist critique. Iris Marion
Young emphasises inclusion in meaningful political deliberation over gender- or race-
blind democratic procedures as source of legitimacy [112]. More explicit about public
perceptions about legitimacy, an experiment finds that increased descriptive representa-
tion increased African Americans’ broad support of federal Judiciary in the US but not
Whites’ [113].
The empirical findings thus underscore that gender diversity in organisations and in-
stitutions contribute to a favourable public assessment broadly, as a holistic judgement
of performance or output. Using gender as an information shortcut about policy compe-
tency, similarly broad judgements about policy output pursued by governments are now
expected to improve with an increasing proportion of female politicians in them.
[H4.1] As the proportion of women politicians in political office increases, citizens (women)
expect better policy output.
When looking at men and women’s broad expectations about policy output, I do not
explicitly consider gender differences. Looking back at the literature on women’s (de-
scriptive) representation, however, women’s historic exclusion from political office has
led many to speculate that women, more than men, are sensitive to gender balance in
politics. One observation is that in the ‘political status quo, [...] men are not [seen as]
particularly successful in solving policy problems’, which is linked causally to women’s
political alienation and apathy [16, p.44]. Being the dominant group, men’s policy ex-
pectations may be entirely insensitive to gender balance, not having used gender as a
competency cue before; or that men are sensitive to gender balance but evaluate policy
more poorly, afraid of losing a dominant position.
Turning to expectations about policy in specialised office, gender-issue stereotypes
may play an important role in public evaluations. It is possible that public evaluation
entirely follows stereotypes, and values a greater presence of women in policy areas where
women are seen competent such as health care and education. Since men and women
often use similar issue stereotypes when looking at male and female politicians [114], it
is likely that the hypothesis applies to both voters of both genders.
[H4.1.1] In policy domains where women are seen as stereotypically competent, role models
are expected to contribute to better policy output.
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The issue stereotype literature offers little to suggest that women in counter-stereotypic
policy areas would be seen to contribute equally. Interestingly, however, an additional
finding of the 2006 ANES survey study, mentioned above, is that those preferring women’s
presence in politics at 50% or above do give counter-stereotypic answers on some issue
competency measures, namely they would prefer women managing crime [107].
Therefore, I am keeping the possibility open that role models may be expected to do
well in counter-stereotypic domains as well, given earlier arguments about women’s sen-
sitivity to historic exclusion [16],[30] which may be most striking in policy areas where
stereotypes do not advantage women. Thus while exploratory, my working hypothesis is
that,
[H4.1.2] In policy domains where women are not seen as stereotypically competent, role
models are expected to contribute to better policy output.
Closing the causal chain of mediation for the overarching hypothesis about policy
expectations, as well as the sub-hypotheses about office type in terms of issue stereo-
types, the final expectation is that better policy output links back to political engagement
instrumentally.
[H4.2] Better policy output motivates greater political engagement.
2.2.2 Delivering a ‘woman friendly’ policy
Moving beyond impressions and stereotypes based on gender, I now turn to more sub-
stantive expectations about women’s tenure in office drawing more directly on the rep-
resentation scholarship, namely, on work engaging with the idea that women represent
women’s interest and issues by implementing ‘women friendly’ policies. While my hy-
pothesis is primarily about the demand side namely public expectations about substantive
representation, I will first briefly review approaches to what might constitute a woman
friendly policy.
A catalogue of women’s issues has proved to be difficult to compile. Many attempts
take the gendered distribution of labour as point of departure, which in Western Euro-
pean countries revolved around demands in the private sphere such as fairer distribution
of domestic work and caretaking responsibilities, and improving health of mothers [115].
Analysing men and women’s preferences based on the content of their claims (‘com-
plaints’) submitted to village councils, a study in India finds that while women rather than
men raised concerns about welfare programmes, drinking water, and child care, concern
about public works issues such a road improvement is rather a function of who commutes
or works on those roads and thus in one state it was predominantly a ‘women’s issue’ but
in another it was a ‘men’s issue’ [62].
Feminist approaches to women’s issues emphasise equality demands and thus equal
pay, reproductive rights, an end of violence against women and human trafficking [116].
Studies may frame this more broadly in terms of improving ‘status’ of women across a
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variety of domains such as ‘social, economic, and political’ [117]. Contemporary polit-
ical agendas such as the UK Women’s Equality Party’s broaden the meaning of who the
constituents might be by emphasising interests of ‘BAME women, disabled women, mi-
grant women, working class women, and LGBT+ women’ [118, p.9]. Another extension
of the concept comes from studies recognising that a number of other actors not from tra-
ditionally left-wing politics take up women’s interests. A comparative case study shows
that a number of right wing actors including the extremes form arguments explicitly based
on women’s rights and freedoms such as in the burqa debate in Belgium [119].
While these insights show that women’s issues depend heavily on context and politi-
cisation, citizens’ expectations, if not carefully delineated, about the representation of
women’s interest has been linked to women’s presence in politics. Study using British
Election Study data finds that while both women and men in older birth cohorts think
that women are better suited to represent women’s interest, the gender gap opens up in
younger birth cohorts where women are more likely to think they need women MPs to be
represented [120]. Another UK study reports, first, that women’s highest priority in rep-
resentation is that MP’s represent their ‘viewpoints’, and second, that 59% more women
think that there should be more women Members of Parliament than those who think
there should be fewer, which is at least theoretically consistent with the idea that women
expect women MPs to represent their viewpoints better [121].
As a specific instrumental linkage especially between women in the electorate and
women policy makers might be citizens’ specific expectations women-friendly output.
Keeping the hypothesis broad as to accommodate a wide range of interests and priorities,
[H5.1] As the proportion of role models in political office increases, women expect women-
friendly policy output.
while the link back to various aspects to political engagement including psychological
engagement with politics is
[H5.2] Women-friendly output motivates greater political engagement.
2.3 Conclusions
A fundamental dynamic in political representation is that constituents retrieve some sym-
bolic benefits from their representatives beyond a substantive representation of interests
[122], which is often described in terms of community empowerment including increas-
ing participation, or some predominantly psychological gains associated with it on the
individual level. For ethnic minorities, historically oppressed or excluded groups, rela-
tively recent democratic theory has started to outline how descriptive representation (that
is, appointing representatives based on likeness, or group membership), if defined care-
fully, could serve the purposes of such empowerment [123, pp. 34–36].
This chapter started by considering ‘symbolic’ or non-policy benefits of descriptive
representation in terms of political engagement, and found that a greater presence of
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women as role models in political offices may positively impact not only participation
but women’s political interest, political knowledge, confidence and self-efficacy, external
efficacy, and trust. While evidence is mixed behind each of these indicators especially due
to diverging methodologies and operationalisation of descriptive representation, I found
the idea of mediation to be the most striking conceptual gap: the absence of systematic
investigation into why role models work, what might be a convincing individual-level
psychological mechanism linking descriptive representatives to their constituents.
Drawing on a diverse set of literature that does not directly study political behaviour,
I developed ideas about mediation around two types of individual-level responses to
women’s presence in politics, namely those more implicit in the sense that they do not
require that citizens judge representatives consciously on some dimension of competency
or policy output, and those more instrumental that do require that expectations are formed
about policy output.
Firstly, I introduced literature on stereotype threat mainly to arrive at affect, and pre-
dominantly anxiety, as potential mediator of political (dis)engagement under political
(mis)representation. It developed a set of hypotheses in which no or minimal levels of
representation are high threat and high anxiety contexts harming self-efficacy assessments
in politics and result in political disengagement. By contrast, equipped with an increasing
presence of role models, politics does not induce self-evaluative threats, and the result is
greater political engagement.
Secondly, I focused on literature about perceptions as well as stereotypes about women’s
competence in policy, to suggest that citizens may expect different policy outcomes from
groups where women contribute in at least two important ways: first it may be assessed
holistically ‘better’, showing diversity of expertise and viewpoints, and second, it may be
expected to deliver policy that is ‘woman friendly’.
These two sets of hypotheses are not meant to exhaust individual-level responses to
descriptive representation, nor are they meant to be exhaustive accounts of mediating
mechanisms that may include broader societal mechanisms such as the role of mass me-
dia in picking up on women’s messages, or characteristics of female politicians including
personality traits and experience. Rather, my aim is to demonstrate on a sample of hy-
potheses how specialist literature in other domains might be helpful in developing testable
hypotheses thus far overlooked in the representation literature, often making only implicit
statements, if any, about mediation, hypothesising rather than explaining why symbolic
benefits of descriptive representation emerge.
My work proceeds as follows. After discussing an empirical strategy in the next chap-
ter, my first empirical chapter ‘Measuring the role model effect’ on page 43 seeks to detect
evidence that women’s visibility impacts a range of psychological engagement indicators
across observational and experimental approaches in a ‘black box’ framework that does
not ask test mediation explicitly. My second empirical chapter, ‘Understanding the role
model effect: Stereotype threat and affect as mediating mechanisms’ is composed of
three studies testing the implicit link introduced above. My third empirical chapter, ‘Un-
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derstanding the role model effect: Expectations about policy competency as mediating
mechanism’ on page 124, is composed of two studies on instrumental linkage between
gender balance in political groups and political engagement.
While each chapter is intended to be self-contained by drawing conclusions about
the specific hypotheses tested in them, my last chapter talks directly to the dichotomy of
implicit mechanisms and instrumentalism in the context of descriptive representation, as
sketched briefly at the beginning of this chapter.
Notes
1In Reingold and Harrell’s only co-partisan Role model effects were detected.
2My categorisation partially intersects with further dualism of categories such as expressive versus
instrumental motivations behind political participation, or automatic versus controlled processes in social
psychology. While it is possible to situate my proposals along these dimensions as well, it is not necessary:
I can use these categories heuristically to respond to early proposals in the representation literature. Nor is
it very straightforward: both these dualisms were coined having different dependent variables in mind. For
instance, is is not useful to consider a linkage between women as politicians and women in the electorate
as ‘expressive’: as noted later and especially in Chapter 6, explicit gender identification is not needed
to account for role model effects. Likewise, conscious reflection on affective linkage such as anxiety is
possible, as a number of studies in the stereotype threat literature used self-report or taught listing exercises
to get at the role of affect (reviewed in detail later).
3The term may be simultaneously used to describe the president’s role in decreasing an activation of
racial stereotypes about Black’s achievements in out-group members and combating prejudice. In this
sense, experimental evidence is more conclusive of the Obama effect [124].
4Although open measures such as this are usual suspects for social desirability effects and misreporting,
here the average response was 60% men in ideal government, with a left-skewed distribution, indicating
minimal social desirability effects. Above in text, I reported the rounded-modal value.
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2.4 List of hypotheses
The role model hypothesis
[H RM] Role models in political office increase women’s political engagement.
[H LRM] Linear role model effects. As the proportion of role models in political office incre-
ses, women’s political engagement increases as well.
[H DRM] Discrete role model effects. Discrete proportions of role models such as a token
or a critical mass of women in politics increase women’s political engagment as citizens.
Implicit linkage
[H1] Role models in political office increase women’s political engagement because they alleviate
anxiety stemming from stereotypes about women’s competency in politics.
[H1.1] As the proportion of role models in political office increases, women experience fewer self-
evaluative threats in the political domain, evidenced by decreasing anxiety.
[H1.2] In the absence of self-evaluative threats in the political domain, decreasing anxiety im-
proves psychological engagement with politics.
Additional hypotheses on affect
[H2] Emotions of sadness and helplessness motivate a move away from the source of threat and dis-
engagement from politics.
[H3] Action-oriented emotion such as anger motivates approach of the source of threat and increase
political engagement.
Instrumental linkage
[H4] Role models in political office increase women’s political engagement because they are expected
to contribute to better policy output.
[H4.1] As the proportion of role models in political office increases, women expect better policy
output.
[H4.1.1] In political office where women are seen as stereotypically competent, role models
are expected to contribute to better policy output.
[H4.1.2] In political office where women are not seen as stereotypically competent, role models
are expected to contribute to better policy output.
[H4.2] Better policy output motivates greater political engagement.
[H5] Role models in political office increase women’s political engagement because they are expected
to contribute to women-friendly policy output
[H5.1] As the proportion of role models in political office increases, women expect women-friendly
policy output.
[H5.2] Women-friendly output motivates greater political engagement.
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Chapter 3
Methodology
My thesis is motivated by questions about women’s political engagement: In what ways
does the presence of female politicians matter for addressing gender gaps in political
engagement, especially psychological engagement with politics? What are the key mech-
anisms explaining why ‘role models’ are powerful on the individual level? The previous
chapters theorised the role model hypothesis linking the numerical presence of women in
visible political office causally to political engagement broadly, and developed new (or
better specified) hypotheses about the underlying mechanisms or mediation.
There are a number of measurement options in terms of dependent, independent or
treatment, and mediating variables. Of the following three empirical chapters, the first
alone is an attempt to combine several approaches to document evidence of treatment and
effect. The second and third seek ways to tease out mediation. The current chapter serves
as an overview of the analytical framework and as a reference chapter of all data sources
and procedures.
3.1 Analytical framework
In Chapter 2, before turning to key questions about mediation, I briefly noted limitations
of the existing empirical project behind the role model effect. First, evidence is detected
on one or two dependent variables in isolation, and not reliably on a larger set of relevant
measures thus making reliability difficult to assess. For example, studies seeking to find
effects on political discussion, or political quiz performance, report no further dependent
measures of psychological engagement with politics. Second, evidence is mixed and often
contradictory, without much speculation as to why role model effects implicate a partic-
ular measure of political engagement over another. Cross-country replication of results
often fail as well. Third, within-subject designs such as panel studies or field experiments
to improve causal inference continue to be rare. Experimental paradigms of social psy-
chology using exposure to role models, where the focus is often on abstract measures of
performance, rarely measure effects on political engagement, and offer results that are
only indirectly relevant to the study of political representation. Fourth, a predominantly
American scholarship on candidate gender effects tends to study single member districts
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contested by few candidates only, rarely addresses questions about gender diversity in
larger groups which may show more variation in numerical proportions.
My first empirical chapter, Chapter 4, aims to address some of these issues by com-
bining observational and experimental evidence in a systematic way on key indicators of
women’s political engagement as well as more novel ways of measurement. Firstly, in a
lab experiment, I collect micro-level evidence of political engagement, namely attentional
engagement, with stimuli depicting political groups and estimate attentional bias to those
that have an improved gender balance. Secondly, I designed an online experiment, and
fielded twice to collect my own replication data, to estimate psychological engagement
with politics evidenced by more typical survey questions, as a function of exposure to
similar picture treatment in which the proportion of women varies. Thirdly, I identified
the same numerical proportions among all candidates running in the 2010 and 2015 UK
parliamentary constituencies (main data source being the Houses of Parliament’s Digital
Service [125], but see Chapter 4 Section 4.2 for procedure), and linked this information to
the British Election Study panels (BES, [126],[127],[128], see Chapter 4 Section 4.2 for
particulars) in both years to investigate campaign effects on men’s and women’s psycho-
logical engagement with politics using comparable survey questions. A visual overview
of this empirical strategy in Chapter 4 is in Figure 4.1 on page 46.
My manipulated images mirror gender diversity at theoretically relevant numerical
proportions, those that might be observable in legislatures or government cabinets. Pre-
vious empirical studies on the role model effect largely neglect this aspect, treating nu-
merical balance as a continuous predictor variable [26],[18], where a potential problem
is that the effect size would capture the impact of an ‘average rate’ of increase. While
such approaches offer important findings, they are insenitive to any non-linearity, such as
if marginal effects flatten out as women become less of a novelty. For example, looking
at US House races, a recent study finds that only ‘mixed-gender’ (a woman challeng-
ing a man) races increased political interest, but not ‘women only’ races [129]. In my
framework, I will concentrate on five discrete categories. The 0% or ‘men only’ context
(often serving as baseline category) mimics the proverbial ‘men’s game’ politics [130],
the status quo especially in early American investigations of descriptive representation
where the majority of House races saw no women [4]. Today, UK races continue to fea-
ture around 20% or a token woman (see descriptive findings in Chapter 4, especially in
Table 4.8). While a striking minority presence, female legislators in a token position have
shown to be exceptionally active advocates of ‘women-friendly’ policies with good suc-
cess rates in bill passage [117]. Women’s growing, ‘critical mass’ presence is perhaps the
one that is most researched in the descriptive representation literature [131], with mixed
empirical support behind hypotheses that certain proportions in numerical representation,
usually around 30–35%, are necessary and sufficient conditions of improving women’s
policy-level or substantive representation in legislatures [132]. My picture stimuli also
explores effects under 50% or a parity presence of men and women, the ideal target of
quota policy.
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I investigate two sets of hypotheses about mediation in two separate empirical chap-
ters. Both chapters use survey experiment data from the replication round mentioned
above, where mediation was investigated. Both follow a combination of approaches to
detect mediation: firstly by asking the right questions after delivery of the picture treat-
ment, and secondly by research design: by implementing specific experimental manip-
ulation on the mediators. In Chapter 5 Study, I look at self-reported anxiety across two
measures to test Hypothesis 1 that role models in political office increase women’s politi-
cal engagement because they alleviate anxiety stemming from stereotypes about women’s
competency in politics. A flowchart of this strategy is in Figure 5.2 on page 97. Similarly,
Chapter 6 Study 1 observes participants’ ratings of policy competency on the group level,
testing Hypothesis 4 that role models in political office increase women’s political en-
gagement because they are expected to contribute to a better policy output. By contrast,
Study 2 in Chapter 5, and Study 2 in Chapter 6, are crossover experiments within the
original framework: After delivery of picture treatment, they introduce further negative
manipulation on a sample of the treated, that is, those who viewed pictures featuring at
least a token presence of women and attempt to reverse role model effects: to re-induce
anxiety (see also Study 2 middle panel of Figure 5.1 on page 93), and to remove women’s
competency expectations. If role models exert impact through these variables, the ran-
domly selected sample receiving negative manipulation should ‘disengage’ from politics
at levels comparable to men only exposure. Chapter 5 also contains a third study, an
exploration of the role of affect beyond anxiety.
Further explanations are provided in the individual studies including more details
about the underlying concepts and what I suggest to infer from these sources. Below
I sketch the three types of data sources and give an overview of procedures.
3.2 Data
In Chapter 4, I triangulate three data types to tap role model effects: (1) a small N lab
experiment where attention is investigated with eye tracking devices; (2) a larger N online
survey experiment where psychological engagement with politics is investigated across
two data collection rounds; (3) and large N, observational samples from the British Elec-
tion Study to investigate campaign effects, that is, change in psychological engagement
with politics as a function of women’s campaign activity, depending on their numerical
presence. Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 use the second, ‘replication’ round data collection of
the survey experiment, analysing the embedded mini experiments excluded from Chapter
4. I therefore discuss these procedures below.
3.2.1 Lab experiment
Sampling
In the eye tracking experiment, I recruited female undergraduate students from various
colleges at the University of Exeter. Twenty minutes lab work earned a reward of £10 in
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Figure 3.1: The eye tracking device.
cash. The study was advertised by module conveners on email lists as well as on Face-
book groups. I aimed for a sample of respondents N=30, based on the following formula,
standard in test power-calculations. The dependent variables of gaze data including fixa-
tions and saccades (see later) are counted on a series of 20 pictures, the unit of analysis.
Fixation duration, a key continuous measure of gaze being held on a particular point, is
measured in milliseconds but is subject to the eye-tracker’s precision in terms of sampling
frequency. On a video recording obtained with 50Hz re-sampling rate, this is somewhat
above 20 ms [133]. I thus determined the smallest effect size that might be detected com-
fortably without too much concern about measurement error should be above that, 30
milliseconds. Taking µ1 = 300 milliseconds to be gaze duration on unengaging stimuli—
this would allow exactly 4 fixations across two pictures in a pair presented for 1,250
milliseconds in total5, see later—, gaze duration of µ2 = 330 milliseconds on engaging
stimuli, assuming large standard deviation under uneven attention σ1,2 = 100, with the
critical z scores of the conventional alpha (α = .1) and power (β = .8) levels, using the
formula,
N =
(σ21 +σ
2
2 ) · (z1−α/2 + z1−β )2
(µ2−µ1)2 (3.1)
I obtained the necessary sample size as N = 137 per group thus N = 274 across two
groups. Measured across 20 picture trials, this comes down to a subject-level N = 13.7.
Beyond this minimum effect of attentional bias between pictures of improved versus de-
creased gender balance, I aim to further detect following effects for which my calculations
are less strict due to the costing of the experiment: on the one hand, Chapter 4 aims to
look at the effect of the particular gender balance such as a token presence of women
or a critical mass of women I thus aim to isolate a few pictures where these proportions
are used. Chapter 5 Study 3 is a randomised affect study (see below), for which I need
2 treatment groups and 1 control group. Therefore, my target sample size is 30 students
which may accommodate 3 group effects given potential missing data on trials such as
due to unobserved pictures.
Main procedure
Wearing head-mounted eye-tracking devices, experimental subjects viewed pairs of pic-
tures appearing simultaneously on the screen, depicting political groups with varying
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men-to-women ratios. Following a brief (500 ms) fixation (+) in the middle of the screen,
subjects were presented with a picture featuring fewer women if any at all, the ‘Contrast
picture’, and another picture with an improved balance, the ‘Role model picture’. Pairs
appeared in randomised order, with 8 unique pairs appearing maximum 4 times. Each
participant was presented with 25 pairs, selected randomly from this pool with repetition,
the first 5 being practice trials to familiarise with the task, these are excluded from anal-
ysis. Each single exposure lasted for 1,250 ms, and was then replaced by a probe on the
screen (x). The probe replaced either the left or the right picture, in randomised order,
and participants were asked to respond to the appearance of the probe as quickly as they
can by pressing the key ‘E’ for a left probe, or ‘I’ for a right probe. I programmed the
task using the free trial version of Inquisit 5.0 and all other procedures of the experiment
(information, consent, the exit survey, and debriefing material) in html. The experiment
ran on my personal laptop computer to enable better mobility. Gaze data was stored on
the unit attached to the eye tracker, consent, response latency and survey data was stored
on the computer.
I selected the pictures with the following procedure. To improve external validity,
the aim was to select real-life and credible campaign pictures of political groups. To my
knowledge, no such tested pool of pictures exist for experimental purposes. To control for
exogenous effects on attention and response strategy, I first needed to make sure that the
figures are not well known politicians, that no party labels and connected identification
(flags, other logos) remain in the pictures. Knowing it would be difficult to control for
other features including ethnicity, age, dressing, I chose to induce more variation in these
features and aimed for a large pool of diverse figures.
Following the UK General Elections of 2015, I pooled together data on all running
candidates (see Section 3.2.3.) and selected those that achieved less than 5 percent of
the vote share in their respective constituencies, minimising the probability that they may
be recognised. Since my study sample currently resides in Exeter, Devon, I excluded
candidates running in all Devon constituencies. After this round of selection, I turned to
publicly available, tweeted images of these candidates during the GE2015 campaign—I
obtained twitter handle data from the Media in Context project [134]—, with the aim
of selecting those that have both gender represented in them, as well as some where
politicians are of varying ethnicity.6 On all images, participants are facing the camera
with facial characteristics indicating positive mood.
To compile the image pairs, I individually cropped women out of most pictures, so that
I could pair men only/mostly men groups with the same original picture but with an im-
proved gender balance in them. I changed some but not all of these image pairs on a grey
scale to control for attention bias possibly stemming from vibrant hair and dress colours.
The pictures are paired according to the following percentage presence of women: four
pairs featuring 0% (men only) Contrast picture and a near 20% or presence Role model
picture; another pair contrasting 0% with women’s 30% or critical mass presence in the
Role model picture, and another contrasting 0% with 50% or parity in the Role model
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Figure 3.2: Picture contrasts—lab experiment.
Each participant completed a series of 20 trials (2 examples below), presented in random order
for 1,250 milliseconds, one of each replaced by a probe in each trial. Original pool presented in
Figure 3.3
x +
x +
Screen 1: Fixation screen, 500 ms Screen 3: Probe screen, 500 ms
Screen 2: Stimuli, 1,250 ms
Trial #1/20 (example)
Trial #2/20 (example)Screen 1: Fixation screen, 500 ms Screen 3: Probe screen, 500 ms
Screen 2: Stimuli, 1,250 ms
picture. Two Contrast images had women in them: a token and a critical mass picture,
both paired with women majority pictures.
Figure 3.2 shows example picture pairs within the flow of the trials in the dot probe
task. The full picture pool from which the contrasting pairs are selected are shown in Fig-
ure 3.2. My pictures being previously untested in previous dot probe tasks, my exposure
time of 1,250 ms is exploratory. Simpler picture stimuli (such as one face per picture) are
typically presented for a shorter period of time but with more complex stimuli, researchers
could detect attentional bias typically at 1,000–1,250 ms presentation times [135],[136].
I reasoned that 1,250 ms would be enough minimal exposure time for basic exploration
and a few brief fixations, and that longer exposure would risk the possibility of conscious
processing.
My dot-probe task script itself logs response latency to probes, along with the infor-
mation if it replaced the Contrast or the Role model picture. The simple differential of
these average latencies constitutes the estimate of attentional bias. In Chapter 4, I will use
dot-probe measures parallel with the eye-tracking measures, treating them as alternative
approaches and looking for consistent patterns.
After completion of the task, participants carried out an additional task measuring
implicit associations regarding gender and leadership, filled out an exit survey, and got
debriefed. Completion of these additional tasks was not recorded by the eye trackers to
save on video size. None of the additional data is analysed in my thesis Chapters, being
out side the scope of my studies.
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Emotion induction
In Chapter 4, I analyse if attention is split evenly or unevenly across Role model pictures
and Contrast pictures. In Chapter 5 Study 3, I analyse these patterns conditioned upon
emotion, guided by hypotheses H2 and H3 (See Section 2.1.3. and Chapter appendix
2.5). Following a relatively unobtrusive method in emotion research [137],[138],[139], I
randomly assign emotions, namely, of approach (anger), and of avoidance (sadness), as
introduced in the previous chapter, to subjects by making one, rather than the other, emo-
tion salient before task completion. I am aiming at the induction of no relevant emotions
for the control group.
Firstly, they are presented with short paragraphs of text about women’s experience
with everyday sexism. These are user-generated comments from an online community
called the Everyday Sexism Project, www.everydaysexism.com. Using dictionary-based,
computer-aided text analysis with the LIWC software [140],[141], a method I present
more in detail especially in Chapter 5 Section 5.2.3, I present predominantly ‘angry’
comments in the anger group, and select those that have an explicit component of action
in it. For example,
“[...] The most tragic with [this] story isn’t harassment itself: it was that
none of them in the team seemed like they were going to tell him off, using
the ‘ignore and he’ll go away’-tactic. The only thing one of the senior players
said about it, was mentioning to one of his team mates they better keep an
eye of him. His team mate answered they were used to him behaving like
that. Well, I am not. And it is a must to fight their ignorance. No one else
will do this for me.” (highlight added)
In the sadness or helplessness group, I manipulate content to remove the action com-
ponent from the story, as well as include other segments within the same stories flagged
up by LIWC as ‘anxious’ or ‘negative affect’ but not ‘angry’.
“[...] The most tragic with [this] story isn’t harassment itself: it was that none
of us in the team seemed like we were going to tell him off, using the ‘ignore
and he’ll go away’-tactic. The only thing one of the senior players said about
it, was mentioning to one of his team mates they better keep an eye of him.
His team mate answered they were used to him behaving like that. I shudder
at the thought what that man is capable of when he’s drunk and there’s no
one of his friends around to keep him in check.” (highlight added)
By contrast, the control group reads user comments, selected from Amazon.co.uk
product reviews.
“Today is the fourth day of ownership of my pen, and I have to say I’m
starting to treat it like an old friend. I would happily recommend this pen to
anyone who is planning on writing on paper.”
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Secondly, once finished with the reading task, they are asked to carry out a short
writing task. In the emotion groups, they are asked to write ‘a sentence or two about
something—a personal story, or [participants’] reflection of what [they] read—that makes
[participant] angry about sexism/sad of being subjected to sexism, let that be [their] own
experience or some else’s who [they] have heard of’. The control group receives the
neutral task of writing a review of recently bought products. Participant’s answered are
analysed to check treatment compliance at the relevant sections in Chapter 5.
Data overview
Dependent measures are used to test the hypothesis that Role model pictures with an
improved gender balance are more engaging than Contrast pictures, and measured across:
(Models 1.0–1.2) response latency on the dot-probe task, (Models 2.0–2.2) fixation—gaze
held at fixation point—duration on pictures, (Models 3.0–3.2) fixation count on pictures,
(Models 4.0–4.2) duration of saccades—rapid movement between two fixation points—,
and (Models 5.0–5.2) count of saccades. I also situate these measures in the context of
attention research in Chapter 4.1.1.
The dot probe paradigm builds on a simple mechanism, namely that fast probe de-
tection, all else being equal, follows probes that appear in areas that were ‘attended’ by
the test subject, and slow detection follows probes that appear in ‘unattended’ areas [75].
Attentional bias is in turn defined as the systematic differential in response latency—
speed in probe detection, measured in milliseconds—for probes replacing more engaging
stimuli minus response latency for probes replacing less engaging visual stimuli.
More direct inference about attention may come from gaze data. While I am only able
to detect one dot-probe response after each trial, gaze might have a distribution across
Contrast pictures and Role model pictures within the same trial. In terms of fixation,
inference works as follows: increased duration of fixations, measured in milliseconds,
as well as a greater number of fixations within the same (type of) picture should indicate
greater engagement with these locations. In terms of saccades, my analysis is exploratory:
while saccades are involuntary eye movements, an increased frequency of saccades within
the same picture may signal that the eye re-focused multiple times to observe multiple
locations. There are no explicit hypotheses about saccadic duration.
Key independent measure is picture type, being either Contrast or the Role model
picture. To account for numerical balance, another independent variable will be the pro-
portion of women in the Role model picture, as outlined above. In the additional Study 3
in Chapter 5, another key grouping factor is emotion treatment group membership. Mea-
sures taken but not analysed within the scope of my thesis are performance on a ‘custom-
built’ gender–leadership Implicit Association Task, and the exit survey exploring political
engagement as well as political values that is identical to that carried out (and analysed)
in the large N online experiment.7
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3.2.2 Survey experiment
My survey experiment project comprises two data collection rounds: an original study
conducted in May 2015, and a replication study conducted in June 2017; all data col-
lected via crowd sourcing platforms ‘Prolific Academic’ and ‘Crowdflower’. These are
large pools of paid survey participants with the advantage that UK-based samples may be
targeted with a wide demographic distribution, emerging as viable alternatives for ‘old’
and overly professionalised survey worker platforms, and tested for data quality [142].
In the first round, I used both platforms with respondents pooled across samples. I cor-
rect for unobserved differences across sample respondents via hierarchical modelling, see
Section 4.2 Equation 4.5. In the replication round, I only used Prolific Academic which
proved to be simpler in terms of data management, and the only platform that allows me
to recruit an even split of men and women.
The two rounds of data collection are identical in procedures to the end of detecting
role model effects on political engagement (Chapter 4), the setup I called ‘blank causa-
tion’, I thus present results pooled across both rounds of data collection. Again, hierarchi-
cal modelling is useful to account for unobserved differences, this time across data col-
lection rounds, but I do present descriptive results separately as well. Mediation (Chapter
5 and Chapter 6) is tested exclusively in the replication round where relevant measures
and alternative procedures are introduced on top of the original procedure: this is called
a crossover design in natural science, where a sequence of treatments are introduced one
after another. Alternative procedures that might interact with the original procedure were
administered on isolated subsamples only, and those respondents are evidently excluded
from the blank causation study.
Sampling
Using the identical formula for sample size calculation, presented above in Equation 3.1,
I determined that on a z score-type, scaled-centred continuous dependent variable, where
the mean is µ1 = 0 and σ1 = 1, a substantively significant effect of one standard devia-
tion, µ2 = 1, α = .05,β = .8 would require 16 participants per group. I am increasing
this target having the following considerations in mind: Firstly, in my research design, as
explained below, I am aiming to detect effects not across two but 4 treatment groups (ex-
posure to men only, a token, critical mass, or parity presence of women in picture stimuli),
allowing, in fact often explicitly hypothesising, that treatment effects differ across the two
gender, thus this number goes up to 4 ·2 ·16 = 128. Secondly, there is no straightforward
rule as to how this might be modified in a hierarchical model using random effects, teas-
ing out variance components across crowd sourcing platforms and data collection rounds
after sample pooling. Random effects terms increase the posterior variance of estimates
(the effect sizes of interest), thus larger sample sizes are useful to confidently detect treat-
ment effects. Thirdly, while I treat many of my scalar dependent variables as continuous
measures for better comparability across data collection rounds and with the large N prob-
ability sample, that one standard deviation difference is fairly difficult to detect with few
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scale points.
I thus concluded that I needed sample sizes near 300 for both data collection rounds
when comparing effects of ‘blank’ causation. In the replication round, this number in-
creases to 750 to accommodate further manipulation used in the mediation studies, using
the following logic: if 3/4 of the sample receives picture stimuli featuring at least a token
woman politician (see next section), that is, 225 out of 300, I need that an equally sized
group receives negative manipulation on the anxiety mediator (Study 2 Chapter 5), and
that an equal number of participants receives negative manipulation on the policy output
mediator (Study 2 Chapter 6), in order to make the appropriate comparisons, totalling
300+225+225 = 750. ‘Treated’ subjects in the 300 pool serve as control group for the
randomised mediator groups. Figure 3.4 on page 40 gives an overview of these groups.
Participants received incentive in form of a pro-rata payment of the UK minimum
wage, £7.50, which is £1 for 8 minutes of survey work.
Main procedure
The main procedure applies to both rounds of data collection. Participants were informed
that that the survey is about political leadership evaluation. Randomly assigned into four
groups, an equal split of men and women viewed a series of five pictures featuring 2015
political campaign groups (information given explicitly in instruction). Gender balance
in picture stimuli varies across groups but not within, thus any given participant was only
exposed to men only politicians, or a group featuring a token woman or 20%, a critical
mass of women or 30%, or a parity of men and women or 50%. I introduced this picture
pool in detail above in ‘Main procedure’ Section 3.2.1, comprising tweeted images of
less known campaigning politicians with a popular vote share below 5%. A selection of
images is directly comparable across groups, that is, I individually cropped out women
in varying proportions and assigned them in different treatment groups. Some groups
needed to be filled out with new pictures as well, these do not have a counter part in other
groups. Figure 3.3 shows all pictures used in the treatment groups.
Survey participants did not merely observe these pictures: they rated them on policy
areas. The question, under each picture, reads ‘How well do you think this group would
manage [finance/healthcare] policy?’, and I analyse the response scales themselves in
Chapter 6 Study 1.
After completion of the viewing and rating task, participants in the first round of data
collection moved on to complete a survey of psychological engagement with politics. In
the replication round, survey participants first responded to questions about state emotion,
and completed a short reading and writing task. All participants viewing men only pic-
tures, as well as a third of all other treatment groups completed a neutral task of writing
about recently bought items. While serving as control groups in the randomised media-
tion studies, see ‘Alternative procedures’ below, I am also confident to use the answers
of these participants as replication data for the original study on role model effects. Both
rounds ended with debriefing, giving information about the aims of my thesis.
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Figure 3.3: Picture pool—survey experiment.
Each treatment group viewed a series of 5 pictures, rating them on ‘healthcare’ or
‘finance’ policy management (randomised).
0% ‘Men only’ 20% ‘Token’ 30% ‘Critical mass’ 50% ‘Parity’
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Figure 3.4: Overview of sample management
Pool of p.
0% Men only
30% Cmass
20% Token
50% Parity
Product review
Anxiety
Policy output
Treated Control
Alternative procedures for randomised mediation studies
Similarly to the emotion induction procedure in my lab experiment, participants com-
pleted a combination of tasks in the replication round of data collection. In Chapter 2 I
outlined two ways role model effects may make sense on the individual level namely that
they alleviate stereotype threat and predominantly anxiety, and that they signal compe-
tency in ‘women friendly’ policies. My aim in the randomised mediation studies, using
the principle of the crossover study design, is to explicitly remove or decrease these ex-
pectations, that is, to observe if role model effects diminish on psychological engagement
with politics, once mediators are removed. On anxiety as a mediator, this hypothesis is
shown in Table 5.7 on page 106. To my knowledge, there are no comparable approaches
in the field of political representation but they are extremely rare in any sub-field of social
science as well.
The anxiety group’s main task is to ‘take a moment to think about and briefly describe
3-5 things that do make [them] anxious’, knowing that they did not ‘need to take too
long on this one. Few words or a sentence would suffice’. Once done, they moved on to
another writing task in which they were asked to ‘describe in more detail the one situa-
tion that makes [them] the most anxious so that someone reading will become anxious’.
Simultaneously, the policy output group was asked to ‘take a moment to think about the
following two findings taken from a recent expert study about women in politics in the
UK’, which said
The notion of women’s feminizing of politics is controversial [...] implying
that as a group, they inherently share a set of policy preferences or ideol-
ogy. Women are not a monolithic entity with a collective set of interests
and beliefs. One could cite many examples of female political figures who
represent the antithesis of what many regard as “women’s interests” (e.g.,
Margaret Thatcher). Representation [...] is not a guarantee that women rep-
resentatives will act for women. [...] In finance debates, findings show that
the most significant [factors in] debate participation are relevant committee
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membership, Conservative party [membership], and seniority, holding other
explanatory variables at constant. Sex was not significant.
which was meant to motivate thinking about women textnot pursuing a woman-friendly
policy. Once done, these participants were asked ‘How would you describe the main find-
ing of the authors? Should you need to read the text again, navigate back below’. The
control group received emotion-neutral task of listing recently bought grocery items, then
describing one in detail.
Data overview
The survey experiment questionnaires are attached in the appendix. I aimed to have com-
parable items to observational studies. While in my thesis, I chose the British Election
Study as benchmark, it was not the only option considered, thus across the two data col-
lection waves, I experimented with different response scales to measure psychological
engagement with politics. To make them comparable between my two data collection
rounds, I need to transform these scales to arrive at z-score type, 0-centred and standard
deviation unit measures. I give more details on the original distributions separately as
well in Chapter 4. In Chapters 5 and 6, I am using data only from the second round
of surveying, thus the original scales may be kept and modelled more appropriately to
measurement level.
I review the key dependent variables, measuring psychological engagement with poli-
tics, at the relevant sections namely political interest in Section 4.2.1.; political knowledge
including test questions in Section 4.2.2., political efficacy in Section 4.2.3., and trust in
MPs in Section 4.2.4. Some of these are single questions (‘How interested would you say
you are in politics?’), and some of them assessed on multiple questions such as a political
knowledge quiz, confidence in political knowledge assessed after each test question, or
political efficacy. My analytical strategy is to use hierarchical modelling wherever pos-
sible, therefore as dependent variables, these multi-item answers, such as self-assessed
confidence after each test question, are nested within latent concepts, namely confidence
in political knowledge, as well as within individuals (See also Equation 4.6 in Chapter 4
Section 4.2).
Key independent variable is treatment group, exposure to 0% or men only picture
stimuli, to 20% or token stimuli, 30% or critical mass stimuli, or 50% or parity stimuli; as
well as its interaction with respondent gender. Model building is explained step by step,
using model equations to demonstrate which group means are derived, first in Chapter 4.
3.2.3 British Election Study (BES) Internet Panels
I am using the BES panels to estimate campaign effects on psychological engagement
with politics, rather than looking at them cross-sectionally, to see if exposure to women
politicians in campaign increased women’s political engagement, in a within-individual
design. Both the 2010 and 2015 election study panels have a pre-election wave (if mul-
tiple, I chose the closest to the campaign period), and a post-election wave. The 2015
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study internet panel has a number of campaign waves as well, these have diffuse timing
and I have no information about the distribution of women’s campaign activity during this
period, I thus discarded these waves.
Data overview
Dependent variables are scaled-centered changes in political interest, political efficacy,
and trust. In terms of political knowledge, on a small set of three questions about foreign
leaders, I am able to determine if participants learned about politics through the campaign.
I give more details about these variables in the relevant Sections 4.2.1 through 4.2.4 per
dependent variable.
I link the BES data, where respondents’ parliamentary constituency identifier is avail-
able, with Electoral Commission data on the candidates running in the respective con-
stituencies8. While candidate names are readily available for these election years, candi-
date gender had missing data for 2010. Wherever the same person, 2015 candidate gender
is imputed on these places. Further missing data was filled in using crowd-sourced infor-
mation site Democracy Hub, the ‘babynames’ data set relying on historical US Social Se-
curity Number Application data to predict probable gender given first name, and finally,
hand coding residuals. I thus obtain ‘treatment’ comparable to the survey experiment
varying from 0% men only constituencies but surpassing parity and including women
majority constituencies as well. The distribution of gender balance across parliamentary
constituencies is shown in Table 4.8 on page 59.
Similarly to the survey experiment, another key independent variable is respondent
gender. Finally, I need to include a minimal host of covariates, this being an observa-
tional study, on respondents’ characteristics influencing political engagement: age and
education, and on constituencies’ characteristics influencing both political engagement
but perhaps also the distribution of ‘treatment’: seat marginality. I discuss these measures
within the voting behaviour literature in Chapter 4 Section 4.2.
This chapter was meant to give an overview of key methods, procedures, and vari-
ables collected. I give more details on measurement, question wording, missing data
management, and analytical strategy in the individual studies.
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Chapter 4
Measuring role model effects:
Experimental and observational approaches
If women inhabit a less political world than men do—one that provides
less exposure to informal political chat and other politicizing cues and of-
fers fewer relevant political role models—then women are likely to infer that
politics, like football, is not for them. [17, p.8]
In this chapter, I report observational and experimental evidence be-
hind two types of role model effects: of tokenism, where attention and po-
litical interest-related variables are impacted by women’s striking minority
presence in politics; and of linear role model effects, where a gradually in-
creasing proportion of female politicians gradually increases women’s self-
efficacy and confidence in politics.
Existing empirical evidence behind the role model effect specifies if and when women
politicians engage fellow women in politics. Results converge on a positive impact on
political knowledge, as women are more likely to recall political information including
names of representatives if living in areas where high visibility offices such a Senate seat
or an executive office are held or contested by women [7],[23],[17],[24],[25],[143]. Sim-
ilarly, evidence is robust that women and especially young girls are likely to engage in
more political discussion with friends and family across a range of contexts with more
women in politics [19],[18],[25],[21]. Studies seeking to isolate effects on political in-
terest and political efficacy offer mixed evidence [24],[26],[129], a substantial stream of
American scholarship stressing partisan appeal engages people rather than weak gender
identification [28],[29].
Yet a lot of this evidence relies on observational data, making it difficult to disen-
tangle whether contexts where role model effects are detected are simply cultures where
women are more politically engaged. To strengthen claims of causality, a recent panel
study provides confirmatory analysis that novel women in campaign do stir more political
discussion among young women but does not measure political engagement beyond that
[21]. Similarly, an online experiment finds some effects on mobilisation (voting propen-
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sities) but fails to uncover an effect of women major party candidates—Republican or
Democratic—on campaign interest and political efficacy, casting doubt on the role model
hypothesis altogether [27]. By contrast, a very high external validity natural experiment
in India [61] reports that one of its states’ gender quota policies, whereby a randomised
third of all village councillor positions were contestable by women only, increased young
girls’ career ambition in numerous fields including leadership roles. While similar ex-
perimental evidence exists that (political) role models may close the achievement gap in
careers and academia such as evidence of an ‘Obama effect’ [56], or a ‘Hillary Clinton
effect’ [58],[59] (see especially Section 2.1.2), effects remain to be investigated in terms
of psychological engagement with politics.
In this chapter, I set out to contribute to this empirical puzzle by considering a wide
range of measurement options on the one hand, and by combining experimental and ob-
servational evidence, on the other. As point of departure, I study whether women’s atten-
tional engagement with a political group varies as a function of its gender composition. I
designed a lab experiment in which responses to a cognitive test as well as eye-tracking
measures were collected in response to visual stimuli depicting political groups, allowing
me to look at how the varying degrees of gender balance in groups attracted women par-
ticipants’ attention. Parallel with this study, I implemented an online survey experiment
where a larger sample of men and women, following exposure to the same pictures and
randomised across gender balance, filled out a standard survey of political engagement.
In this study, I explore if women’s political engagement increases following improve-
ments in gender balance, and whether patterns of political engagement follow patterns
of attentional engagement found in the lab experiment. Finally, I ‘recreate’ some of the
gender balance setups from the picture stimuli by identifying the proportion of women
candidates running in the 2010 and 2015 United Kingdom General Elections in each par-
liamentary constituency, and link this information to the British Election Study internet
panels to investigate if citizens’ reported levels of political engagement increased during
the two campaign periods, conditioned upon gender balance in their constituency’s race.
An overview of this empirical strategy is displayed in Table 4.1.
Situated within the larger empirical project of my thesis, the aim of this chapter is
mainly to gather evidence of cause and effect or ‘blind causation’, pooling together a
large number of relevant variables. This prepares the scope for the subsequent chap-
ters tackling more difficult questions of mediation: channels explaining why exactly a
greater presence of women in politics should engage fellow women, namely by allevi-
ating stereotype threat and implicating affective processes such as anxiety (Chapter 5),
and by influencing expectations about greater efficacy in implementing policy including
‘women friendly’ policies (Chapter 6). It is entirely possible, however, that mediation
will be open for testing for some variables where I find at least minimal experimental
evidence of an effect but not for others.
I discuss my results by key dependent variables, split by level of abstraction. Section
4.1. reviews psychophysiology evidence to infer attentional engagement, while Section
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4.2. reviews survey evidence to infer more explicitly on political engagement. Latter is
a host of measures including political interest in Section 4.2.1., political knowledge in
Section 4.2.2., political efficacy in Section 4.2.3., and trust in MPs in Section 4.2.4.
Across these sections, common is the analytical strategy in which some form of a
Bayesian hierarchical or mixed-effects model is fitted with a comparable host of predictor
variables to tap role model effects. While this may complicate estimation of treatment ef-
fects beyond comparing group averages, mixed-effects modelling is necessary to account
for the hierarchical structure of the data in which observations are not always indepen-
dent from each other. In the lab experiment models, hierarchical structure describes how
test responses and gaze data on picture stimuli are nested, foremost, within experimental
subjects, suggesting that two measures on gaze durations would be related to each other
taken on the same test subject. In the models using survey data, many dependent variables
such as test performance or political efficacy are latent meaning they are measured across
multiple ’response’ items or test questions but tapping the same underlying construct,
in this case those items are nested within latent constructs. Finally, in the BES models,
‘treatment’ varies on the parliamentary constituency, not the individual level, thus survey
respondents are nested within their respective constituencies as well. Bayesian hierarchi-
cal models are suitable to make these structures explicit while making the estimation of
fairly difficult models with interaction effects across levels possible—those models may
prove difficult or impossible to estimate in the classical statistical models supporting fre-
quentism. In the following sections, the term random effect is reserved to denote variables
that describe hierarchical structure (e.g. subject ID, test item, constituency)
In terms of comparable predictor variables, in each section ‘treatment’ is the propor-
tion of women that study participants are presented with, either on picture stimuli or in
real-life campaigns. To allow for varying or non-linear treatment effects, I do not treat this
as a continuous variable but look at theoretically founded, key discrete values of women’s
presence. The 0% or ‘men only’ context (often serving as baseline category) mimics the
proverbial ‘men’s game’ politics [130], the status quo especially in early American inves-
tigations of descriptive representation where the majority of House races saw no women
[4]. Today, UK races continue to feature around 20% or a token woman (see descriptive
findings, especially in Table 4.8). While striking minority presence, female legislators
in a token position have shown to be exceptionally active advocates of ‘women-friendly’
policies with good success rates in bill passage [117]. Women’s growing, ‘critical mass’
presence is perhaps the one that is most researched in the descriptive representation liter-
ature [131], with mixed empirical support behind hypotheses that certain proportions in
numerical representation, usually around 30–35%, are necessary and sufficient conditions
of improving women’s policy-level or substantive representation in legislatures [132]. Fi-
nally, I explore the effect of 50% or parity presence, the ideal target of quota policy, and
in the BES models, women’s majority presence, observed around 60%.
Participant gender is interacted with treatment in the survey experiment and BES
panel studies so that unique, women-specific role model effects can be isolated, men
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Table 4.1: Chapter 4—Empirical strategy
Study type Target concept Operationalisation
Lab experiment
Attentional engagement
Attentional bias 1.
(Dot-probe task response)
Attentional bias 2.
(Eye-tracking measures)
Survey experiment
Psychological engagement
with politics
Political interest
Political knowledge 1.
(Subjective self-report)
Political knowledge 2.
(Test performance)
Political knowledge 3.
(Test answer confidence)
Political efficacy
Trust in politicians
Observational study
(British Election Study, pre- and post-campaign waves, 2010 & 2015)
Psychological engagement
with politics
Change in election interest
Change in political knowledge 1.
(Subjective self-report)
Change in political knowledge 2.
(Test performance)
Change in political efficacy
Change in trust in politicians
being the framework of comparison. In the lab experiment using eye-trackers, due to its
higher cost and exploratory nature, I recruited women participants only thus this element
of comparison is entirely missing.
Finally, as appropriate given the data type at hand, a host of covariates is included. In
the observational study, these are age and education on the individual level, and winning
majority on the constituency level—a readily available indicator of party competition,
which may (though imperfectly) indicate if a seat is safe or marginal, often with con-
sequences on political interest [144]. Moreover, historically and especially before the
1997 General Elections, UK major parties have tended to place women in unfavourable
seats challenging incumbents in a safe seat [145]. Therefore, there is a possibility that
‘treatment’ in the BES is non-randomly distributed across constituencies but depend on
winning majority. In the survey experiment, age and education factors are assumed to
be randomly distributed across treatment groups (an issue to be investigated), but I do
include data collection platform and data collection year (an original round of data col-
lection in 2015 and a replication round in 2017, as random effects allowing me to pool
data gather across different ‘time or place’ but accounting for unobserved differences
(variances) at the same time. More explanation on random effects are provided below
near the model equations, but see also Chapter 3 Section 3.2.2. In the lab experiment
models featuring eye-tracking generated data, I control for ‘probe location’, as elabo-
rated in the next sections, to discount non-random measurement error: imprecise timing
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through data extraction whereby gaze data remains collected after the pictures disappear
from the computer screen for a very brief time.
The next sections review main results with minimal speculation about their wider sig-
nificance. I present statistical models expanded gradually, starting from uninformative or
‘null’ models, then including treatment and/or gender effects estimating the average treat-
ment effect (ATE), and lastly including covariates or any further manipulation deemed
necessary. Similar approaches of model expansion are common in hierarchical modelling
allowing researchers to identify variances on multiple levels of nesting (e.g. is there any
variation on the individual level to be explained? is there a variability on the constituency
level?), which I will often reference as well. Occasionally, movements in variance com-
ponents may be used as partial substitutes for the classical ‘model fit’ statistic such as the
R2 which is missing in extensions of linear models. In the first examples of dependent
measures (‘Attentional bias 1.’), this approach is explained step by step but will later be
omitted, concentrating on the key effect sizes.
Substantive interpretation is left to the Section Conclusions 4.1.3. for Attentional
engagement, and 4.2.5. for Political engagement, while Section 4.3 draws more general
conclusions concentrating on common patterns across these studies. A wider significance
of my findings is discussed in my thesis Conclusions chapters.
4.1 Attentional engagement
If somewhat indirectly, attention has been in focus of political behaviour studies, espe-
cially on information seeking, selectivity, and learning [146]; and more recently, atten-
tional bias has been measured to describe how Conservatives and Liberals react differ-
ently to simple valenced stimuli [147] as well as complex emotional tone in campaign
[148]. The current study, however, is novel in the sense that it measures attention more
directly to infer political engagement. I use basic physiological evidence of attention, as
in engagement with visual stimuli from the political world, as early indication of political
interest, bearing in mind consequences on the acquisition of knowledge of current affairs
via learning.
Attentional engagement might thus viewed as micro-level evidence of political en-
gagement in a paradigm where competing political stimuli are available to collect infor-
mation from. In this section, I describe the results of a small, N = 28 lab experiment
where an incentivised convenience sample of women undergraduate students completed
a cognitive task called the dot probe test while wearing head-mounted eye-tracker de-
vices, collecting large amounts of data per millisecond of gaze location, duration, and
saccadic movements. The task itself was to view 25 pairs of images, all depicting real
political groups. The pairs featured very similar images except that the women in them
were cropped out in varying proportions. One of each pair featured a group whose gender
balance was improved (with more women in them), compared to the other with fewer or
no women at all. Throughout this analysis, I refer to the former set of pictures as the role
model pictures, and latter as their Contrast pictures, within each pairing. Both may have
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appeared on the left or the right. Each pair was replaced by a dot ‘probe’ on either side,
and participants were required to identify which side, ‘as quickly as possible ’ (Figure 3.2
in Chapter 3).
Ultimately, the aim is to compare attention to images of improved gender balance
with those of decreased gender balance. Important detail is that the unique pairs (8 pairs,
reappearing in random order and 20 times in total) were chosen to introduce more vari-
ation in the details of the pictures: women appeared in various positions in the frames,
with varying details in appearance, including race. The idea behind this is that an average
treatment effect, if detected, would more likely be due to gender balance, rather than the
varying features. Given the number of trials, I chose to introduce most variation in the
context where one woman is surrounded by multiple men (up to 4 picture pairs, in later
sections labelled as the ‘token condition’) but I did not vary positions and appearance
to the same extent in other numerical representation setups such as a 30% critical mass
presence or complete gender parity.
4.1.1 Attentional bias 1.
Dot probe paradigm
The dot probe paradigm itself has been used to infer attentional bias [149][75] building on
a fairly simple mechanism, namely that fast probe detection (the probe being a black dot
on the computer screen), typically executed by pressing a button on the keyboard, follows
probes that appear in areas that were ‘attended’ by the test subject, and slow detection
follows probes that appear in ‘unattended’ areas [75]. Attentional bias is in turn defined
as the systematic differential in response latency—speed in probe detection—for probes
replacing more engaging stimuli minus response latency for probes replacing less engag-
ing visual stimuli. While the eye-tracker data is more useful to get at attention directly,
for its availability, and to produce a larger number of measures for cross-validation, I first
present attentional engagement patterns based on the dot-probe task performance.
The basic hypothesis is that women would pay more attention to groups of politicians
with more women in them (the Role model pictures), as opposed to more stereotypical,
male dominated groups (the Contrast pictures). The study is largely exploratory of at-
tentional engagement at the specific values of numerical balance. While most picture
pairs contrasted a single woman’s token presence (20%) to men only groups, one or two
pictures presented women in other proportions, as listed in Table 4.2.
The dependent variable is the latency, measured in milliseconds, of the submission of
a correct response, that is, correctly identifying whether the probe appeared on the left or
on the right hand side9. Across 28 subjects, responses were submitted on 28 · 20 = 560
image pair trials10, the vast majority of which, 513 being correct.11 On average, probes
were detected in about a third of a second. A large portion of variation in response latency
should be explained by individual-level variation in vigilance or skills (i.e. some people
would just simply be faster to respond than others), or in terms of how individuals might
get better at task execution as they advance through the trials. A ‘null’ model, Model 1.0,
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Table 4.2: Descriptive statistics: Measures of attentional engagement
Pairing # Prop. women N
M ws resp. latency
(dot probe)
M ws duration of
fixations
M ws count of
fixations
M ws duration of
saccades
M ws count of
saccades
1-Role model 0.20 3 368.69 258.26 12 782 5
1-Contrast 0.00 3 420.28 224.04 10 516 4
2-Role model 0.25 1 390.50 270.21 4 299 2
2-Contrast 0.00 1 387.35 201.81 3 133 1
3-Role model 0.33 1 376.70 222.01 3 100 1
3-Contrast 0.00 1 401.48 216.45 3 233 1
4-Role model 0.50 1 395.86 234.66 4 333 2
4-Contrast 0.00 1 393.43 239.51 4 266 2
5-Role model 0.67 1 428.33 258.38 5 250 2
5-Contrast 0.33 1 393.76 241.71 3 67 1
6-Role model 0.75 1 390.31 204.72 2 33 0
6-Contrast 0.25 1 396.20 225.21 2 33 0
‘ws’ stands for within-subject statistic; ‘M’ for mean duration or median count. Inference: (a) dot-probe: shorter response time is
suggestive of attentional bias across pairings; (b) gaze data: greater duration & counts may mean attention bias.
Ylatency = β0 +utrial0t +u
sub ject
0s + e (4.1)
where the u0. terms are ‘random effects’ reflecting where nesting of responses is to
be expected12, decomposes this latency variable into a grand mean of response latency
(intercept), and a host of grouped means: for each of the 20 test trials, and for each of the
28 participants. Using this information, I calculated that subject-level variation explains
up to 200 milliseconds differential in average response times (which is estimated to be
about 33-36% of the total variance, see Table 4.3), but that trial-level variance averages
out to zero, explaining very little of response latency.
Next, an extended model, Model 1.1 explores what room is left for other, substan-
tively meaningful effects, on top of trial and individual-level nesting—whether responses
took longer depending on gender balance in the picture primes. Specifically, two vari-
ables explore (a) whether responses took longer if probe replaced the ‘Contrast picture’
with more men, or the ‘Role model picture’ with more women; and (b) what was the
specific numerical balance in the Role model pictures. Table 4.2 shows the observed la-
tency across these categories, suggesting that attention was uneven under two extremes:
women’s token minority at 20% and Women’s majority at 67%. In the 20% versus Con-
trast setting, Role model pictures received more attention but this differential turned into
the opposite direction in the 67% picture versus Contrast. In the formal model,
Ylatency = β0 +utrial0t +u
sub ject
0s +β1X
pic. type
t ·β2X% balancet + e (4.2)
the multiplicative term teases out response latency within these categories, resulting
in 2 (picture type either Contrast or Role model) · 4 (∼20% or ∼30% or 50% or >60%
balance n the Role model picture) = 8 point predictions. Looking at the marginal effects
(the β coefficients in Table 4.3), Model 1.1 finds weak evidence of a token effect (see
β of the non-interacted Contrast picture) to begin with. Its large posterior variance—90
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or 95% credible intervals both include zero—is possibly due to my lumping 20% and
25% pictures together, but the descriptive Table 4.2 shows those 25% pairs received even
attention. Moving on to increasing percentage, effect sizes diminish. There is sufficient
evidence, however, behind a reverse women majority effect (>60%. x Role model pic-
ture) suggesting that as men become minority, attention is directed to them.
Finally, in Model 1.2, I excluded responses to the 25% picture to investigate if its
inclusion was responsible for the token result, and in which case the 20% token effect
does remain positive within 90% credible interval (but note that Table shows more con-
servative 95% CI). In this model, the token effect is the distance between the Intercept
and the Contrast picture estimates, suggesting that it is about a third standard deviation,
33 milliseconds. The predicted response latencies, transformed from standard scores to
milliseconds, are visualised in Figure 4.1.
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Note: C stands for ‘Contrast image’ in pair featuring less or no women. Faster probe detection may indicate attentional bias.
Figure 4.1: Attentional bias across picture contrasts, Model 1.2
The dot-probe task thus shows only weak evidence that gender-balanced stimuli re-
ceive more attention, that attention is even under other contrast options but stronger evi-
dence that men’s novel token position against a woman majority receive attention surplus.
The eye tracking evidence in the next section is partially used as confirmatory analysis of
these patterns.
4.1.2 Attentional bias 2.
Eye-tracking data
Response latency data from the dot probe task above is used to make an inference on
attention bias indirectly. Using the eye tracker-generated data, I can explore attention one
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Table 4.3: Models 1.0–1.2, Attentional bias (dot probe response latency)
m1.0 m1.1 m1.2
DV Response latency, standardised (z) scale
Type Linear / MCMC Linear / MCMC Linear / MCMC
Stacked N 700 700 599
Subject N 28 28 28
Trial N 20 20 20
DIC 1380.91 1389.59 1178.17
Beta [95% CI] Beta [95% CI] Beta [95% CI]
Intercept -0.06[-0.38;0.25] -0.04[-0.34;0.27] -0.04[-0.36;0.30]
30% -0.07[-0.30;0.14] -0.06[-0.27;0.18]
50% -0.10[-0.37;0.13] -0.08[-0.33;0.15]
60% -0.05[-0.19;0.13] -0.04[-0.20;0.14]
Contrast pic. 0.02[-0.09;0.15] 0.06[-0.08;0.22]
30% x Cntr 0.19[-0.08;0.49] 0.15[-0.13;0.44]
50% x Cntr 0.03[-0.30;0.37] -0.03[-0.36;0.33]
60% x Cntr -0.06[-0.30;0.18] -0.09[-0.35;0.15]
Gamma [95% CI] Gamma [95% CI] Gamma [95% CI]
Subject var (Random) 0.61[0.33;1.00] 0.60[0.30;0.94] 0.61[0.34;1.00]
trialnum 0.06[0.02;0.11] 0.06[0.02;0.11] 0.05[0.01;0.09]
Residual var 0.39[0.36;0.44] 0.40[0.35;0.44] 0.39[0.34;0.43]
step more directly, by looking at selected locations of visual attention, and quantify en-
gagement with these locations by counting up the number and duration of total fixations—
gaze kept on/within single location—and the number and duration of saccades—rapid eye
movements—crossing them.
Inference from fixation duration measures is the inverse of inference from dot-probe
response latency: difficult, cognitively complex, and/or attention grabbing stimuli should
result in greater length of a single fixation [150]. It also makes sense to expect that fix-
ations are more frequent on more engaging pictures while subjects explore more details
within these images. I also analyse saccadic movement data, but this project is more
exploratory. Saccades are involuntary movements between points of fixations, while in-
formation is typically acquired during fixations. While long and frequent saccadic move-
ments may take time away from information processing, greater saccade frequency may
also imply that subjects were exploring more details in the imagery.
Areas of Interests (AoIs) are fields of picture stimuli where fixation and saccade ac-
tivity is measured, discarding gaze data on alternative fields. Following the logic of the
dot-probe task, the AoIs are selected as to correspond to each picture across the picture
pairs presented to participants through 20 trials. Using the log of the experimental tri-
als13, I matched these AoIs to the actual picture files presented and thus obtained, for
each picture pair, an AoI featuring less women (or no women at all), an AoI featuring
more women, and information on percentage of numerical balance on the pictures.
Based on the role model hypothesis on attention, the general expectation is that Role
model (more women) AoIs get more attention than Contrast (less women) AoIs. Learning
from the provisional dot-probe results earlier, however, it is further expected that Role
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model AoIs get the attention surplus when featuring a single or token woman surrounded
by larger group of men—a proportion of about 20%—but receive less attention if women
do not ‘stand out’ in contrast to men (30% and beyond).
The unit of analysis is the image-area of interest, resulting in an N = 2 (images in a
single pair) · 20 (trials, the number of pairs presented) · 18 (participants without missing
data) = 720. Recording is entirely missing for two participants due to software failure (no
video recorded during trial). There were tracking quality issues for three participants, I
excluded those from further analysis. Another five participants did not follow the instruc-
tions to observe the pictures but, given their satisfactory dot probe task performance (two
subjects made no errors at all, and three subjects made one error each across 20 trials),
they may have adopted another strategy to detect the probes without. While it may seem
like a substantial loss of data, due to the intensive nature of data collection with an eye
tracking , I am still working with plenty of observations.
Though conceptually separate, data on the number of fixations, duration of fixations,
number of saccades and duration of saccades overlap empirically, at least in terms of
their distribution across treatment groups, as demonstrated in Table 4.2. The descriptive
statistics report comparable movements to response latency, confirming basic validity of
the dot probe task in measuring attentional bias, with a few exceptions.
First, gaze data detects somewhat greater range of treatment averages, while group
means in response latency went from about 370 to 420 milliseconds, gaze duration covers
group differences of up to 70 milliseconds and saccade duration of 750 milliseconds.
Latter range is exaggerated as often saccades were not picked up on an AoI at all. Second,
gaze data is simultaneously recorded on both pictures in pair, offering perhaps better
within-subject controls, while a dot-probe response is recorded either after the role model
picture, or after the Contrast picture. Third, of more substantive interest, there may be
more validity behind a token effect as the attention gap is not only on the 20% pictures
but also on the 25% picture, previously an outlier. Finally, looking at women majority
pairings, the attention gap led by Contrast pictures, as observed in the dot-probe data,
seems less exaggerated or disappears entirely suggesting that pictures where men became
novelty may have received less attention than previously found.
Through exploratory data analysis, a pattern emerged in which probe location, that is,
where the dot after picture stimuli was presented, is reliably and strongly associated with,
above all, gaze duration (t(719.01) = −32.39, p < .001). This would mean that partici-
pants predicted where the probe was going to appear (by spending about 30 milliseconds
more time on those pictures), which is an unlikely explanation given randomised trials.
The log of the experimental trials confirms that randomisation was successful. Thus the
only explanation left is that, though care was taken to extract gaze data for times only
when pictures were on screen, the software picked up attention directed at the probes im-
mediately the pictures disappeared for about 30 milliseconds. I am returning to this point
in the section conclusions.
I fit hierarchical models following the same logic as explained above under Section
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4.1.1. Duration of fixation and duration of saccades are scaled (mean centred, divided
by standard deviation) to allow direct comparability to response latency results. I did not
make changes in the hierarchical structure, nesting is within trials and individuals, and
there will be no subsequent exclusion of the 25% picture AoI from the sample.
Fixation and saccade duration data models are linear regressions at the core fit with
MCMC, comparable directly to the dot-probe model,
Yduration = β0 +utrial0t +u
sub ject
0s +β1X
pic. type
t ·β2X% balancet +β3X probe loc.t + e (4.3)
with a familiar host of predictors comprising picture type (Contrast versus Role model),
numerical balance in the Role model picture, but also new piece of information being
lagged probe location as discussed above. Count data of fixations and saccades, on the
other hand, follows a Poisson rather than standard normal distribution, which is accounted
for in these models by using the appropriate link function:
ln(Y )count = β0 +utrial0t +u
sub ject
0s +β1X
pic. type
t ·β2X% balancet +β3X probe loc.t (4.4)
where the same linear combination of predictors designate the natural logarithm of the
dependent variable (count of fixations). These effects sizes are reported in the appropriate
model tables, while the prediction plot will be show values transformed back to on the
original count scale.
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Note: C stands for ‘Contrast image’ in pair featuring less or no women. Longer fixations may imply attentional bias.
Figure 4.2: Attentional bias across picture contrasts, Model 2.2
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My results reveals a pattern very similar if more moderate compared to the dot-probe
results. Evidence behind the token effect weakens, likely due to a decrease in subject
sample size. In Model 2.2, Contrast parameter (that is, the attention gap in contrast to
role model pictures with a token or 20% presence only) remains negative, as expected,
in a smaller 85% highest density interval: though still non-negligible probability. The
treatment effect is identical to that in the dot-probe task before excluding the 25% pic-
ture (-.14 and .13, respectively, note that direction of inference should be opposite from
response latency and fixation duration). The gap is still very small, if existing at all, be-
tween contrast pictures and 30–50% role model pictures. Finally, though the descriptives
suggested no separation of contrast and role model pictures at women majority pairs, the
model-based answer is similar to the dot-probe result in that attention is re-directed to
men-in-minority pictures. Figure 4.2 shows these predicted probabilities.
Looking at variance components, two important results emerge. First, the uninfor-
mative model shows about 75% variability in fixation duration is unexplained by simply
looking at ‘blank’ between-subject variation (which itself remains around 25% through-
out model expansion) suggesting attentional engagement patterns may not be entirely up
to individuals but it has to be a more elaborate mechanism in terms of variability in stim-
uli. Second, including gender balance predictors, however uncertain estimates in terms
of posterior density, do decrease this unexplained variance about 7%, showing better ex-
planatory power than lagged probe location, accounting for a mere 1%.
Fixation count results largely confirm patterns found in results about fixation dura-
tion. The magnitude of the token effect is comparable to that measured through fixation
duration and response latency previously, the single standing Contrast coefficient remain-
ing around -.17 or a fifth of the dependent variable’s standard deviation. This parameter
now has higher posterior density and remains negative within 95% credible intervals.
This model however finds very weak evidence that these patterns may reverse when men
become majority.
Figure 4.3 shows the posterior predictions transformed back on the original scale. In
terms of fixation counts, the role model effect under women’s token presence, though
detected by the model, fails to account for one extra fixation, which may explain another
piece of detail observed. I will discuss this issue again in the Section Conclusions.
Saccadic data models show weak evidence that Contrast pictures were implicated in
fewer and shorter saccades. Saccadic duration effect is the strongest of the two. Saccades
being involuntary movements between points of fixations, this duration effect may mean
that quick saccades connected two fixation points within the same pictures—previous
model confirmed that about every one in five token pictures had an extra fixation. The
saccadic count effect, though positive, has very large posterior variance. This, too, is
consistent with the fixation count model which found low predicted probability of fixation
counts beyond 2, which would be necessary to detect multiple saccades between them.
Across the two models, the remaining parameter estimates are inconsistent.
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Figure 4.3: Attentional bias across picture contrasts, Model 3.2
4.1.3 Section conclusions
Using a strategy that seeks to get at a singular underlying concept through a number of
alternative measures, namely attentional bias to political role models, I observe very con-
sistent effects. When contrasted with men only groups, a token woman’s novelty draws
women participants’ attention, consistently shown through performance on a cognitive
task (the dot-probe task), as well as gaze measures. Role model pictures featuring the
token woman were ‘attended’ areas of the picture contrasts and were followed by a fifth
standard deviation quicker response time, about 33 milliseconds. These pictures also
were implicated in a fifth standard deviation longer fixations, remaining above 30 mil-
liseconds through all models. About every fifth role model picture may have received
an extra fixation, suggesting that more information was taken in from token pictures.
Despite magnitude differences, however, posterior probabilities vary, weakest treatment
effects remaining non-zero within 85%, strongest within 95% credible intervals.
Though exploratory, I also analyse pairings with different numerical balance contrasts,
finding that although role model pictures continue to get attention surplus, this may di-
minish by parity when women no longer stand out as minority. Rather, as men become
minority in two picture pairings, participants redirected attention at them. My further ex-
ploratory results on saccadic data is consistent with the idea that participants re-focused
on role model pictures, as my model found evidence that quicker saccades happened on
role model pictures. As the probability of re-fixation was estimated to be very low in the
previous models thus a third, fourth etc. fixations deemed very unlikely, saccade count
model found no evidence of further saccadic activity on role model pictures.
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Table 4.4: Models 2.0–2.2, Attentional bias (fixation duration)
m2.0 m2.1 m2.2
DV Duration of fixation, standardised (z) scale
Type Linear / MCMC Linear / MCMC Linear / MCMC
Stacked N 720 720 720
Subject N 18 18 18
Trial N 20 20 20
DIC 1869.32 1880.01 1877.91
Beta [95% CI] Beta [95% CI] Beta [95% CI]
Intercept 0.00[-0.24;0.27] 0.09[-0.18;0.38] 0.02[-0.27;0.27]
30% -0.12[-0.42;0.19] -0.10[-0.39;0.21]
50% -0.05[-0.34;0.24] -0.06[-0.36;0.22]
60% -0.15[-0.36;0.05] -0.14[-0.36;0.06]
Contrast pic. -0.14[-0.32;0.03] -0.13[-0.30;0.06]
Probe lag 0.13[0.01;0.27]
30% x Cntr 0.10[-0.37;0.52] 0.06[-0.43;0.48]
50% x Cntr 0.14[-0.22;0.63] 0.15[-0.33;0.52]
60% x Cntr 0.23[-0.04;0.53] 0.21[-0.12;0.49]
Gamma [95% CI] Gamma [95% CI] Gamma [95% CI]
Subject var (Random) var 0.24[0.11;0.50] 0.25[0.12;0.53] 0.25[0.12;0.53]
Trial var 0.00[0.00;0.00] 0.00[0.00;0.00] 0.00[0.00;0.00]
Residual var 0.77[0.69;0.85] 0.70[0.59;0.81] 0.69[0.59;0.85]
Table 4.5: Models 3.0–3.2, Attentional bias (fixation count)
m3.0 m3.1 m3.2
DV Fixation count
Type Poisson / MCMC Poisson / MCMC Poisson / MCMC
Stacked N 720 720 720
Subject N 18 18 18
Trial N 20 20 20
DIC 1917.95 1903.41 1913.54
Beta [95% CI] Beta [95% CI] Beta [95% CI]
Intercept 0.20[-0.07;0.49] 0.18[-0.18;0.53] 0.17[-0.17;0.48]
30% 0.06[-0.20;0.33] 0.01[-0.30;0.30]
50% -0.04[-0.22;0.16] 0.01[-0.24;0.25]
60% -0.07[-0.23;0.07] -0.13[-0.35;0.05]
Contrast pic. -0.14[-0.32;0.00] -0.13[-0.29;0.06]
Probe lag 0.06[-0.04;0.23]
30% x Cntr 0.08[-0.23;0.52] 0.20[-0.19;0.59]
50% x Cntr 0.32[0.04;0.51] 0.20[-0.23;0.68]
60% x Cntr 0.00[-0.26;0.23] 0.17[-0.08;0.40]
Gamma [95% CI] Gamma [95% CI] Gamma [95% CI]
Subject var (Random) var 0.35[0.15;0.63] 0.52[0.22;0.95] 0.46[0.17;0.84]
Trial var 0.00[0.00;0.00] 0.00[0.00;0.00] 0.00[0.00;0.00]
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Table 4.6: Models 4.0–4.2, Attentional bias (duration of saccades)
m4.0 m4.1 m4.2
DV Duration of saccades, standardised (z) scale
Type Linear / MCMC Linear / MCMC Linear / MCMC
Stacked N 720 720 720
Subject N 18 18 18
Trial N 20 20 20
DIC 1959.46 1969.07 1970.5
Beta [95% CI] Beta [95% CI] Beta [95% CI]
Intercept 0.00[-0.18;0.19] 0.05[-0.18;0.29] 0.04[-0.17;0.28]
30% -0.02[-0.35;0.29] -0.02[-0.38;0.30]
50% 0.01[-0.33;0.30] 0.00[-0.33;0.29]
60% 0.04[-0.17;0.27] 0.03[-0.17;0.26]
Contrast pic. -0.12[-0.32;0.07] -0.12[-0.30;0.07]
Probe lag 0.01[-0.11;0.15]
30% x Cntr 0.15[-0.35;0.60] 0.14[-0.33;0.63]
50% x Cntr 0.16[-0.29;0.58] 0.17[-0.26;0.59]
60% x Cntr -0.10[-0.43;0.23] -0.09[-0.41;0.19]
Gamma [95% CI] Gamma [95% CI] Gamma [95% CI]
Subject var (Random) 0.16[0.05;0.29] 0.16[0.06;0.30] 0.15[0.05;0.27]
Trial var (Random) 0.00[0.00;0.00] 0.00[0.00;0.00] 0.00[0.00;0.00]
Residual var 0.87[0.78;0.96] 0.87[0.77;0.96] 0.87[0.79;0.97]
Table 4.7: Models 5.0–5.2, Attentional bias (count of saccades)
m5.0 m5.1 m5.2
DV Count of saccades
Type Poisson / MCMC Poisson / MCMC Poisson / MCMC
Stacked N 720 720 720
Subject N 18 18 18
Trial N 20 20 20
DIC 1420.79 1429.62 1411.51
Beta [95% CI] Beta [95% CI] Beta [95% CI]
Intercept -0.65[-0.99;-0.39] -0.61[-0.97;-0.25] -0.73[-1.07;-0.37]
30% 0.02[-0.56;0.44] 0.01[-0.16;0.24]
50% -0.01[-0.39;0.39] 0.08[-0.11;0.38]
60% -0.09[-0.39;0.24] -0.12[-0.31;0.10]
Contrast pic. -0.23[-0.46;0.02] -0.17[-0.28;-0.04]
Probe lag 0.19[0.09;0.27]
30% x Cntr 0.43[-0.11;1.14] 0.30[0.00;0.59]
50% x Cntr 0.40[-0.14;1.03] 0.22[-0.30;0.48]
60% x Cntr 0.07[-0.46;0.49] 0.03[-0.32;0.27]
Gamma [95% CI] Gamma [95% CI] Gamma [95% CI]
Subject var (Random) 0.39[0.13;0.72] 0.44[0.17;0.83] 0.54[0.20;1.02]
Trial var (Random) 0.00[0.00;0.00] 0.00[0.00;0.00] 0.00[0.00;0.00]
Residual var 0.04[0.00;0.12] 0.05[0.00;0.13] 0.00[0.00;0.01]
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4.2 Political engagement
This section reviews evidence of role model effects more directly on psychological en-
gagement with politics, relying on two data sources. First, I collected original data in a
survey experiment where respondents were randomly assigned to view images of political
groups depicting varying numerical balance of men and women. This project comprises
two data collection rounds, an ‘original’, N = 329 study fielded May 2015, and a repli-
cation round in June 2017, where N = 277 paricipants14 received the original treatment
unchanged.
Second, I use observational data from the British Election Study projects, namely, an
N = 15,658 internet panel [127] and an N = 1,935 face to face panel study before and
after the election campaign of 2010 [126], and an N = 31,323 internet panel before and
after the election campaign of 2015[128]. Most of the variables of interest are available in
the large internet samples, while the smaller 2010, face-to-face panel study is used only to
explore if the women’s campaign impacted trust in politicians. I link the BES data, where
respondents’ parliamentary constituency identifier is available, with data provided by the
Houses of Parliament’s Digital Service [125] on the candidates running in the respective
constituencies. While winning majority and candidate names are readily available for
these election years, candidate gender had missing data for 2010. Wherever the same
person, 2015 candidate gender is imputed on these places. Further missing data was
filled in using crowd-sourced information site Democracy Club[151], the ‘babynames’
data set relying on historical US Social Security Number Application data to predict most
probable gender given first name, and finally, hand coding residuals15.
Both BES projects ran across many waves with a good number of respondents staying
in the panels, the waves being numbered differently. The 2010 face-to-face panel only had
a pre-election and post-election wave, did not implement a campaign wave between the
two. To avoid confusion, for all observational study, Wave 1 will refer to a pre-election
wave, in the case of the BES 2015, the the one closest to but still preceding the campaign;
and Wave 3 will refer to the post-election wave, the one closest to the actual vote cast
(typically asked a day after). Wave 2 might be reserved for the internet panel ‘campaign
waves’ in a possible extension of this study, but not currently used due to its diffuse timing
and difficult comparison between the two election years.
The basic analytical strategy was to take measures of a wide range of indicators of
psychological engagement with politics: political interest, political knowledge, and polit-
ical efficacy; and assess differences under the following numerical balance setups in the
picture or campaign contexts: 0% or ‘men only’ politics, 20-25% or token, near 30% crit-
ical mass, and a 50% thus parity of men and women. These setups are readily available
as they correspond to the treatment groups in the survey experiment, while they are cal-
culated for the observational study based on the number of women standing as candidates
over the total number of candidates. I found that 272 races featured one woman, or less
than a third, in 2015 and 282 in 2010. 122 (2010) and 169 (2015) races more women
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but less than 50%, 35 (2010) and 32 (2015) races an equal number of women and men.16
An extra group denotes women majority presence in the campaign context (66 races) but
the comparable category is missing from the pool of pictures. Table 4.8 below shows the
number of races by women’s presence.
Table 4.8: N of constituencies by women’s campaign presence, GE 2010 & 2015
No. women 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Treatment ↓
2010
M.only 146
Token 237 64 1
C.mass 76 43 3
Parity 7 22 4 2
W.maj 8 12 4 1
2015
M.only 101
Token 223 62 2
C.mass 116 53 1
Parity 2 24 6
W.maj 2 2 2
M.only = no women ran. Token = 1 woman race but always less than 30% of all candidates. C.mass races surpass 30% but equal to
less than fifty-fifty, Parity. W.maj =women majority races.
Participants are relatively evenly distributed across treatment groups in the survey ex-
periment due to random assignment. By contrast, respondents of the 2015 election study
are highly unevenly distributed across race type, the vast majority of them being respon-
dents under a token woman presence, with ‘men only’ and critical mass races coming
up second most populous, but already with half as many respondents, while very few re-
spondents observed parity races (Table 4.9 at Chapter appendix shows distribution across
treatment groups for both datasets). Evidently latter distribution follows the actual distri-
bution of gender balance across the 614 parliamentary constituencies sampled.
Table 4.9: N of respondents, by data source & by treatment—gender combination
Treatm. Gender BES 2010 BES 2015 Exp Round 1 Exp Round 2
M.only Men 1970 2385 41 38
Women 1991 2456 51 41
Token Men 4257 7109 41 36
Women 4342 7440 39 31
C.mass Men 1615 4166 40 35
Women 1703 4278 47 28
Parity Men 499 844 38 31
Women 480 894 32 36
W.maj. Men 347 815
Women 389 936
The dependent variables are change in election interest from baseline, Wave 1 to Wave
3, in BES 2010 and 2015; political interest, as reported by survey participants, survey
experiment; change in self-assessed or subjective political knowledge, Wave 1 to Wave 3,
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in BES 2015; self-assessed or subjective political knowledge, survey experiment; change
in performance on political knowledge test Wave 1 to Wave 3, in BES 2015; performance
on political knowledge test, survey experiment; confidence in political knowledge test
answers, survey experiment; change in political efficacy, Wave 1 to Wave 3, in BES 2010
and 2015; political efficacy, survey experiment; change in trust in MPs, Wave 1 to Wave
3, in BES 2010 and 2015; and Trust in MPs, survey experiment.
Although the empirical models will vary based on measurement levels across the de-
pendent variables, I am aiming to keep the structure of predictors fixed. The most im-
portant independent variable is treatment’s (featuring the 4-5 numerical balance setups)
interaction term with respondent gender, resulting in 8 to 10 point predictions. Further-
more, in models using survey experiment data, I fit hierarchical models to include a ran-
dom term for the crowd-sourcing platform through which respondents were recruited, to
account for any variation due to average respondent characteristics between these plat-
forms. Thus for any linear dependent variable of psychological engagement with politics,
YPEP, my models take a generic form,
YPEP = β0 +u
plat f .
0p +u
sub ject
0s +β1X
resp. gender
s ·β2X% treatments + e (4.5)
where usub ject0s is optional random effect if the dependent variable is multi-response
variable nested within respondents, as explained eariler at the introduction and at equation
4.1.
The random term for crowd-sourcing platform is also a component that allows me to
disregard further covariates from the survey experiment models to ‘save’ on test power,
needed in a small N experiment. There are very minimal ‘within-treatment’ differences
in the distribution of key demographics such as education and age due to the element
of random assignment to treatment groups, and differences are mostly on gender (which
variable is present in all equations).
Latent variable models include an additional random term. When looking at multi-
item dependent variables, such as political efficacy measured across four items, I pool
these resopnses together such as the unit of analysis becomes the item response, stacked
within individuals thus an item-level or stacked sample size equals to Nitem ·Ns where s
stands for subjects.
YPEP = β0 +u
plat f .
0p +u
sub ject
0s +u
item
0i +β1X
resp. gender
s ·β2X% treatments + e (4.6)
In this equation, YPEP is latent construct, whereas uitem0i gives variation across items
within this latent construct.
In the election study data, ‘treatment’ varies on the constituency level but not on the
respondent level, thus models with this data source will further include a random compo-
nent for parliamentary constituency ID. Furthermore, since an element of randomisation
is entirely missing in observational studies, I include further covariates in these models
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to exclude effects reflecting on alternative, individual-level explanations. Keeping them
constant, I choose a minimal, most stable set of predictors of political interest[9],[7],
including age and 6 formal education levels ranging from ‘None’ to ‘Postgraduate’. Fur-
thermore, to account for constituency-level explanations other than the density of female
politicians, I include winning majority, to control for how close the race might have been.
The assumption is that races where candidates win by large majorities may be considered
safe or uninteresting seats, resulting in less intense campaigning.
For any linear dependent variable that is a change of psychological engagement with
politics during (women’s) campaign, ∆YPEP, my models take a generic form,
∆YPEP =β0 +u
constituency
0c +u
year
0y +u
sub ject
0s +
β1X resp. genders ·β2X% treatments +
β3Xages +β4X
education
s +β5X
ma jority
s + e
(4.7)
where usub ject0s is optional random effect if the dependent variable is multi-response
variable nested within respondents, such political efficacy.
The following sections review the results of these models, grouped by dependent vari-
ables. All hierarchical models are fit with MCMC using an uninformative or flat prior17,
and are built up from a ‘null’ model made up of a grand mean and variance components,
expanded to include gender, treatment, and finally covariates (if observational study).
Further details on the hierarchical structure such as for latent models (political knowl-
edge and efficacy) are provided under each model table. I concentrate on major findings
and plot marginal effect sizes, and make a note of the substantively interesting variance
components to infer explanatory power or ‘model fit’. Details on model convergence and
a plot of each parameter’s posterior distribution are provided in the Chapter appendix.
4.2.1 Political interest
In both the survey experiment and the BES, political interest is assessed on Likert-type
scales. While in the survey experiment, I asked participants about ‘general’ political in-
terest, the BES panel waves both in 2010 and in 2015 asked participants about election
interest. For exploration purposes, Tables 4.10–4.11 show the simple group means per
data set. Note that only very small changes are expected: previous studies have shown
that political interest is fairly stable over the life course [152], therefore I am looking
for only marginal campaign effects at best. The observed means through the BES panel
waves show that in both election years, survey respondents became more interested by
the end of the election campaign period, and that the magnitude of this change is always
larger for women. M∆ shows the averaged ‘within-individual’ change suggesting very
small differential across ‘treatment’ groups; the magnitude of gains nevertheless seeming
largest in constituencies with a token woman campaigning in 2015, and a critical Mass
campaigning in 2010. These averages, however, may hide further heterogeneity as cam-
paign interest is expected to be conditional foremost on individual characteristics, such
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as age and education, but also contextual characteristics, such as the closeness of the
race. Dispersion is near-identical across treatment groups and election years, but some-
what larger for women than for men, standard deviations ranging between the extremes
of SD = 0.72 and SD = 0.89.
Table 4.10: Descriptive statistics: Campaign interest; BES 2010
Gender Treatm. M Wave 1 M Wave 3 M∆
Men M.only 3.41 3.55 0.13
Token 3.39 3.53 0.11
C.mass 3.38 3.52 0.12
Parity 3.43 3.58 0.12
W.maj. 3.43 3.58 0.09
Women M.only 3.14 3.40 0.22
Token 3.14 3.40 0.23
C.mass 3.11 3.39 0.26
Parity 3.21 3.45 0.24
W.maj. 3.23 3.52 0.24
Table 4.11: Descriptive statistics: Campaign interest BES 2015
Gender Treatm. M Wave 1 M Wave 3 M∆
Men M.only 3.51 3.56 0.05
Token 3.51 3.55 0.03
C.mass 3.50 3.55 0.04
Parity 3.53 3.56 0.03
W.maj. 3.52 3.55 0.03
Women M.only 3.26 3.40 0.12
Token 3.25 3.40 0.15
C.mass 3.25 3.39 0.13
Parity 3.28 3.43 0.13
W.maj. 3.26 3.41 0.13
In the original and replication rounds of the survey experiment, I tested different scales
(4 and 5 points, respectively) for more potential comparison with different observational
studies, but the last columns of Table 4.12, ‘standardised (z)’ makes them comparable,
expressing differences from the overall mean (set 0) in standard deviation units. In the
first round of data collection, survey experiment results suggest that women’s political
interest is highest in the token condition, a significant increase from the baseline, Men
only condition, but as the proportion of women in the pictures increased, mean reported
political interest decreased somewhat (although not again hitting baseline Men only lev-
els). The replication round, however, showed different patterns: women’s political inter-
est decreased in all treatment conditions, except parity, suggesting large within-treatment
variances.
In the election interest models, Models 6.0–6.2, the random component for Parliamen-
tary constituency bears substantive interest as it is an estimate of the variance found across
constituencies, at which level the number of women campaigning varies. A large vari-
ance component may thus facilitate large substantive ‘treatment’ effects, however, the null
model shows that constituency-level variation between respondents’ reported change in
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Table 4.12: Descriptive statistics: Political interest; Survey experiment
Gender Treatm. M Round 1 M Round 2
M Round 1
standard (z)
M Round 2
standard (z)
Men M.only 3.02 3.79 0.21 0.06
Token 2.95 4.06 0.11 0.33
C.mass 2.95 3.91 0.11 0.19
Parity 2.79 3.74 -0.09 0.01
Women M.only 2.67 3.71 -0.24 -0.02
Token 2.97 3.61 0.14 -0.12
C.mass 2.81 3.07 -0.07 -0.66
Parity 2.75 3.78 -0.14 0.05
campaign interest is essentially zero. In the first expanded model, 6.1, where respondent
gender is included as a predictor, a little space may have opened up for constituency-level
variation but remained almost negligible (0.001).
Nevertheless, Model 6.2 including the treatment interaction and the full host of con-
trols, does find evidence that, everything else held equal,
1. Women’s, rather than men’s, election interest increased through both campaign pe-
riods, see Beta ‘Gender: Woman’ in Table 4.13, and the ‘W’ marginal effect in
Figure 4.4;
2. Men were not sensitive to the gender composition of the campaigns;
3. The token woman campaign presence marginally increased women’s election inter-
est, on top of the baseline gender effect, if only by less than a hundredth standard
deviation, see Beta ‘Woman x 20%’ or ‘Wx20’ in Figure 4.4;
4. Beyond token, there are no more marginal increases in election interest.
Gender, along with the proportion of women in campaigns, explains about one per
cent variability of election interest, see decreasing Residual variance component. The
inclusion of covariates has somewhat larger explanatory power, with about 5% variability
now explained by adding age, education, and candidates’ winning majority. Interest-
ingly, winning parties’ vote share is found to have an impact on political interest in the
unexpected direction. Though a tiny effect size, results suggest that a growing winning
percentage (an indication of a ‘safe seat’) translates to an increased political interest. The
top panel of Figure 4.4 shows these effects expressed in terms of standard deviation units
of the dependent variable. The full results are in Table 4.13.
Models 7.0–7.2 on political interest based on the survey experiment data find gener-
ally no treatment effects. A token boost comparable to the BES model, though observed
in the first round of data collection, is now counter-balanced by negative movements in the
replication study. Model expansion to respondent gender and treatment group does little
to reduce individual-level, unexplained variance (Residual variance component), pointing
to a very weakly informative model. The bottom panel of Figure 4.4 shows key marginal
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Figure 4.4: Treatment x gender marginal effects, Models 6.2 & 7.2
Change in election interest, W3-W1, BES panels 2010 & 2015
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Key: β coefficients (posterior means) and 95% CI corresponding to the effect of women’s presence in campaigns (BES) or picture
stimuli (survey experiment) at the discrete proportions of near 20% or token, near 30% or critical mass, 50% or parity, and women’s
majority near 60%. W stands for women respondents.
effects, with the full results in Table 4.13. Model convergence trace plots are in Section
4.4 Chapter appendix, introduced by general remarks.
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Table 4.13: Models 6.0–6.2, Change in election interest, BES
m6.0 m6.1 m6.2
DV Election interest Wave 3–Wave1, standardised (z) scale
Type Linear / MCMC Linear / MCMC Linear / MCMC
N 48916 48916 36737
Constituency N 632 632 632
Election years 2 2 2
DIC 111070.4 110805.53 102389.28
Beta [95% CI] Beta [95% CI] Beta [95% CI]
Intercept 0.02[-0.72;0.90] 0.09[-0.92;1.39] -0.02[-0.62;0.71]
Gender: Woman 0.13[0.08;0.18] 0.11[0.07;0.16]
Treatment: 20% -0.02[-0.06;0.02] -0.03[-0.06;0.01]
Treatment: 30% 0.00[-0.05;0.04] -0.01[-0.06;0.03]
Treatment: 50% -0.02[-0.09;0.05] -0.03[-0.10;0.04]
Treatment: 60% -0.03[-0.10;0.04] -0.03[-0.09;0.04]
Woman x 20% 0.05[0.00;0.11] 0.06[0.01;0.12]
Woman x 30% 0.02[-0.04;0.08] 0.03[-0.03;0.09]
Woman x 50% 0.05[-0.05;0.14] 0.06[-0.04;0.15]
Woman x 60% 0.05[-0.04;0.15] 0.06[-0.03;0.15]
Resp.: Age -0.09[-0.10;-0.08]
Resp.: Educ. 0.01[0.00;0.02]
Const.: Marginality 0.01[0.00;0.02]
Gamma [95% CI] Gamma [95% CI] Gamma [95% CI]
Constit. var (Random) 0.00[0.00;0.00] 0.00[0.00;0.00] 0.00[0.00;0.00]
Election year var (Random) 1.67[0.00;2.16] 7.10[0.00;4.42] 11.23[0.00;1.00]
Residual var 1.00[0.98;1.01] 0.99[0.97;1.00] 0.95[0.94;0.96]
Table 4.14: Models 7.0–7.2, Political interest, Survey experiment
m7.0 m7.1 m7.2
DV Political interest, standardised (z) scale
Type Linear / MCMC Linear / MCMC Linear / MCMC
N 605 605 605
Platforms 2 2 2
Coll. round 2 2 2
DIC 1718.91 1712.33 1717.49
Beta [95% CI] Beta [95% CI] Beta [95% CI]
Intercept -0.10[-0.08;0.09] 0.12[0.01;0.24] 0.14[-0.10;0.34]
Gender: Woman -0.24[-0.39;-0.08] -0.29[-0.57;0.00]
Treatment: 20% 0.08[-0.20;0.40]
Treatment: 30% 0.01[-0.30;0.32]
Treatment: 50% -0.19[-0.51;0.10]
Woman x 20% 0.10[-0.32;0.51]
Woman x 30% -0.16[-0.59;0.26]
Woman x 50% 0.29[-0.17;0.72]
Gamma [95% CI] Gamma [95% CI] Gamma [95% CI]
Coll.round var (Random) 0.00[0.00;0.00] 0.00[0.00;0.00] 0.01[0.00;0.00]
Crowds-pl. var (Random) 4.81[0.00;0.01] 0.02[0.00;0.00] 0.00[0.00;0.00]
Residual var 1.00[0.89;1.11] 0.99[0.88;1.10] 0.99[0.88;1.10]
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4.2.2 Political knowledge
Political knowledge is introduced as relevant aspect of political engagement on at least
three accounts. Firstly, greater stores of political knowledge, especially about current
affairs, may be an indication that citizens follow politics. Secondly, the politically aware
is more likely to be politically engaged in terms of participation [153],[154]. Thirdly,
a subjective, confident assessment of one’s political skills is part of her more holistic
judgement self-efficacy [48],[49], measures I discuss separately under political efficacy.
Objectively, political knowledge is typically measured through factual political knowl-
edge quizzes, while subjectively, it is assessed on Likert scales as part of a longer battery
of questions about political efficacy. The BES panel of 2010 implemented none of these
options, while the BES 2015 has a number of waves experimenting with different op-
tions. Participants were tested for their knowledge of current affairs in almost all cam-
paign waves, but only three questions from before the election campaign were re-asked in
the post-election wave. These were job pairing tasks where respondents had to match the
names of the President of Russia, the Chancellor of Germany, and the President of Syria.
Table 4.15 on test performance and learning shows large gender gaps. For each of the
three test questions, I determined if respondents answered correctly in the pre- and the
post-election wave, and categorised them depending on whether they learned about the
leaders or not, kept existing knowledge, or ‘forgot’ (gave correct answer in Wave 1 but
an incorrect answer in Wave 3). Taking the most typical value across three test questions,
‘N Learned’ counts the number of respondents who gave a correct response in Wave 3
but not Wave 1. ‘Learned odds’ shows the odds of this over ‘Not learning’ (both waves
incorrect or ‘don’t know’ response), suggesting that men were up to 4.5 times more likely
to learn through the campaign than women, the odds being highest in men only races.
Women had near equal odds in men only and token races but less in Critical mass and
parity races, at least as far as the test question medians are concerned. The model-based
solution will look at common learning patterns about all three leaders, not relying on the
mode across three questions.
Table 4.15: Descriptive statistics: Change in knowledge of foreign leaders by Wave 3,
BES 2015
Gender Treatm. N Not learn N Learned N ‘Forgot’ N No change Learn odds
Men M.only 16 144 0 82 9.00
Token 53 377 8 219 7.11
C.mass 34 269 4 131 7.91
Parity 7 46 1 23 6.57
W.maj. 10 58 0 26 5.80
Women M.only 110 255 6 89 2.32
Token 300 636 26 234 2.12
C.mass 195 386 14 112 1.98
Parity 43 74 3 22 1.72
W.maj. 29 70 5 24 2.41
Through the original and the replication rounds of the survey experiment, I adminis-
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tered tests comprising 12 and 10 questions, respectively. The questions in the first round
test civic knowledge and familiarity with the constitution, adopted from Audit of Political
Engagement Survey [155], whereas the questions for the replication round resemble more
the BES-style leaders and names matching exercise, emphasizing more current affairs.
Table 4.16 shows average scores, confirming the gender gap on the (harder) matching
task but not confirming the gender gap on the (easier) civic knowledge. Women did not
seem to have been impacted by the treatment. For list of test questions, see Chapter 3
Section 3.3 Chapter appendix.
Table 4.16: Descriptive statistics: Political knowledge test scores; % correct
Gender Treatm. M score BES ‘15 M score Exp. Round 1 M score Exp. Round 2
Men M.only 0.91 0.70 0.69
Token 0.91 0.74 0.76
C.mass 0.91 0.73 0.71
Parity 0.91 0.72 0.65
W.maj. 0.90
Women M.only 0.74 0.71 0.63
Token 0.74 0.72 0.61
C.mass 0.74 0.72 0.59
Parity 0.75 0.73 0.64
W.maj. 0.74
Both exercises were paired with a rating task about confidence in the individual an-
swers, analysed separately in the next section.
The BES panel models are Models 8.0–8.2 in Table 4.17 predicting the odds of learn-
ing about foreign leaders. The number of random components are extended to include
test Question and Subject variance components: in these models, all answers are pooled
together to be nested within the three test questions, and those within individuals. The
model being predictive of odds, rather than a standardised-continuous dependent variable
as before, variance components reflect how much variation in terms of (log) odds is due
to nesting. Test question variance is very large18, meaning that whether or not people
learned about them is almost entirely up to their saliency or obscurity in the campaign.
During the 2015 campaign, 38% of all panel respondents learned the name of the Pres-
ident of Syria, compared with 56% learning about the Chancellor of Germany, which
may reflect major party priorities in campaign communication, at that time more focus-
ing on the European Union. Between-individual variance is naturally large as learning
may be more up to skills and motivation if embedded within similar information envi-
ronments. Through model expansion, however, this ‘subject’ variance decreases, as we
add information about education, age, and importantly, gender. Finally, in these models,
between-constituency variance, on which level the proportion of women in campaigns is
measured, is small but non-negligible. Constituency Gamma in Table 4.17 starts at 0.36,
meaning that a variability of e0.36 = 1.43 in terms of odds may be up to any kind of con-
stituency characteristics. For example, out of two constituencies with a population of 100
people, if 10 have learned about leaders in constituency A, 15 may be expected to learn
in constituency B. Residual variance is not interpreted in probabilistic models.
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Figure 4.5: Treatment x gender marginal effects, Models 8.2 & 9.2
Odds of learning about foreign leaders, BES Internet Panel 2015
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Key: β coefficients (posterior means) and 95% CI corresponding to the effect of women’s presence in campaigns (BES) or picture
stimuli (survey experiment) at the discrete proportions of near 20% or token, near 30% or critical mass, 50% or parity, and women’s
majority near 60%. W stands for women respondents.
The results indicate that women are less likely to have learned about the three political
leaders. In the full model specification, the odds of women’s learning in constituencies
with only men campaigning is e−2.28 = 0.10 or a tenth against men’s learning. In terms
of ‘treatment’ effects, somewhat over 90% of the posterior distribution points to a posi-
tive token effect on women’s learning, the odds now being e0.52 = 1.68. Certainty about
effects beyond token decreases in all setups. The top panel of Figure 4.5 shows the key
marginal effects, while Table 4.17 shows the full results including control variables, con-
firming expectations.
Test score models 9.0–9.2 on the probability of a correct response using survey exper-
iment data are in Table 4.18. 21 unique test answers— having implemented quizzes with
10 and 11-questions in the two data collection rounds, respectively—are submitted by
605 test subjects. Question-level variance is large, likely due to variation in question dif-
ficulties. For example, using the confidence ratings analysed in the next section, I learned
that 84.41% of all respondents knew the Leader of the Labour Party with maximum con-
fidence, but only 8.09% picked the Prime Minister of Italy with maximum confidence—a
difficult item given especially that I included two Italian names in the pool of options.
There is also large subject level variation, skills (and maybe confidence) exhibiting a
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variation of e1.79 = 5.47 in terms of odds: this might be the space ‘open’ to be explained
in terms of gender as well as exposure to gender balance in picture stimuli.
Gender does matter. Women fare less well on the tests, the odds estimated to be
e−0.36 = 0.70 or a third less likely than men to get a correct answer. Model expansion
including the effect of treatment, however, finds no reliable treatment effects on women.
Men may have experienced a token boost in getting a correct answer, being 1.7 times
more likely to get the correct answer if viewing pictures with a token woman than men
looking at men only pictures, the effect remaining positive within 90% credible intervals.
Men’s odds may be gradually decreasing, but the effect sizes sit within wide CIs. The
bottom panel of Figure 4.5 shows the relevant marginal effects.
As mentioned earlier, political knowledge may be assessed subjectively. Since con-
ceptually very close to internal political efficacy, as argued at the beginning of this section
and in Chapter 2 Section 2.1.1; as well as empirically part of most political efficacy bat-
teries of survey items, such as the one asked in the BES, I will look at role model effects
on a positive or self-confident assessment of one’s political knowledge in the next section.
Table 4.17: Models 8.0–8.2, Log odds of learning about foreign leaders, BES 2015
m8.0 m8.1 m8.2
DV Learning versus not learning about leaders by Wave 3
Type Binomial / MCMC Binomial / MCMC Binomial / MCMC
Stacked N 8799 8799 8799
Question N 3 3 3
Subject N 3328 3328 3328
Constituency N 605 605 605
DIC 7076.47 6773.09 6572.14
Beta [95% CI] Beta [95% CI] Beta [95% CI]
Intercept 1.74[-2.78;5.36] 2.84[-0.81;6.92] 2.98[-0.66;7.74]
Gender: Woman -1.84[-2.35;-1.37] -2.28[-2.87;-1.75]
Treatment: 20% -0.19[-0.76;0.45] -0.56[-1.08;0.02]
Treatment: 30% -0.13[-0.86;0.45] -0.11[-0.74;0.48]
Treatment: 50% -0.49[-1.31;0.51] -0.03[-0.99;0.96]
Treatment: 60% -0.04[-0.76;0.67] 0.05[-0.86;0.94]
Woman x 20% 0.08[-0.61;0.64] 0.52[-0.11;1.07]
Woman x 30% -0.10[-0.78;0.64] -0.06[-0.71;0.67]
Woman x 50% -0.10[-0.94;0.98] -0.30[-1.33;0.77]
Woman x 60% 0.06[-0.74;1.02] 0.14[-0.89;1.07]
Resp.: Age 0.97[0.85;1.10]
Resp.: Educ. 0.53[0.43;0.64]
Const.: Marginality -0.05[-0.15;0.06]
Gamma [95% CI] Gamma [95% CI] Gamma [95% CI]
Question var (Random) 32.49[0.42;57.09] 14.85[0.29;47.65] 49.28[0.38;55.51]
Subject var (Random) 7.12[5.46;8.69] 5.36[4.40;6.07] 5.93[4.67;6.92]
Constit. var (Random) 0.36[0.09;0.70] 0.38[0.18;0.59] 0.29[0.02;0.52]
Residual var 0.06[0.01;0.10] 0.01[0.00;0.03] 0.02[0.01;0.05]
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Table 4.18: Models 9.0–9.2, Political knowledge test scores, survey experiment
m9.0 m9.1 m9.2
DV Probability of correct test answer
Type Binomial / MCMC Binomial / MCMC Binomial / MCMC
Stacked N 6708 6708 6708
Test question N 22 22 22
Subject N 605 605 605
Coll. rounds 2 2 2
Platform N 2 2 2
DIC 6191.2 6205.5 6150.77
Beta [95% CI] Beta [95% CI] Beta [95% CI]
Intercept 1.83[0.95;2.73] 1.84[1.06;2.58] 1.95[1.01;3.13]
Gender: Woman -0.36[-0.63;-0.15] -0.25[-0.80;0.22]
Treatment: 20% 0.53[-0.08;1.05]
Treatment: 30% 0.30[-0.19;0.91]
Treatment: 50% -0.10[-0.63;0.48]
Woman x 20% -0.54[-1.31;0.24]
Woman x 30% -0.32[-1.17;0.37]
Woman x 50% 0.21[-0.63;1.00]
Gamma [95% CI] Gamma [95% CI] Gamma [95% CI]
Question var (Random) 2.55[0.83;4.77] 2.08[0.82;3.60] 2.80[0.89;5.70]
Subject var (Random) 1.57[0.84;2.34] 1.26[0.93;1.66] 1.70[0.91;2.78]
Coll.round var (Random) 0.00[0.00;0.00] 0.01[0.00;0.00] 0.00[0.00;0.00]
Crowds-pl. var (Random) 0.03[0.00;0.02] 0.01[0.00;0.01] 0.62[0.00;0.05]
Residual var 2.50[0.23;5.01] 1.51[0.77;2.19] 2.96[0.45;6.14]
4.2.3 Political efficacy & related measures
Before analysing political efficacy more comprehensively, across confidence about po-
litical knowledge and beliefs about influencing political outcomes through participation,
I will look at these components separately, subject to availability in the data sets. My
dependent variables comprise, firstly, a single-item subjective assessment of political
knowledge (BES 2015 and survey experiments); secondly, multi-item confidence mea-
sures developed for the survey experiment asking test subjects to indicate their level of
confidence after each submitted answer; thirdly, a single item self-assessed political in-
fluence question asked in the 2010 BES, and finally, a multi-item political efficacy scale
asked in the BES and mirrored in my survey experiment.
Subjective political knowledge
In the BES panel of 2015, the subjective self-assessment question was asked as part of
a standard ‘political efficacy’ battery, where participants could express their agreement
with the statement ‘I understand the most important questions facing this country’. Table
4.19 shows changes in self-assessment through the campaign. Similarly to the increase
in political interest presented previously, women on average reported the largest gains by
Wave 3 (column M∆), but beyond that, there are no clear patterns of treatment effects:
token and critical mass averages are somewhat smaller than men only and parity averages,
although an average gain in ‘women majority’ races does stand out more. Dispersion
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Table 4.19: Descriptive statistics: ‘Subjective’ political knowledge, BES ‘15 and Survey
experiment
Gender Treatm. M Wave 1 M Wave 3 M∆ M Round 1 M Round 2
BES BES Experiment Experiment
Men M.only 3.98 4.01 0.01 4.07 4.03
Token 3.97 4.01 0.02 3.88 4.19
C.mass 4.01 4.02 0.01 3.67 3.94
Parity 4.00 4.04 0.03 3.58 4.06
W.maj. 4.00 4.03 0.04
Women M.only 3.57 3.68 0.09 3.57 3.93
Token 3.58 3.68 0.07 3.82 3.84
C.mass 3.56 3.66 0.07 3.57 3.46
Parity 3.57 3.69 0.09 3.53 3.86
W.maj. 3.59 3.73 0.12
differs across men and women but remain within a narrow range across treatment groups
(SD = 76–79 and SD = 82–89, respectively).
I repeated this question in the survey experiment. The simple group averages in Ta-
ble 4.19 show that the second round of experiments was more successful in reproducing
the gender gap (perhaps due to this being asked after a more difficult political knowledge
question), but that group averages across treatment groups are somewhat inconsistent with
either positive or negative role model effects in either rounds. In the first round, there may
have been a token spike on women’s subjective assessment of their political knowledge,
but a negative critical mass effect dominated in the replication round. Men’s subjective
assessment has gradually decreased as the proportion of women in picture stimuli in-
creased in Round 1, but not in Round 2. There are no consistent patterns in dispersion
across genders. The full range of standard deviations is SD = 0.64–1.00, critical mass
driving the largest variability but I detected no further patterns beyond that.
Tables 4.20 and 4.21 report the model results for subjective political knowledge. Both
dependent variables are standardised for better comparability with the other measures in
this chapter. In the BES, constituency-level variation is estimated at 0, suggesting that
substantively significant effects on this level, namely that of the proportion of women
in campaigns, are unlikely. None of the two sets of models show a decrease in residual
variances by a large magnitude. After inclusion of gender and treatment, explanatory
power may be up to 2% in the survey experiment but less than 1% in the BES data.
Nevertheless, these small variances are likely measurement artefacts, trying to teasing
out variability on a single-item measure with few scale points. I aim to correct for this
with my questions developed to measure confidence below.
Looking at the fixed effects in the BES models, women are found to have assessed
their political knowledge more positively by the post-election wave, if only by a tenth
of a standard deviation. On top of this, treatment effects are estimated to be near zero.
Women respondents of the survey experiment report reliably, a quarter to a third standard
deviation worse assessments of their political knowledge, compared with men—but no
treatment effects are detected in this project either. Interestingly, posterior point predic-
71
Figure 4.6: Treatment x gender marginal effects, Models 10.2 & 11.2
Change in self-assessed political knowledge, BES Internet Panel 2015
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Key: β coefficients (posterior means) and 95% CI corresponding to the effect of women’s presence in campaigns (BES) or picture
stimuli (survey experiment) at the discrete proportions of near 20% or token, near 30% or critical mass, 50% or parity, and women’s
majority near 60%. W stands for women respondents.
tions do increase gradually, as shown by the marginal effects plot in Figure 4.6, but these
effects are likely to counter-balance negative treatment effects on men. Again, at least in
terms of the survey experiment results, these patterns may become sharper with a higher
probability behind these effect sizes with a measurement approach that fixes problems
with scale variability and uses multiple items.
Confidence
I am directly tackling concerns about scale variability and the number of response items
by implementing a quiz question-level measure of confidence. After each question, as
analysed under political knowledge, participants of the survey experiment were asked to
indicate their level of confidence in the answer they were about to submit. Participants
were allowed to guess an answer but asked explicitly to pick the minimum score on the
10-point scale, indicating a least confident answer. Table 4.22 shows group means across
the two genders and treatment groups. In the first round of data collection, test ques-
tions were easier, thus the average confidence scores I report do not move much, except a
moderate decrease in men’s confidence gradually, from men only to parity exposure, and
a very minimal increase of women’s confidence by parity. These movements are much
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Table 4.20: Models 10.0–10.2, Change in Subjective political knowledge, BES 2015
m10.0 m10.1 m10.2
DV Subjective assessment of political knowledge,
Wave 3–Wave1, standardised (z) scale
Type Linear / MCMC Linear / MCMC Linear / MCMC
Subject N 25748 25748 25748
Constituency N 632 632 632
DIC 73073.26 73042.8 73013.96
Beta [95% CI] Beta [95% CI] Beta [95% CI]
Intercept 0.00[-0.01;0.01] -0.05[-0.09;-0.01] -0.04[-0.09;0.00]
Gender: Woman 0.11[0.05;0.17] 0.11[0.04;0.17]
Treatment: 20% 0.02[-0.03;0.07] 0.02[-0.03;0.07]
Treatment: 30% -0.01[-0.06;0.05] -0.01[-0.07;0.04]
Treatment: 50% 0.03[-0.06;0.11] 0.02[-0.07;0.10]
Treatment: 60% 0.02[-0.07;0.11] 0.02[-0.07;0.10]
Woman x 20% -0.05[-0.12;0.02] -0.05[-0.13;0.02]
Woman x 30% -0.02[-0.10;0.06] -0.02[-0.10;0.06]
Woman x 50% -0.03[-0.15;0.08] -0.03[-0.14;0.09]
Woman x 60% 0.01[-0.12;0.12] 0.01[-0.10;0.14]
Resp.: Age -0.03[-0.05;-0.02]
Resp.: Educ. 0.01[0.00;0.02]
Const.: Marginality 0.00[-0.02;0.01]
Gamma [95% CI] Gamma [95% CI] Gamma [95% CI]
Constit. var (Random) 0.00[0.00;0.00] 0.00[0.00;0.00] 0.00[0.00;0.00]
Residual var 1.00[0.98;1.02] 1.00[0.98;1.02] 1.00[0.98;1.01]
Table 4.21: Models 11.0–11.2, Subjective political knowledge, survey experiment
m11.0 m11.1 m11.2
DV Subjective assessment of political knowledge,
standardised (z) scale
Type Linear / MCMC Linear / MCMC Linear / MCMC
Subject N 605 605 605
Coll. round 2 2 2
2 2 2
Platform N 2 2 2
DIC 1719.95 1711.6 1713.15
Beta [95% CI] Beta [95% CI] Beta [95% CI]
Intercept 0.00[-0.08;0.08] 0.13[0.01;0.24] 0.26[0.04;0.48]
Gender: Woman -0.26[-0.41;-0.11] -0.37[-0.65;-0.11]
Treatment: 20% -0.03[-0.32;0.26]
Treatment: 30% -0.29[-0.56;0.04]
Treatment: 50% -0.29[-0.60;0.03]
Woman x 20% 0.15[-0.22;0.60]
Woman x 30% 0.06[-0.35;0.46]
Woman x 50% 0.26[-0.16;0.68]
Gamma [95% CI] Gamma [95% CI] Gamma [95% CI]
Coll.round var (Random) 0.00[0.00;0.00] 0.00[0.00;0.00] 12.14[0.00;0.01]
Crowds-pl. var (Random) 0.00[0.00;0.00] 0.05[0.00;0.00] 0.00[0.00;0.00]
Residual var 1.01[0.89;1.12] 0.99[0.89;1.11] 0.98[0.87;1.09]
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sharper in the second round of data collection, where I implemented a difficult test, sug-
gesting gradual role model effects on women’s confidence and negative effects on men’s
confidence. Scrutinising descriptive results further, it is worth noting that the standard-
ised scores to reflect group averages across both rounds point to a slight curvilinearity of
effects. Men may have experienced a boost in confidence under women’s token status,
while women may have experienced a slight depression of confidence under the same
exposure.
Table 4.22: Descriptive statistics: Confidence in test answers, survey experiment
Gender Treatm. M Round 1 M Round 2 M overall, standard. (z)
Men M.only 3.23 7.13 0.22
Token 3.23 7.83 0.37
C.mass 3.21 7.33 0.25
Parity 3.09 6.04 -0.14
Women M.only 3.06 5.72 -0.24
Token 3.06 5.68 -0.25
C.mass 3.01 6.08 -0.21
Parity 3.08 6.76 0.01
Models 12.0–12.2 tease out these effects on 6,708 responses nested within 605 test
subjects and 22 test questions. Following the variance components or random effect
‘Gammas’ in Table 4.23, it becomes apparent that up to about 2 per cent of subject level
variance may be explained by gender, while treatment may have very little explanatory
power. Residual variances are insensitive to model expansion. Nevertheless, as far as
fixed effects are concerned, my models detect evidence that the initial confidence gap be-
tween men and women is affected women’s proportion in the picture stimuli. The average
treatment effect by parity (on men) is a quarter standard deviation decrease in confidence,
but this is countered by women’s larger, third standard deviation increase in confidence
(Beta ‘Woman x 50%’), suggesting that exposure to a parity of women in picture stimuli
may be enough to close the gender gap as observed under men only exposure. Figure 4.7
shows these marginal effects. Note that, given descriptive findings, these treatment effects
are driven by those detected in the second round of survey experiment, and moderated by
the results in the first round. Nevertheless, besides the difference in magnitude, the effects
are consistent across the two rounds.
This concludes my discussion of one component of political efficacy, examined in
isolation, namely confidence in knowledge and skills. I will discuss more about these
findings in Section Conclusions 4.2.5. Next, I turn to observing another component of
self-efficacy separately, namely perceived political influence, followed by analysis of an
efficacy battery that includes components of subjective assessment, perceived influence
of vote, and external political efficacy, that is, a judgement of whether political actors or
institutions themselves have influence over policy in the first place.
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Figure 4.7: Treatment x gender marginal effects, Model 12.2
Confidence in test answer, political knowledge quiz, survey experiment
20% 30% 50% 60%
W Wx20 Wx30 Wx50 Wx60
-0
.4
0.
0
0.
4
Key: β coefficients (posterior means) and 95% CI corresponding to the effect of women’s presence in picture stimuli at the discrete
proportions of near 20% or token, near 30% or critical mass, and 50% or parity. W stands for women respondents.
Table 4.23: Models 12.0–12.2, Confidence in political knowledge, survey experiment
m12.0 m12.1 m12.2
DV Confidence in political knowledge, standardised (z) scale
Type Linear / MCMC Linear / MCMC Linear / MCMC
Stacked N 6708 6708 6708
Test question N 22 22 22
Subject 605 605 605
Coll. round 2 2 2
Platform N 2 2 2
DIC 15409.72 15405.76 15405.18
Beta [95% CI] Beta [95% CI] Beta [95% CI]
Intercept -0.01[-0.17;0.20] 0.12[-0.08;0.30] 0.14[-0.07;0.34]
Gender: Woman -0.23[-0.32;-0.13] -0.29[-0.47;-0.11]
Treatment: 20% 0.09[-0.09;0.30]
Treatment: 30% 0.02[-0.19;0.22]
Treatment: 50% -0.22[-0.41;-0.02]
Woman x 20% -0.09[-0.37;0.18]
Woman x 30% 0.01[-0.26;0.27]
Woman x 50% 0.37[0.07;0.62]
Gamma [95% CI] Gamma [95% CI] Gamma [95% CI]
Question var (Random) 0.15[0.07;0.25] 0.15[0.07;0.25] 0.14[0.07;0.25]
Subject var (Random) 0.35[0.30;0.39] 0.33[0.29;0.38] 0.33[0.29;0.38]
Coll.round var (Random) 0.01[0.00;0.00] 0.00[0.00;0.00] 0.00[0.00;0.00]
Crowds-pl. var (Random) 0.12[0.00;0.01] 0.05[0.00;0.00] 0.00[0.00;0.00]
Residual var 0.54[0.52;0.56] 0.54[0.52;0.55] 0.54[0.52;0.56]
Perceived influence
Perceived influence over the political outcomes, kept vague in question phrasing, is as-
sessed using a single-item Likert scale in the 2010 BES panels but not repeated in 2015—
latter used a multi-item battery of questions about political efficacy. I am thus able to test
the working hypotheses that women became more efficacious, evidenced through ‘per-
ception of influence’, in constituencies where more women ran for a seat. Table 4.24
shows the 2010 question means per gender and per proportion of women in campaigns.
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Interestingly, respondents of both genders appear to have lost somewhat of their initial
assessment, and men did more so than women. Women seem to have submitted only
a slightly more pessimistic assessment of their influence in the first wave, and some of
these differences evened out by wave 3. There is no clear pattern of effects regarding
the proportion of women campaigning, but men seem to have become less pessimistic in
races with a high percentage of women candidates.
Table 4.24: Descriptive statistics: Perceived political influence, scaled 1–5, BES 2010
Gender Treatm. M Wave 1 M Wave 3 M∆
Men M.only 2.23 1.99 -0.20
Token 2.33 2.02 -0.27
C.mass 2.35 2.13 -0.27
Parity 2.25 2.00 -0.14
W.maj. 2.55 2.48 -0.07
Women M.only 2.26 2.11 -0.12
Token 2.12 1.99 -0.11
C.mass 2.14 2.00 -0.11
Parity 2.45 2.32 -0.20
W.maj. 2.38 2.14 -0.18
The model-based answer to detect ‘treatment’ effects offers no clear patterns either.
Table 4.25 shows that all marginal effects are estimated to be near zero, although the point
estimates do suggest that women become less pessimistic (evidenced by a decreasing
Wave 3 minus Wave1 differential) as the proportion of female candidates increased their
constituencies: a movement invisible through group averages descriptively. The top panel
of Figure 4.8 shows these effects. Finally, it is worth noting that only the inclusion of
control variables on the individual and constituency levels drives down residual variance,
and even that explains only about 1% variability in campaign effects on perceived political
influence.
Political efficacy, multi-component
Political efficacy in the BES 2015 is assessed using multiple questions tapping into its
different aspects, namely into voters’ self-efficacy as active members of the citizenry, and
into external political efficacy broadly assessing if citizens believe that policy makers are
able and willing to implement good policy. At least three questions tapped directly self-
or ‘internal’ type of efficacy, asking to provide a level of agreement with the following
statements. Firstly, analysed above separately as subjective political knowledge, stating
that respondent has ‘a pretty good understanding of the important political issues facing
our country’; secondly, that it ‘takes too much time an effort to be active in politics and
public affairs’, and thirdly, that ‘it is often difficult for [respondent] to understand what
is going on in government and politics’. A fourth statement clearly taps into external
political efficacy, that ‘politicians’ don’t care what people like [respondent] think[s]’. I
discarded further statements either because they were not repeated across the pre- and
post-election waves to analyse campaign effects, or because they tap into some other
dimension that I deemed less relevant for the current study. For example, while one
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Table 4.25: Models 13.0–13.2, Change in political efficacy BES 2010 (single item)
m13.0 m13.1 m13.2
DV Perceived political influence,
Wave 3–Wave1, standardised (z) scale
Type Linear / MCMC Linear / MCMC Linear / MCMC
Subject N 10275 10275 10275
Constituency N 630 630 630
DIC 29162.33 29160.98 29134.26
Beta [95% CI] Beta [95% CI] Beta [95% CI]
Intercept 0.00[-0.02;0.02] -0.02[-0.07;0.04] -0.01[-0.06;0.04]
Gender: Woman 0.06[-0.02;0.14] 0.05[-0.03;0.13]
Treatment: 20% -0.03[-0.10;0.03] -0.04[-0.10;0.03]
Treatment: 30% -0.03[-0.10;0.06] -0.03[-0.12;0.05]
Treatment: 50% 0.02[-0.10;0.15] 0.02[-0.12;0.14]
Treatment: 60% 0.08[-0.07;0.22] 0.06[-0.07;0.21]
Woman x 20% 0.03[-0.06;0.13] 0.04[-0.05;0.14]
Woman x 30% 0.01[-0.10;0.12] 0.02[-0.09;0.14]
Woman x 50% -0.08[-0.25;0.11] -0.08[-0.27;0.08]
Woman x 60% -0.09[-0.28;0.13] -0.07[-0.28;0.13]
Resp.: Age -0.06[-0.07;-0.04]
Resp.: Educ. 0.01[-0.01;0.03]
Const.: Marginality -0.01[-0.03;0.01]
Gamma [95% CI] Gamma [95% CI] Gamma [95% CI]
Constit. var (Random) 0.00[0.00;0.00] 0.00[0.00;0.00] 0.00[0.00;0.00]
Residual var 1.00[0.97;1.03] 1.00[0.97;1.03] 0.99[0.97;1.02]
might consider whether respondent thinks voting for small parties is a waste of effort,
or whether it matters if they vote for a party with a chance to win, but I found no clear
conceptual link between these aspects of political efficacy and women’s empowering or
role model effect in visible roles.
Table 4.26 shows BES 2015 group means averaged across internal and external effi-
cacy items. Typology matters: both men and women seem to judge their personal efficacy
a little better during the campaign but judge the efficacy of politicians in office less opti-
mistically after the campaign. Note that positive changes in internal efficacy are against
the findings on the perceived influence scale, which is likely due to these items relying
heavily on assessments of political knowledge rather than the explicitly on the influence
component. Women’s gains in internal efficacy seemingly surpass men’s as the proportion
of women increases in the campaign environment.
I implemented these four questions in both rounds of the survey experiment. Table
4.27 shows gender and treatment group means on these items. There are no major differ-
ences between the results from these rounds and point to small effects, generally in the
direction that men’s self-efficacy decreased by parity exposure, while women reported
greater self-efficacy only at token and critical mass proportions but a decrease when ex-
posed to a parity of male and female politicians, suggesting curvilinearity. In terms of
external efficacy, effect directions across data collection rounds appear entirely inconsis-
tent.
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Table 4.26: Descriptive statistics: Political efficacy, BES 2015
Gender Treatm.
Internal Internal External External ∆ In. ∆ Ex.
M w1 M w3 M w1 M w3
Men M.only 3.46 3.55 3.71 3.59 0.09 -0.12
Token 3.48 3.54 3.66 3.59 0.06 -0.07
C.mass 3.51 3.56 3.67 3.57 0.05 -0.10
Parity 3.55 3.58 3.60 3.49 0.03 -0.11
W.maj. 3.47 3.54 3.66 3.56 0.07 -0.10
Women M.only 3.21 3.31 3.63 3.53 0.10 -0.10
Token 3.21 3.33 3.65 3.56 0.12 -0.09
C.mass 3.19 3.32 3.68 3.56 0.13 -0.12
Parity 3.20 3.35 3.61 3.57 0.15 -0.04
W.maj. 3.19 3.32 3.67 3.60 0.13 -0.07
Table 4.27: Descriptive statistics: Political efficacy, Survey experiment
Gender Treatm.
Internal Internal External External
M Round 1 M Round 2 M Round 1 M Round 2
Men M.only 3.52 3.36 2.17 3.89
Token 3.37 3.22 2.49 3.39
C.mass 3.39 3.33 2.52 3.49
Parity 3.24 3.26 2.34 3.68
Women M.only 3.25 3.30 2.51 3.54
Token 3.22 3.48 2.33 3.45
C.mass 3.19 3.42 2.34 3.89
Parity 3.11 3.39 2.31 3.83
My models explore effects on political efficacy as a single latent construct. Models
14.0–14.2 on campaign effects point to low variance components on the constituency level
casting doubt on the explanatory power of candidate gender. Only subject level variation
seems significant, explaining about 5 per cent of variation in changes on the standardised
scale. Nevertheless, fixed effects point to treatment effects on women. Visualised in the
middle panel of Figure 4.8, there is enough evidence that the proportion of women as
candidates in the 2015 parliamentary constituencies gradually improved women’s politi-
cal efficacy, likely driven by the self-efficacy items in the latent construct. Men were less
efficacious with more women in campaigns. However, both effects break by women’s
parity presence, where gains up to parity seemingly diminish.
By contrast, these effects are not mirrored in my survey experiment. There is weak
evidence behind a negative effect of token and critical mass proportions but the effect sizes
are insufficient to change political efficacy as predicted in the baseline category: men. The
bottom panel of Figure 4.8 shows these marginal effects. Finally, model expansion did
not affect residual variance suggesting very poor explanatory power.
A follow-up analysis confirms that, if fitted separately on external efficacy, efficacy
effects were driven by internal political efficacy or self-efficacy. Using campaign effects
on external efficacy as the dependent variable, all treatment coefficients remain close
to zero, the gender x treatment interactions ranging between β = 0.01–0.04. The only
exception is a small effect under tokenism on men’s external political efficacy, which has
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decreased marginally by -0.05 in terms of standard deviation unit19. Looking at external
political efficacy in the survey experiment, where Round 1 and Round 2 averages pointed
in inconsistent directions, the model-based answer is seemingly driven by Round 1 results
in that it detects positive effects on men’s external efficacy, concentrated under tokenism,
β = 0.35 in standard deviation unit20; and negative effects on women’s external efficacy,
concentrated under critical mass, β =−0.53 in standard deviation unit21.
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Figure 4.8: Treatment x gender marginal effects, Models 13.2 and 14.2
Change in perceived political influence, BES Internet Panel 2010
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Change in political efficacy, BES Internet Panel 2015
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Treatment x gender marginal effects, Model 15.2
Political efficacy, survey experiment
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Key: β coefficients (posterior means) and 95% CI corresponding to the effect of women’s presence in picture stimuli (survey
experiment) at the discrete proportions of near 20% or token, near 30% or critical mass, and 50% or parity. W stands for women
respondents.
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Table 4.28: Models 14.0–14.2, Change in political efficacy, BES 2015 (multi item)
m14.0 m14.1 m14.2
DV Political efficacy, Wave 3–Wave1, standardised (z) scale
Type Linear / MCMC Linear / MCMC Linear / MCMC
Stacked N 95000 95000 95000
Item N 4 4 4
Subject 23750 23750 23750
Constituency N 632 632 632
DIC 268825.48 268805.25 268789.94
Beta [95% CI] Beta [95% CI] Beta [95% CI]
Intercept 0.00[-0.01;0.01] 0.01[-0.02;0.03] 0.01[-0.01;0.03]
Gender: Woman 0.00[-0.03;0.04] 0.00[-0.03;0.03]
Treatment: 20% -0.03[-0.06;0.00] -0.03[-0.06;0.00]
Treatment: 30% -0.03[-0.06;0.00] -0.03[-0.06;0.00]
Treatment: 50% -0.05[-0.10;-0.01] -0.05[-0.10;-0.01]
Treatment: 60% -0.02[-0.06;0.03] -0.02[-0.06;0.03]
Woman x 20% 0.04[0.01;0.08] 0.04[0.00;0.08]
Woman x 30% 0.05[0.01;0.10] 0.05[0.01;0.10]
Woman x 50% 0.07[0.00;0.13] 0.07[0.00;0.13]
Woman x 60% 0.04[-0.03;0.10] 0.04[-0.02;0.11]
Resp.: Age -0.01[-0.02;-0.01]
Resp.: Educ. 0.00[0.00;0.01]
Const.: Marginality 0.00[-0.01;0.00]
Gamma [95% CI] Gamma [95% CI] Gamma [95% CI]
Item var (Random) 0.00[0.00;0.00] 0.00[0.00;0.00] 0.00[0.00;0.00]
Subject var (Random) 0.05[0.04;0.06] 0.05[0.04;0.06] 0.05[0.04;0.06]
Constit. var (Random) 0.00[0.00;0.00] 0.00[0.00;0.00] 0.00[0.00;0.00]
Residual var 0.95[0.94;0.96] 0.95[0.94;0.96] 0.95[0.94;0.96]
Table 4.29: Models 15.0–15.2, Political efficacy (multi item), survey experiment
m15.0 m15.1 m15.2
DV Political efficacy, standardised (z) scale
Type Linear / MCMC Linear / MCMC Linear / MCMC
Stacked N 2420 2420 2420
Item N 4 4 4
Subject 605 605 605
Coll. round 2 2 2
Platform N 2 2 2
DIC 5944.99 5941.17 5944.35
Beta [95% CI] Beta [95% CI] Beta [95% CI]
Intercept -0.02[-0.88;0.86] 0.06[-0.89;0.98] 0.00[-1.00;0.89]
Gender: Woman -0.15[-0.23;-0.05] -0.02[-0.20;0.16]
Treatment: 20% 0.11[-0.07;0.30]
Treatment: 30% 0.03[-0.15;0.23]
Treatment: 50% -0.02[-0.21;0.19]
Woman x 20% -0.21[-0.44;0.06]
Woman x 30% -0.22[-0.45;0.04]
Woman x 50% -0.12[-0.38;0.16]
Gamma [95% CI] Gamma [95% CI] Gamma [95% CI]
Question var (Random) 0.72[0.05;2.62] 0.61[0.03;1.74] 4.58[0.05;2.61]
Subject var (Random) 0.22[0.19;0.27] 0.22[0.18;0.26] 0.22[0.18;0.26]
Coll.round var (Random) 0.00[0.00;0.00] 0.00[0.00;0.00] 0.00[0.00;0.00]
Crowds-pl. var (Random) 0.02[0.00;0.00] 0.00[0.00;0.00] 0.28[0.00;0.01]
Residual var 0.59[0.55;0.63] 0.59[0.55;0.62] 0.59[0.55;0.63]
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4.2.4 Trust
Trust in MPs is measured in a question battery together with trust in a number of other
people and institutions. The same Likert scales were implemented in both election years
in the BES. Tables 4.30 and 4.31 show group averages through the 2010 waves: men and
women both grew more trusting of MPs by the end of both election periods, Delta M
column showing within-individual average changes. Regarding the proportion of women
running, there are baseline differences in 2010 showing that citizens were more trusting
of politicians in constituencies where women eventually ran for seats. The magnitude
of change, in terms of campaign effects on trust, may still probe to be dependent on the
proportion of female candidates in campaigns: in 2010, men grew less trusting of politi-
cians in constituencies with a growing presence of women as candidates while women
clearly became more trusting. Discarding women majority constituencies, it seems that
this pattern is repeated in 2015 if much more moderate.
Comprable across data collection modes, Table 4.32 shows standard scores of aver-
age trust per groups together with the survey experiment. Group averages in latter are
inconsistent with campaign effects in the BES: men and women were most trusting of
MPs under token exposure, while both groups less trusting as the proportion of women
increased beyond token in picture stimuli—suggesting this be a kind of tokenism that uni-
formly affects men and women, unlike my results regarding political interest and learning
in the BES.
Table 4.30: Descriptive statistics: Trust in MP’s, BES 2010
Gender Treatm. M Wave 1 M Wave 3 M∆
Men M.only 3.26 3.98 0.65
Token 3.53 4.13 0.64
C.mass 3.91 4.34 0.38
Parity 3.67 3.97 0.03
W.maj. 4.43 4.25 -0.08
Women M.only 3.46 4.08 0.57
Token 3.59 4.21 0.65
C.mass 3.60 4.14 0.48
Parity 3.06 3.82 0.74
W.maj. 4.18 4.72 1.00
Table 4.31: Descriptive statistics: Trust in MP’s, BES 2015
Gender Treatm. M Wave 1 M Wave 3 M∆
Men M.only 3.18 3.41 0.22
Token 3.23 3.38 0.16
C.mass 3.23 3.39 0.17
Parity 3.26 3.43 0.17
W.maj. 3.22 3.45 0.23
Women M.only 3.17 3.36 0.19
Token 3.20 3.36 0.16
C.mass 3.20 3.36 0.14
Parity 3.11 3.33 0.23
W.maj. 3.16 3.26 0.13
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Table 4.32: Descriptive statistics: Trust in MP’s, all data, standard scores (z)
Gender Treatm. M BES ‘10 M BES ‘15 M Exp. Round 1 M Exp. Round 2
Men M.only -0.08 0.02 -0.15 -0.34
Token -0.01 0.01 0.29 0.37
C.mass 0.09 0.01 -0.12 0.00
Parity -0.09 0.04 0.12 -0.13
W.maj. 0.05 0.05
Women M.only -0.04 -0.01 -0.02 0.05
Token 0.03 -0.01 0.23 0.23
C.mass -0.01 -0.01 -0.28 0.02
Parity -0.16 -0.03 -0.03 -0.18
W.maj. 0.27 -0.07
The model tables show that the variance explained by my host of predictors is negligi-
ble, except in the survey experiment where inclusion of treatment does improve about 2%
of model fit, likely because of tokenism. In both approaches, the token fixed effects are
largest, affecting men and women uniformly but in inconsistent directions. In the BES,
people grew more trusting of MPs but the magnitude of this change is smallest in token
constituencies; whereas in the survey experiment, trust peaks for both men (the baseline
Beta, Treatment: 20%) and women (Beta ‘Woman x 20%” negative but very large pos-
terior variance, making it unlikely to reverse baseline tokenism). Figure 4.9 shows these
marginal effects.
Table 4.33: Models 16.0–16.2, Change in trust in MPs, BES 2010&2015
m16.0 m16.1 m16.2
DV Trust in MPs, Wave 3–Wave1, standardised (z) scale
Type Linear / MCMC Linear / MCMC Linear / MCMC
N 27022 27022 27022
Constituency N 632 632 632
Election years 2 2 2
DIC 76314.54 76323.65 76281
Beta [95% CI] Beta [95% CI] Beta [95% CI]
Intercept 0.00[-0.02;0.01] 0.04[0.00;0.08] 0.04[-0.01;0.08]
Gender: Woman -0.02[-0.07;0.04] -0.01[-0.07;0.04]
Treatment: 20% -0.05[-0.10;0.00] -0.05[-0.10;0.00]
Treatment: 30% -0.04[-0.10;0.01] -0.04[-0.10;0.01]
Treatment: 50% -0.05[-0.14;0.03] -0.05[-0.15;0.03]
Treatment: 60% -0.01[-0.10;0.07] -0.01[-0.10;0.07]
Woman x 20% 0.01[-0.05;0.07] 0.02[-0.04;0.09]
Woman x 30% -0.01[-0.09;0.06] 0.00[-0.08;0.07]
Woman x 50% 0.07[-0.05;0.18] 0.07[-0.04;0.20]
Woman x 60% -0.03[-0.15;0.08] -0.03[-0.15;0.08]
Resp.: Age 0.04[0.03;0.05]
Resp.: Educ. 0.02[0.00;0.03]
Const.: Marginality 0.00[-0.01;0.01]
Gamma [95% CI] Gamma [95% CI] Gamma [95% CI]
Constit. var (Random) 0.00[0.00;0.01] 0.00[0.00;0.01] 0.00[0.00;0.01]
Election year var (Random) 0.00[0.00;0.00] 0.00[0.00;0.00] 0.00[0.00;0.00]
Residual var 0.98[0.97;1.00] 0.98[0.97;1.00] 0.98[0.97;1.00]
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Table 4.34: Models 17.0–17.2, Trust in MPs, survey experiment
m17.0 m17.1 m17.2
DV Trust in MPs, standardised (z) scale
Type Linear / MCMC Linear / MCMC Linear / MCMC
Subject N 605 605 605
Coll. round 2 2 2
Platform N 2 2 2
DIC 1718.98 1720.97 1712.8
Beta [95% CI] Beta [95% CI] Beta [95% CI]
Intercept -12.36[-0.08;0.09] 0.01[-0.11;0.12] -0.24[-0.45;-0.01]
Gender: Woman -0.02[-0.18;0.14] 0.26[-0.08;0.55]
Treatment: 20% 0.57[0.26;0.88]
Treatment: 30% 0.18[-0.15;0.51]
Treatment: 50% 0.24[-0.06;0.58]
Woman x 20% -0.37[-0.80;0.06]
Woman x 30% -0.36[-0.77;0.11]
Woman x 50% -0.37[-0.79;0.09]
Gamma [95% CI] Gamma [95% CI] Gamma [95% CI]
Coll.round var (Random) 14.89[0.00;0.00] 0.00[0.00;0.00] 0.00[0.00;0.00]
Crowds-pl. var (Random) 0.00[0.00;0.00] 0.00[0.00;0.00] 0.00[0.00;0.00]
Residual var 1.00[0.89;1.11] 1.00[0.89;1.11] 0.98[0.86;1.09]
4.2.5 Section conclusions
In this section I presented results from an observation study and an experimental study
side by side, grouped by dependent variable, to investigate if evidence is consistent that
exposure to female candidates in increasing proportions improves psychological engage-
ment with politics. While I will look at broad patterns and groups of effects across both
political engagement and attentional engagement in the Chapter Conclusions (next sec-
tion), here I am briefly summarising my results, focusing on consistency across observa-
tional and experimental approaches.
Women’s political interest is impacted by tokenism in the BES and only one round of
survey experiments. Learning about politics follows this pattern in the BES, but it seems
that both men’s and women’s performance on the political knowledge test asked in the
survey experiment is improved by token exposure. Women assess their subjective political
knowledge more pessimistically than men do in both study types, and the BES study finds
that women became more optimistic about their subjective political knowledge through
the campaign. These movements are, however, not impacted by women’s proportion in
campaigns, and evidence is weak that subjective political knowledge increases as more
female candidates are shown in picture stimuli. Confidence about political knowledge,
measured in the survey experiment after each test question, does shows gradual improve-
ments, and women became very confident about their test answers by parity. This effect is
not mirrored on perceived political influence but it is detected on a more comprehensive
set of questions about political efficacy: women became more efficacious in constituen-
cies where more women ran in the 2015 election. This is not replicated in the survey ex-
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Figure 4.9: Treatment x gender marginal effects, Models 16.2 & 17.2
Change in Trust in MP’s, BES Internet Panels 2010 & 2015
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Key: β coefficients (posterior means) and 95% CI corresponding to the effect of women’s presence in campaigns (BES) or picture
stimuli (survey experiment) at the discrete proportions of near 20% or token, near 30% or critical mass, 50% or parity, and women’s
majority near 60%. W stands for women respondents.
periment using similar questions. Looking at external efficacy separately as a dependent
variable, however, both the BES and the survey experiment models suggested positive
token effects on men’s, suggesting that they judged politics itself to be more responsive
and responsible with minimal presence of women. Finally, trust is impacted across the
BES and the survey experiments in inconsistent directions.
4.3 Chapter Conclusions
In this chapter, I reviewed observational and experimental evidence in support of role
model effects on a number of potential outcomes, to explore if an increase in women’s
numerical representation increases women’s ‘attentional engagement’ with politics, their
self-assessed political interest, political knowledge (performance and confidence), polit-
ical efficacy and trust in politicians. Across these dependent measures, two noteworthy
patterns emerged: a non-linear token effect on attention-related variables, and a linear or
gradual effect on self-efficacy related variables.
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Token spike
Looking at psychophysiological data, as well as repeated survey measures from the British
Election Study panels, I found that, although lower numbers of women pay attention
to politics than men, regardless of whether featuring only men or a high proportion of
women politicians, there is a spike in attention when presented with a single or token fe-
male politician. In the lab experiment, a cognitive test and a host of eye-tracking measures
showed that women’s token presence in pictures of political groups drew participants’ at-
tention, but in the few cases when their proportion increased and surpassed men’s, this
attention surplus diminished.
Correspondingly, women panel respondents in the 2010 and 2015 BES became more
interested in the election than men by the end of both campaign periods but on top of
this mechanism, in constituencies where campaigns featured a token female candidate,
women became most interested. Perhaps stemming from a surplus in attention, my mod-
els using BES data also showed that the odds of learning about politics were highest
in these token constituencies. Importantly, however, the survey experiment using ran-
domised picture exposure offered mixed evidence. While women were most interested in
politics under token exposure in the first round of data collection confirming tokenism,
they were unaffected in the replication round.
Although a token spike has not yet been identified in the previous studies, the ob-
servation does link to a stream of literature on symbolic representation about the novelty
of women on the campaign trail. In a long-standing empirical project exploring role
model effects on political discussion, a recent US panel study [21] provides evidence that
women were likely to discuss more about politics as a result of ‘unique and newsworthy’
[21, p.424] female candidates, where ‘novelty’ means that the candidate herself had not
previously ran for office, and the state is such that it had not already been represented by a
woman in the House, the Senate, or as Governor. A recent survey of political engagement
finds some evidence that mixed-gender races, that is when a woman is standing against a
man, increase political interest, decrease alienation and ‘indifference’ of candidates, but
not same-gender races including a woman against a woman [129].
My results provide further evidence that variables related to attention to politics, and
attention’s potential consequences such as the frequency of political discussion or politi-
cal knowledge of current affairs, are influenced by women’s presence as long as it carries
a novelty factor, if there is a sharp enough contrast to draw attention. It seems that in the
context of the 2010 and 2015 elections, one woman challenging men may have invoked
more election interest than a second or third woman entering the campaign in which case
average election interest is ‘back’ to the figures when no women at all ran.
My experimental evidence of tokenism, however, is only conclusive on the micro-
level, in the lab experiment. In the online experiment, I did not succeed in replicating my
own finding to causally link exposure to a token woman to higher self-assessed political
interest. The null result is, naturally, open to speculation on many points: about mea-
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surement (single Likert item to self-report) in the context of the small N in the individual
study rounds, and that the effect sizes in question are very small both in the lab and in
the BES. I would not, however, discard substantive reasons behind the null effects. On
the micro level, a token woman presence may invoke immediate interest in the stimulus
but experimental subjects may not have consciously translated this into political interest.
In the BES, while the survey question is similar, exposure to token female politicians is
repetitive, spread out through the entire campaign period, and through multiple channels
including media appearance and campaign material. It is this component of repetitive
exposure, and to a variety of stimuli, is what future experimental investigation may need
to tackle.
Linear role model effects
Unlike the ‘token spike’, a more gradual pattern emerged on some of the dependent
variables, centering on self-efficacy. In the survey experiment, women were more and
more confident about their political knowledge, interpreted as part of political efficacy
[48],[49], as the proportion of women increased in the pool of pictures they viewed, and
gave most confident answers when presented with a parity of men and women. In terms
of broader measures of political efficacy including perceptions about self-assessed polit-
ical influence, no such pattern emerged in the survey experiment but it did in the 2015
BES: women, taking their baseline efficacy prior to the campaign, became more and more
efficacious as the proportion of women campaigning in their constituency increased. Sep-
arating the concepts of self- or internal efficacy about one’s own political influence from
trust in MPs and external efficacy, my models found that former is implicated while latter
may not be.
This linear role model effect, namely, that a gradually improving numerical balance
gradually increases political engagement, is seemingly not driven by a novelty factor. Al-
though there were not many Critical mass and parity pictures in the pool of visuals in the
lab experiment, the first evidence does suggest that attention was not biased to these pro-
portions as much as they were to token pictures. In other words, something beyond mere
attention surplus could be at work when looking at effects on self-efficacy. The follow-
ing chapters test possible channels of mediating mechanisms explicitly, including effects
through alleviating anxiety and stereotype threats, which may be the explanation behind
these linear effects. In another chapter, I test mediation through improving expectations
about policy output, which may prove to be influential self-efficacy judgments as well.
At the core of the argument, the role model hypothesis was simply that if more and
more women participate in politics in visible roles, more and more women in the elec-
torate will engage with politics. My analysis shows different indicators of psychological
engagement are impacted differently by gender balance, and this schematic form of the
role model hypothesis is most likely to apply on self-efficacy, that is women’s confidence
in their competency and potency in the political world.
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Further considerations
In this chapter, I pooled together analysis of a host of indicators measuring psychologi-
cal engagement with politics to get a comprehensive review of role model effects, with
previous research testing only in isolation or reporting variables selectively. I conclude
that the majority of evidence altogether supports some form of the role model hypothesis,
while the pooled evidence from two rounds of survey experiments yielded inconclusive
effects, potentially casting doubt on a simplistic causal link between picture exposure and
self-reports of political engagement. I did not address some of the negative effects found
in the replication round of the survey experiment, such as a seemingly negative impact
of critical mass exposure on political efficacy, or negative token and critical mass effects
on trust in MPs. Although negative effects would be consistent with the self-deflating or
‘harmful social comparison’ theories briefly mentioned in Chapter 2 Section 2.1.2, there
are three main reasons I do not see these as direct evidence: inconsistency across depen-
dent measures, inconsistency across data collection rounds, and inconsistency with the
lab experiment and the observational study.
Although conceptually separate, there is a degree of empirical overlap between self-
reported political interest, subjective political knowledge, political efficacy, and trust. It
is likely that a negative effect would impact most of these consistently, which is not the
case: women assessed their political knowledge better when viewed pictures with at least
a token woman in them, and the pattern is somewhat similar, if more variable, for political
interest. Second, the negative critical mass tendency is mostly driven by the replication
round of data collection, these effects were entirely missing from the original data collec-
tion round, showing larger than expected volatility of the survey responses. Third, there
is no corresponding tendency either in the lab experiment regarding attentional bias, or
in the BES data that would lend more support to self-deflating social comparisons, which
were both more supportive of role model effects. These considerations do not mean that
the negative effects should be entirely discarded from my analyses, but are meant to ex-
plain why I choose not to engage with these results on a more theoretical level.
Finally, I did not interpet treatment effects on the outgroup members explicitly. Im-
plicitly, men are always in the analysis because I reserved the term of ‘role model effects’
for cases when they were unique to women. This is formalised in the analysis with the
interaction term: a significant gender and treatment interaction means in practice that men
were either unaffected, or negatively affected by the treatment. Both movements can be,
however, of substantive interest. Interstingly, men were less likely to learn about foreign
leaders in token constituencies, assessed their political knowledge lowest if critical mass
or parity group respondents of the survey experiment, and were least confident in their test
answers in the parity group—one might speculate if this is because of perceptions about
group hierarchy and changes in dominance structures. Looking at self-confidence, men
may have experienced a token boost in confidence, another aspect of tokenism that may
be worth exploring in furture studies, especially in relation to Stereotype Boost Theory
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[156],[157].
Notes
5These would be connected by arbitrarily small saccadic movements, which in reality took 20-30 mil-
liseconds, see Table 4.1 on page 46
6My special thanks go to Ekaterina Kolpinskaya, looking through media content of the near one hundred
twitter handles I selected for inspection.
7This is for purposes of exploratory and future analyses. Political engagement data might be linked
directly to attentional engagement patterns, however, it is outside the scope of the current studies.
8The BES website itself has major party candidate data, but that is insufficient to determine the propor-
tion of women amongst all candidates.
9The variable is standardised by centering on its mean and dividing by standard deviation. Thus a value
of 0 in the model table means 0 ·SDX +MX = 0 ·94.41+393.62 = 393.62
10I excluded practice trials.
11I excluded incorrect responses from further analysis
12I give more detailed explanation on the appropriateness of multilevel modelling in Chapter 3, as well
as a note at the beginning of this Chapter.
13Note that this is not pre-set for any participant but pairs appeared in randomised order.
14For this analysis, both rounds targeted 300 respondents, see Methodology Chapter. In the first round,
I encountered difficulties recruiting women participants through the CrowdFlower platform, and I thus
needed this to be on the field for longer. The second round of data collection targeted a sample of 750 but
2/3s of the sample received further manipulation, to be explored in the subsequent chapters.
15Most often non-English names as well as those names where predicted gender probability was too
close to call.
16These numbers exclude Northern Ireland constituencies as the BES does not sample respondents from
that country.
17The choice of using Bayesian modelling over Maximum Likelihood is due to some of the models,
especially the latent ones, having a complicated nesting structure that would have convergence problems
with the non-Bayesian packages available currently. In an earlier draft of this chapter, many of these models
were fit by Maximum Likelihood, producing identical results.
18Though the component may not have reached convergence, see diagnostic plots
1995% credible intervals -0.11– -0.01.
2095% credible intervals 0.06–0.60.
2195% credible intervals -0.93– -0.15.
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Chapter 5
Understanding the role model effect:
Stereotype threat and affect as mediating mechanisms
[...] We believe that it would be productive to look once again at the mes-
sages received by males and females of various ages in order to understand
how the taste for politics emerges. [130]
[...] Even if a young woman emerges from childhood as a relatively cool
and resilient adult, she still has to do battle with social forces that seem bent
on making her anxious. [158]
My studies report evidence that, when present in increasing proportions,
women in politics alleviate situation-specific anxieties when it comes to as-
sessing one’s own political skills; that at least a single standing ‘token’
woman may be relied on if one does not feel that taking action to confront
stereotypes is possible; but that in the presence of anger, women confronted
stereotypes, and did not turn away from politics.
As an important argument behind descriptive representation, studies have described a
number of ‘symbolic’ or non-policy benefits that seem to generate directly from (women’s)
greater political representation, often described broadly as representatives instilling a
‘sense of empowerment’ [22],[30],[159]. While an uncertain claim in terms of tangible
effects, a number of studies, including my thesis, takes this to suggest that increasing de-
scriptive representation can foster political engagement, and thus more women in visible
political office could increase women’s participation, interest, and efficacy in politics.
There is, however, further uncertainty about the underlying mediating mechanisms as
to why descriptive representation leads to increased political engagement. Only very few
empirical studies make attempts to demonstrate a more thorough causal mechanism that
is convincing on the individual level, one of the hypotheses being that women may expect
their interests be better represented by women politicians [22],[19]. On this level of voter
psychology, as I argue in Chapter 2 especially in Sections 2.1 and 2.1.2, there have been
no competing hypotheses tested in the representation literature.
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In the previous chapter, of ‘Measuring role model effects’, I only tested ‘blank’ cau-
sation between treatment and effect, namely exposure to an increasing number of women
politicians on a range of indicators of attentional engagement first, and then on psycholog-
ical engagement with politics. I concluded that (a) women’s ‘striking minority’ or token
presence may have the greatest impact on attention-related outcomes such as election in-
terest or learning about politics, and (b) a more gradual increase in women’s presence
towards parity is most likely to affect deeper psychological variables such as confidence
in political knowledge and self-efficacy in general.
In this chapter, I test hypotheses derived directly or indirectly from the stereotype
threat paradigm predicting that women’s attention to, and self-efficacy in politics is in-
creased at least partly because, as role models, visible female politicians help alleviate
often implicit anxieties stemming from negative stereotypes about women’s role and ca-
pabilities in politics. For the purposes of this chapter, I call the process implicit because
it does not presuppose (nor does it exclude) that women more instrumentally consider if
their own policy preferences are being advanced by fellow women in office, an option
tested in more detail in Chapter 6. Rather, anxieties may guide behaviour automatically,
generating from subtle signals from the political environment, such as an evaluative ap-
prehension in the presence of out-group members, namely men, advantaged by the same
gender stereotypes that harm women in the political domain. I elaborate more on the idea
of stereotype threat as situational performance anxiety in Chapter 2.
While ideally I would test mediation on all variables tested in Chapter 4 as well, I have
to accept data limitations. Following experimental procedures I expand on below, I am
able to test for mediation mainly in the survey and the lab experiment data sets, which also
means that I am tied to effects observed in those data sets. The survey experiment was,
generally speaking, unsuccessful in detecting effects on most of my survey measures,
except confidence about test answers. Therefore, I can use confidence as the dependent
variable in two of the following mediation studies, treating it as an example of a gradual
role-model effect on self-efficacy22. For the token spike-type of effect on attention, I am
able to test some mediation at the end of this chapter using the lab experiment data, but
unable to scrutinise tokenism on political interest, an effect detected in the BES only but
inconclusive across two rounds of survey experiments.
My contribution here is twofold. Firstly, as argued in Chapter 2, the stereotype threat
literature has been especially useful in demonstrating causal linkage between experimen-
tally induced stereotypes (very explicit reminders of stereotypes), anxiety, and malperfor-
mance on tasks; however, the experimental paradigm itself has difficulties when applied
to study naturally and more subtly occurring stereotypes such as those in political repre-
sentation. In the lab, stereotypes are ‘written out’ explicitly, whereas outside of the lab,
stereotypes are ‘in the air’[41]. In my survey experiment, introduced in Chapter 4, treat-
ment is not artificial induction of threat but threat levels are a function of gender balance
in picture stimuli, with the primary hypothesis being that increasing exposure to pictures
of candidates as role models alleviate stereotype threats. This methodology is meant to
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reflect more how stereotype threat in the political domain occurs in the real world such as
through media exposure or perhaps even on the ballot paper.
Secondly, stereotype-induced anxiety has been linked extensively to testing perfor-
mance, especially on mathematics tests [32],[37],[160],[161], with somewhat limited
scope and only very few studies go beyond standard tests to implicate more general con-
cepts such as ‘intellectual identity’ [41] or ‘academic disidentification’ [42]. Mine is
an attempt to link stereotypes to self-efficacy and confidence about political knowledge
which manifest in a much less-defined set of behaviours, but may ultimately result in
engagement with, or disengagement from, politics.
Through the studies reported here, I am taking a range analytical and measurement
strategies to get at the role of affect, predominantly anxiety, as mediator of role model
effects. Study 1, the simplest experimental approach, follows the logic of the survey ex-
periment first reported in Chapter 4, in that participants are shown pictures of groups
of politicians with the proportion of women in them experimentally manipulated. After
treatment delivery, they provided a quick assessment either of state anxiety (a general as-
sessment of emotion felt ‘right now’) or anxiety felt specifically over political knowledge
testing23. Through these measures, I am able to perform a first, admittedly approximate,
test of mediation via a set of regressions, to assess if (a) treatment impacted anxiety,
(b) anxiety impacted confidence about political knowledge, and finally, (c) the effect of
treatment is captured entirely by anxiety, when both variables are used simultaneously to
predict confidence: a popular approach in mediation analysis [162],[163],[164]. Strong
evidence of mediation is an affirmative answer to all the three questions (a)–(c). In this
approach, the mediator measure is observed after treatment delivery, thus randomisation
inference does not apply on this variable to make a confident causal claim. It might be the
case that role model effects impact a third, unmeasured variable which is responsible for
both the anxiety and the efficacy effects, thus merely removing anxiety would not result
in improved efficacy per se.
To strengthen claims of causality, in Study 2, a novel ‘crossover’ experimental ap-
proach [165],[164], I introduce experimental manipulation on the mediator variable, anx-
iety itself, after delivery of the picture treatment. Participants were randomly reassigned
into an anxiety group where they were invited to list and reflect on things or situations
that make them anxious, often used in experiments to instil state anxiety. A control group
listed and elaborated on objects they have recently purchased online24. In this frame-
work, men only exposure serves as a control group both in terms of picture treatment
and in terms of mediation. Beyond ‘men only’ exposure, all ‘treated’ subjects, thus those
viewing at least 20% of women or more in picture stimuli, were assigned either in the
anxiety group or remained in a control. Without role model effects reversed by anxiety,
only members of the control (online shopping) group are expected to report higher con-
fidence in political knowledge, their anxieties being successfully alleviated by exposure
to role models. By contrast, if viewing gender balanced pictures first, but subsequently
members of the anxiety group, role model effects on test subjects are expected to dimin-
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ish via re-induced anxiety, and confidence about political knowledge would be reported to
comparable levels to those who viewed ‘men-only’ or low gender-balance pictures. The
middle panel of Figure 5.1 is a visual representation of this approach.
Women rep –
Women rep +
Women rep –
Women rep +
Anxiety +
Anxiety –
Anxiety +
Anxiety +
Control
Sadness +
Anger +
Control
PE –
PE +
PE –
PE +
PE –
AE +
AE –
AE –
Study 1
Study 2
Study 3
Manipulated Observed/Hypothesized
PE stands for ‘political engagement’, AE for ‘attentional engagement’25. +− signs show hypothesized (if observed)
or manipulated direction of effects on women respondents.
Figure 5.1: Chapter 5—Overview of studies
In Study 3, I revisit the eye-tracking study of attentional engagement, to investigate
mediation on attentional bias to gender-balance in political groups. Affect remains exper-
imentally manipulated, similarly to Study 2, but with more differentiation in type and a
much clearer target. In one group, female participants are invited to reflect on their expe-
rience with everyday sexism in particular and on those filling them with anger. In another
group, they focussed on experiences with sexism resulting in feelings of helplessness and
sadness. While originally I aimed to keep to the distinction between anger and anxi-
ety, my exploratory study26 concluded it may be difficult to invite participants to reflect
vaguely on ‘anxiety’ in the context of sexism, but the contrast between action-oriented
negative feelings (anger) and feelings where action did not seem possible (sadness, help-
lessness) were more typical on the topic. I elaborate more on theory regarding emotions
of approach and avoidance at the end of Chapter 2 Section 2.1.3.
The following sections report the results of Studies 1–3. To keep to a unified set of
statistical tools across my chapters, treatment/control group means per gender (if appli-
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cable) are estimated via MCMC using flat priors, however, the classical or frequentist
approaches to estimate group means and variances were confirmed to produce identical
results. Since these studies are less exploratory in nature than those in Chapter 4 but
test specifically for mediation, there is no model expansion from ‘null’ or uninformative
effects.
5.1 Study 1: Self-assessed anxiety as mediator
Anxiety has been central to the theory of stereotype threat since its inception [32]. In
the original studies, self-reported anxiety is linked to both receiving the negative treat-
ment (that is, stereotype threat) and to weak performance on standardised testing, while
those in the control group not experiencing stereotype threat typically report less anxiety
and perform better [35],[37]. Although treatment is defined differently, Study 1 does fol-
low this basic analytical path to demonstrate a link between gender balance in political
office and anxiety levels to infer on stereotype threat, and to seek evidence that alleviat-
ing anxiety results in greater political engagement, specifically confidence about political
knowledge (see section above), thus isolating stereotype threat as mediating mechanism
in role model effects.
5.1.1 Data & procedures
In this round of data collection (in previous chapters I called this the second or ‘replica-
tion round’ running through May 2017), I ran an online experiment in which N = 667
participants with a near equal gender split were randomly assigned to view and rate a
series of pictures with politicians that were either only men, or featuring a token woman,
a Critical mass of women, or a Parity of men and women. Immediately following treat-
ment delivery, participants answered a question about state emotion (a self-assessment of
emotions felt ‘right now’) or about testing emotion, latter being an assessment of how
they feel about the upcoming political knowledge test. The random split between these
emotion questions was to ensure participants do not have to answer two similar ques-
tions subsequently, minimising the possibility of projecting responses from one question
to another, a strategy they might adopt to provide consistent answers across similar ques-
tions27. Finally, dependent measures of political engagement were taken including a po-
litical knowledge test where 10 UK and international politicians needed to be matched
with their jobs, along with an assessment after each question about how confident respon-
dents were in their test answers (in the following referred to as ‘confidence about test
answer’, the dependent variable of this study).
The two emotion questions comprise identical check lists of emotions (respondents
ticking the boxes next to each they feel), taken from established inventories of anxiety
(STAI, [166]): pleasant, relaxed, calm, uncomfortable, uneasy, worried, nervous, jittery,
indecisive, anxious and uncertain. For state anxiety, these were phrased to indicate they
felt these emotions ‘right now’, for testing anxiety, the phrase ‘Regarding the test of po-
litical knowledge’ was added. These together are meant to measure the same underlying
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Table 5.1: ‘Regarding the test of political knowledge, would you say you are experiencing any these emotions right now?’
Treatment Gender % Pleasant % Relaxed % Calm % Uncomfortable % Uneasy % Worried % Nervous % Jittery % Indecisive % Anxious % Uncertain
Men only Men 60.00 80.00 85.00 15.00 10.00 20.00 15.00 10.00 20.00 15.00 40.00
Token 72.00 80.00 82.00 20.00 18.00 16.00 14.00 12.00 18.00 14.00 28.00
Cmass 56.52 73.91 73.91 19.57 26.09 23.91 23.91 13.04 28.26 23.91 41.30
Parity 56.00 76.00 76.00 20.00 20.00 26.00 24.00 8.00 30.00 26.00 46.00
Men only Women 43.48 43.48 43.48 39.13 43.48 43.48 43.48 21.74 47.83 43.48 69.57
Token 51.22 63.41 73.17 24.39 29.27 29.27 24.39 19.51 41.46 29.27 53.66
Cmass 51.11 75.56 77.78 13.33 24.44 20.00 15.56 6.67 17.78 22.22 48.89
Parity 66.67 73.68 71.93 19.30 22.81 19.30 26.32 15.79 29.82 19.30 42.11
N All 338.00 338.00 338.00 338.00 338.00 338.00 338.00 338.00 338.00 338.00 338.00
χ2(3,N = 168) Women 5.25 8.07 8.84 6.50 3.90 5.60 6.62 4.00 8.71 5.20 5.12
p 0.15 0.04 0.03 0.08 0.27 0.13 0.08 0.26 0.03 0.16 0.16
Table 5.2: ‘Would you say you are experiencing any these emotions right now?’
Treatment Gender % Pleasant % Relaxed % Calm % Uncomfortable % Uneasy % Worried % Nervous % Jittery % Indecisive % Anxious % Uncertain
Men only Men 77.78 88.89 100.00 11.11 5.56 5.56 0.00 5.56 11.11 0.00 22.22
Token 75.00 88.64 84.09 11.36 15.91 13.64 9.09 9.09 22.73 15.91 25.00
Cmass 72.73 87.27 76.36 10.91 14.55 21.82 9.09 7.27 21.82 18.18 18.18
Parity 64.00 88.00 98.00 6.00 6.00 14.00 8.00 6.00 18.00 14.00 24.00
Men only Women 83.33 77.78 83.33 5.56 5.56 16.67 11.11 5.56 11.11 22.22 16.67
Token 73.47 75.51 85.71 8.16 12.24 22.45 18.37 4.08 10.20 12.24 26.53
Cmass 66.67 74.51 80.39 25.49 23.53 19.61 19.61 15.69 23.53 17.65 27.45
Parity 67.50 67.50 75.00 17.50 25.00 20.00 17.50 20.00 27.50 25.00 45.00
N All 329.00 329.00 329.00 329.00 329.00 329.00 329.00 329.00 329.00 329.00 329.00
χ2(3,N = 159) Women 2.00 0.87 1.56 7.24 5.12 5.60 0.31 0.69 6.48 5.531 5.71
p 0.55 0.83 0.66 0.06 0.16 0.95 0.87 0.09 0.14 0.48 0.12
Note: participants were either exposed to test emotion (Table 5.1) or state emotion (Table 5.2) questions, via random assignment.
χ2 shows chi-square test statistic for subsample of women, and p the respective p-values.
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construct, namely anxiety, tapping into its varying intensities to obtain a continuum as
some of these emotions are expected to be less striking and thus easier to subscribe to
(e.g. calm) than others (e.g. anxious). Inherently, testing anxiety is state anxiety, but a
more situation specific version of it evoked by fear of performing badly on a test. For a
discussion of situation-specific anxiety approaches in the stereotype threat literature, refer
to Chapter 2 Section 2.1.3.
Tables 5.1 and 5.2 on page 95 show the percentage of respondents selecting each par-
ticular emotion, demonstrating a number of key patterns. Firstly, there is a clear gender
gap in testing anxiety but not in state anxiety. Regarding the political knowledge test,
often twice as many women as men respond with anxiety, holding across the majority of
anxiety markers. There may be some gaps within the state anxiety markers as well (see
‘uncomfortable’), however, these differences do not hold across all anxiety markers and
sometimes go the opposite direction (such as ‘anxious’ against ‘uncomfortable’). Sec-
ondly, the raw percentages already suggest treatment effects on testing anxiety (tested
in sections below) gradually following patterns in gender balance. Women do not only
become less anxious across all of the indicators but by parity their anxiety seems to have
hit bottom, being comparable to men’s initial levels. Thirdly, men’s testing anxiety has
increased as the proportion of women did in the picture treatment. Fourth, both men
and women may have become more anxious with regards to state anxiety; the between-
treatment movements being much smaller and not visibly dependent on respondent gen-
der.
To test anxiety as a mediator relying on this set of measures, I follow an analytical
strategy most common in regression-based mediation analysis [162], in one instance used
to explore mediation of role model effects as well though on different mediating mech-
anisms [19]. Firstly, I regress Treatment on Effect, namely refit Model 12 in Chapter 4,
to find out if increasing gender balance in the picture pool increased women’s confidence
about their political knowledge. Note that the answer in Chapter 4 is one across both data
collection rounds, but here I need to establish the specific treatment effect in the current
data set only. Secondly, I take the first half-step to mediation analysis and regress Treat-
ment on Mediator, to find out if increasing numerical balance in pictures decreased (state
and testing) anxiety. Thirdly, I take the second half-step in mediation analysis and regress
Mediator on Effect, to find out if anxiety decreased confidence about political knowledge.
Finally, I run an analysis of the full, mediated path in which both Treatment and Medi-
ators are regressed on the Effect, where suggestive of mediation is if the gender balance
effect disappears via inclusion of self-assessed anxiety, as a result of the mediator variable
capturing enough of the treatment effect.
96
Treatment
Treatment
Mediator
Mediator
Effect
Effect
Treatment Mediator Effect
Direct path
Interim 1
Interim 2
Full path
Treatment is increased gender balance in picture stimuli, mediators are state anxiety and
testing anxiety. Effect is ‘Confidence about political knowledge’.
Figure 5.2: Chapter 5 Study 1—Steps of mediation analysis
Table 5.3: Descriptive statistics: Respondent N & Mean Conf. in political know.
Treatment Gender Respondent N Mean confidence
(across 10 scales each ranges 1–10)
Men only Men 38 7.13
Token 36 7.83
Critical mass 35 7.33
Parity 31 6.04
Men only Women 41 5.72
Token 31 5.68
Critical mass 28 6.08
Parity 36 6.76
5.1.2 Results
Step 1, Direct path: From cause to effect
Chapter 4 found most evidence that an increasing proportion of women in the picture
pool increased women participants’ confidence in their political knowledge, measured
across confidence ratings following each test question. To that end, it used a combined
sample generated from an ‘original round’ of data collection and a ‘replication round’
of data collection. Specifically this meant pooled analysis of 605 subjects’ self-assessed
confidence recorded across 10 political knowledge test questions, resulting in a final N =
6,708 sample size in the item-level or ‘stacked’ data set for analysis.
Here I refit this model using the the ‘replication round’ sample, without pooling,
where the emotions questions were asked to investigate mediation. For this model, sub-
ject N drops to 276, with the item-level or stacked N being 2,760. Note that the data
collection round itself included a larger respondent N = 667: currently using the control
group of people receiving no further experimental manipulation such as those reported in
Chapter 5 Study 2 and Chapter 6 Study 2. Further details about the sample structure are
given in Chapter 3, Methodology.
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Key: β coefficients (posterior means) and 95% CI corresponding to the effect of women’s presence in picture stimuli at the discrete
proportions of near 20% or token, near 30% or critical mass and 50% or parity.
Figure 5.3: ‘Direct path’ results, Model 18
In a 4 treatment groups · 2 gender categories design, after removal of missing data
on gender (1 record), cell sizes average at 34.5, determined via randomisation and thus
range from 28 (women in the Critical mass group) to 41 (women in the men only group).
Confidence is indicated on 10 point scales. In Chapter 4, I used standardised scores to
be able to compare effects across several dependent variables. In this chapter, my DV is
fixed across Studies 1 and 2, therefore I will use the untransformed raw scores in a linear,
multilevel regression fit by MCMC to derive the 8 group means and infer on treatment
effects.
Model 18 fits this model, results are reported in the first column of Table 5.5 on page
5.5. Replicating the findings in the pooled sample in Chapter 4, I find strong evidence
that though women are less confident than men are in their test answers if viewing men
only pictures (estimated at -1.42 points on a 10 point scale), the confidence gap disap-
pears gradually as gender balance in picture stimuli increases and women catch up to,
if not surpass, men’s confidence levels by parity (see also ‘Models 18–21: Summary of
key effects’ on page 104). Figure 5.3 shows the treatment group-level predictions using
the 95% posterior distribution, showing relatively wide prediction intervals due to large
unexplained variance, nevertheless demonstrating treatment effects.
Step 2, Interim link: From treatment to mediator
In this section I explore treatment effects on anxiety, an essential link to establish if the ab-
sence or low proportions of women in visible political office may translate into stereotype
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threat, and to see if improving gender balance successfully alleviates this threat. On the
one hand, I keep the split between testing-specific anxiety and more diffuse state anxiety
(see Tables 5.1 and 5.2) by analysing them separately; on the other, I pool the 11 anxiety
markers together within these two, treating them all as tapping into the same underlying
construct, namely either ‘state anxiety’ or ‘test anxiety’.
I begin with a confirmatory scaling exercise testing this unidimensionality via Mokken
scaling [167],[168, for R package]. I obtain high scale scalability coefficients [169] H =
0.57(SE = 0.03) for state anxiety and H = 0.62(SE = 0.03) for testing anxiety suggesting
good measurement validity. Pairs of items, if measuring similar latent constructs, should
and do co-vary highly, across both anxiety types only 10 out of 110 possible pairings
having normed covariance less than 0.50.
Given satisfactory scale performance, I am confident in pooling together the single
item responses into a stacked data set similar to the one used in the previous section,
and thus obtain a sample structure where 11 emotion responses are nested within N =
327 individuals if testing treatment effects on state anxiety, and N = 336 individuals if
testing treatment effects on testing anxiety, resulting in stacked N’s for analysis of 3,597
and 3,696, respectively. Respondent N’s increase compared to the ‘direct path’ model:
while there the dependent measure, confidence in test answers, was taken after further
experimental manipulation, irrelevant for the direct path model and thus excluded from
the sample, state anxiety or test anxiety measures were taken before the delivery of those
further manipulations thus all subjects remain in this sample.
Using this stacked data set, Models 19.1 (state anxiety) and 19.2 (testing anxiety) are
multilevel logistic regression models fitted with MCMC to derive the probability of an
anxious response within 8 treatment x gender groups (fixed effects) and controlling for
unequal variances on the individual and test item levels (random effects). I expand on the
full results in the first two columns of Table 5.4. Broadly, treatment effects on state anxi-
ety do not hold, while treatment effects on Testing anxiety do stand out. In other words,
there is no evidence that either of the treatment groups instilled or decreased self-assessed
state anxiety but there are gradual effects on testing anxiety. The direction of these effects
depends heavily on respondent gender. Men become more anxious about political knowl-
edge testing if viewing more women in picture stimuli. The average treatment effect on
men under parity exposure is over one and a half times (e0.47 = 1.60) more likely anxiety
than under men only picture exposure, though still sizeable posterior probability (about
15%) of null or negative effects. Effects are much more robust on women, the odds of an
anxious response decreasing to about a tenth of that observed under men only exposure.
The predicted proportion of women, as visualised by Figure 5.4, decreases from 45% to
17% by token, 10% by critical mass, and 9% by parity. There is a small residual variance
left in terms of odds in Model 19.2 suggesting good model fit, especially contrasted with
that of the state anxiety model.
This concludes the test of emotion as a dependent variable, to be integrated into the
full mediation model in Step 4. Though no treatment effects were detected on self-
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Figure 5.4: ‘Interim link 1’ results, Model 19.2
assessed state anxiety, for full information, the latent variable will be included along
with testing anxiety in the further models even though current results cast doubt on its
constituent role in mediating role model effects.
Step 3, Interim link: From mediator to effect
In this model, anxiety is the independent and confidence is the dependent variable. Simi-
larly to the direct path model, this model will make use of a narrower subject pool N = 276
(see above) but since state or testing anxiety were presented as alternative questions, the
former model will use subject N = 130 and latter N = 146, resulting in stacked N’s across
confidence ratings through 10 test questions of 1,300 and 1,460, respectively.
In this setup, however, anxiety needs to be a single independent latent variable on
the individual level as the more efficient stacking approach is only feasible if applied to
latent dependent variables. To this end, data reduction techniques such as factor analy-
sis are available. Given discreet data observed through dichotomous response patterns
(respondents either ‘felt’ given emotion or ‘did not feel’ given emotion, I use an Item
Response Theoretical framework to generate this latent variable given the 11 individual
emotion-item responses [170],[171, for R package].
Latent trait models under IRT such as the current ones for testing- and state anxiety
are widely used in psychometrics research specifically to evaluate scale validity, an issue
I addressed briefly in the previous section via reporting Mokken’s scalability coefficients.
These models estimate further useful information, not of immediate interest in this sec-
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tion, such as variation across single items, in my case emotion markers, due to item ‘diffi-
culties’ (how typically or rarely ‘felt’ an emotion is in the sample) as well as due to items’
‘discriminatory power’ (how well a particular item distinguishes between levels of anxi-
ety, for example, is the particular item needed to describe extreme levels of anxiety or al-
ternatively, is it simply needed to split between high and low anxieties). These IRT models
find that that there is relatively little variation across coefficients associated with item dif-
ficulties for state anxiety (0.91–1.52), but somewhat more in testing anxiety (0.16–1.25),
the extremes being ‘uncertain’—a typical choice among respondents— and ‘jittery’—
choice not very typical among respondents. Similarly, discrimination parameters vary
more in testing anxiety than in state anxiety in which ‘indecisive’ (β = 1.35,SD = 0.20)
may not discriminate extreme high anxiety individuals from moderate anxiety individuals
very well, as opposed to the reverse coded ‘relaxed’ (β = 6.70,SD = 1.97).
Via this model, I am able to derive, for each respondent, a factor score to describe
his or her level or intensity of anxiety. These scores are estimates themselves, subject
to standard error but are nevertheless useful summary estimates of the level of anxiety
felt by test subjects. These scores are standardised, those around 0 indicating closeness
to an estimated population-level average, and negative values indicating below-average,
positive values indicating above-average state or test anxiety. State anxiety factor scores
range from -0.54–1.73 with a mean of -0.07 and a standard deviation of 0.59, test anxiety
factor scores range from -0.80–1.68, with a mean 0.14 and a standard deviation of 0.79.
These scores are thus imputed in the stacked data set to fit Model 20.1 with state
anxiety and Model 20.2 with testing anxiety, both being multilevel linear models using
the 1–10 test answer confidence ratings as dependent variable, fit by MCMC, random
effects defined as test questions (confidence submitted across 10 questions in the political
knowledge quiz) and subjects to reflect nesting structure. Full results are reported in Table
5.4.
Model 20.1 using state anxiety as a predictor, does not find enough evidence of an
effect on confidence, the posterior mode of the of the ‘Anx state’ Beta is essentially zero,
surrounded by large credible intervals. Model 20.2, however, finds a testing anxiety effect
predicting a decrease in confidence of 0.74 (confidence measured on a 10 point scale)
corresponding to a unit increase in latent anxiety. Using the empirical range of the anxiety
scores (see paragraph above), respondents’ predicted confidence at low anxiety (-0.80) is
around 7.55 (well above average) whereas for a high anxiety individual it is predicted at
5.77 (below the average of 6.33 across both genders). Figure 5.5 plots this regression line.
Interestingly, a closer inspection of random effects show that anxiety over the political
knowledge test left still a fair portion of residual variation in test answer confidence.
Step 4, Full mediated path
The previous models presented necessary evidence that women’s self-assessed anxiety,
expressed specifically over political knowledge testing, may be a mediator of stereotype
threat effects and results in uncertainty about the test answers themselves. Contexts where
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Figure 5.5: ‘Interim link 2’ results, Model 20.2
role model effects were hypothesized, namely exposure to more women in picture stimuli,
translated into less anxiety and more confidence about test answers. These models cast
doubt that my self-assessed state anxiety measure works as a mediator.
Models 21.1 and 21.2 (full results in Table 5.5) present the fully mediated path right
next to the direct path, presenting a regression in which both treatment and mediators,
state anxiety and testing anxiety, are regressed on test answer confidence. Key indepen-
dent variables are the 8 groups corresponding to combinations of gender x treatment, as
well as the additive anxiety effects. As asserted in the regression-based mediation anal-
ysis literature, a successful mediator captures treatment effect in its entirety—I will pay
attention to both effect sizes and credible intervals—while a partial mediator may cap-
ture some of the treatment effect but may also allow the original treatment variable to
retain some explanatory power. Thus the basic expectation, if mediation is present, is that
gender balance in pictures would cease to be a predictor of test answer confidence while
(testing) anxiety predicts test answer confidence on its own.
The model-based results confirm this expectation. Although state anxiety does noth-
ing to remove treatment effects, remaining an essentially null effect, the testing anxiety
coefficient remains robust and consistently negative within a 95% highest posterior den-
sity region. In this model, both gender and treatment lose their magnitude as predictors
with credible intervals enclosing zero in all treatment groups. The single-standing gender
coefficient is cut by more than a half compared with the direct path model. Though still
not exactly zero, it has a much larger posterior variance, suggesting that testing anxiety
explains the gender gap as observed especially under men only exposure. A similar pat-
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Table 5.4: Models 19.1–19.2 and 20.1–20.2, ‘Interim links’
beta m19.1 m19.2 m20.1 m20.2
DV Pr(state anxiety) Pr(testing anxiety) Confidence in test answer, scaled 1–10
Type Binomial / MCMC Binomial / MCMC Linear / MCMC Linear / MCMC
Stacked N 3597 3696 1300 1460
Subject N 327 336 130 146
Item N 11 11 10 10
DIC 1857.16 2453.47 6161.76 6784.76
Beta [95% CI] Beta [95% CI] Beta [95% CI] Beta [95% CI]
Intercept -5.45[-7.98;-2.74] -2.41[-3.84;-1.12] 6.35[5.25;7.60] 6.95[5.69;8.20]
Gender: Woman 0.34[-2.76;3.41] 2.22[0.55;3.83]
Treatment: 20% 0.57[-2.09;3.05] -0.58[-1.86;1.00]
Treatment: 30% 1.21[-1.30;3.72] 0.42[-1.10;1.74]
Treatment: 50% 0.80[-1.70;3.08] 0.47[-0.49;1.81]
Woman x 20% 0.43[-3.13;3.86] -0.49[-2.50;1.47]
Woman x 30% 0.41[-3.32;3.70] -2.11[-4.14;-0.21]
Woman x 50% 1.28[-2.09;4.78] -2.36[-4.62;-0.56]
Anx: state -0.07[-0.72;0.56]
Anx: testing -0.74[-1.14;-0.32]
Gamma [95% CI] Gamma [95% CI] Gamma [95% CI] Gamma [95% CI]
Subject var 14.27[7.50;20.94] 6.80[5.16;8.53] 4.55[3.47;5.94] 3.46[2.52;4.31]
Item var 1.21[0.26;2.75] 0.88[0.22;1.85] 3.11[0.87;6.92] 3.99[1.17;8.76]
Residual var 2.83[0.40;5.50] 0.04[0.02;0.08] 6.09[5.63;6.57] 5.58[5.18;6.03]
tern is observed looking at the treatment coefficients, notably a parity effect halved, large
credible intervals not ruling out the possibility of null effects. Comparing the direct path
model with the fully mediated path model using testing anxiety, my results thus suggest
that testing anxiety mediated role model effects on women’s confidence.
Table 5.5: Models 18 & 21.1–21.2, Direct and mediated (‘full’) paths
m18 m21.1 m21.2
DV Confidence in test answer, scaled 1–10
Type Linear / MCMC Linear / MCMC Linear / MCMC
Stacked N 2760 1300 1460
Subject N 276 130 146
Item N 10 10 10
DIC 12958.73 6160.14 6785.28
Beta [95% CI] Beta [95% CI] Beta [95% CI]
Intercept 7.17[5.93;8.68] 6.76[5.25;8.05] 7.34[6.02;8.89]
Gender: Woman -1.42[-2.27;-0.48] -1.83[-3.17;-0.49] -0.72[-1.89;0.58]
Anx: state -0.17[-0.76;0.46]
Anx: testing -0.63[-1.04;-0.15]
Treatment: 20% 0.68[-0.21;1.61] 1.45[0.06;2.86] -0.07[-1.50;1.03]
Treatment: 30% 0.18[-0.73;1.10] 0.42[-1.07;1.82] 0.30[-0.94;1.52]
Treatment: 50% -1.13[-2.08;-0.24] -0.96[-2.15;0.58] -1.02[-2.28;0.32]
Woman x 20% -0.74[-2.04;0.60] -0.84[-2.76;1.09] -0.33[-2.34;1.33]
Woman x 30% 0.17[-1.16;1.57] 0.54[-1.61;2.69] -0.58[-2.69;1.08]
Woman x 50% 2.17[0.88;3.40] 2.65[0.66;4.47] 1.35[-0.64;3.06]
Gamma [95% CI] Gamma [95% CI] Gamma [95% CI]
Subject var 3.68[2.97;4.45] 3.83[2.75;5.10] 3.47[2.45;4.37]
Item var 3.47[0.99;7.17] 3.01[0.87;6.59] 3.79[1.12;8.19]
Residual var 5.86[5.53;6.20] 6.08[5.62;6.59] 5.57[5.13;5.94]
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Table 5.6: Models 18–21: Summary of key effects
Model DV. Key IV. β [95% CI] subject N stacked N
Direct path 18 Confidence Parity x Women 2.17 [0.88;3.40] 276 2,760
Interim link 1 19.1 State anxiety Parity x Women 1.28 [-2.09;4.78] 327 3,597
19.2 Testing anxiety Parity x Women -2.36 [-4.62;-0.56] 336 3,696
Interim link 2 20.1 Confidence State anxiety -0.07 [-0.72;0.56] 130 1,300
20.2 Confidence Testing anxiety -0.74 [-1.14;-0.32] 146 1,460
Full path/ state a. 21.1 Confidence Parity x Women 2.65 [0.66;4.74] 130 1,300
21.1 Confidence State anxiety -0.74 [-0.76;0.46] 130 1,300
Full path/ test a. 21.2 Confidence Parity x Women 1.33 [-0.38;3.10] 146 1,460
21.2 Confidence Testing anxiety -0.63 [-1.04;-0.15] 146 1,460
Full results at respective model tables. ‘95% CI’ is the 95% highest posterior density area of the predictors. ‘Stacked N’ is the
number of test items or emotion items x number of respondents, after missing data exclusion.
5.1.3 Section Conclusions
In this study, I presented results of a regression-based approach to mediation analysis
broken down into four steps. In Step 1, I confirmed that my treatment, an experimentally
improved gender balance in picture stimuli depicting political campaign groups, impacted
if respondents gave a confident answer to their political knowledge test questions. As sug-
gested by the role model hypothesis, women were more confident across 10 test answers
if looking at political groups featuring a higher proportion of women. At the same time,
men gave less confident answers although, looking at the model-based predictions, they
may have experienced a confidence boost when exposed to a token female presence.
In Step 2, I looked at self-assessed anxiety expressed through 11 emotion markers
measuring either diffuse state anxiety (‘Would you say you are experiencing this emo-
tion now?’) or testing anxiety (‘Regarding the upcoming political knowledge test, would
you say you are experiencing this emotion now?’) and confirmed that treatment effects
impacted the assessment of testing anxiety: women gave systematically less anxious re-
sponses on these emotion markers if viewing pictures with improved gender balance pre-
viously.
In Step 3, I regressed both these types of anxieties on confidence and found that
testing anxiety, not state anxiety, predicted test answer confidence. A potential concern is
whether ‘testing anxiety’ and ‘test answer confidence’ may capture too similar concepts
that the relationship between them is perhaps definitional, rather than causal. My results
in terms of residual variance, however, suggest that a variance amounting to almost half
of the full range of the dependent variable (5.58, or a standard deviation of 2.36) is left
unexplained after factoring in testing anxiety.
Finally, in a fully mediated path, my model presented evidence that gender and treat-
ment effects on confidence may be captured by testing anxiety, establishing this emotion
as a mediator of treatment effects. A summary of the key effects within these paths is
displayed in Table 5.6.
Drawing heavily on the stereotype threat and role model literature, I treat this as pre-
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liminary evidence that political role models, potentially women in visible political office,
can alleviate stereotype threat effects in the political domain, such as women’s poten-
tial disengagement from politics. That stereotype threat is a relevant concept in political
behaviour, is captured by pointing at anxiety itself as mediator: according to this inter-
pretation, political engagement may be driven not only by policy considerations or even
partisanship but also by more automatic, affective processes.
Before drawing broader conclusions about the role of stereotype threat in women’s
political engagement, however, there are potential limitations to point to. First, although
this study utilised experimental manipulation of treatment in a survey experiment setup,
it still relies on observational data about emotion. While the process of mediation seems
plausible looking at the regression results, and presents sufficient evidence to the causal
‘primacy’ of treatment (proportion of women politicians), it leaves the relationship be-
tween mediator, effect and unobserved variables, unaddressed. It remains open whether
treatment impacted some other variable that manifests both in anxiety and confidence.
Additionally, self-assessed emotions are subject to misinterpretation and misreporting
on the respondent’s behalf. For instance, testing anxiety inherently is state anxiety in that
it is momentarily felt anxiety. Differences emerge in that the state emotion was diffuse,
not mentioning any target, but testing anxiety was an explicit reminder of the upcoming
test. When at the point of testing, those reporting no state anxiety have likely generated
some anxiety. Looking at emotion directly at testing without relying on self-report is
however not feasible in an online experiment.
To overcome at least some limitations in the observational approach, and to further
examine the role of state anxiety in its more general sense, in Study 2 I undertake a differ-
ent approach in mediation analysis. Via experimental manipulation of state anxiety before
testing, I am seeking to introduce a more appropriate test of causality. Though limitations
still apply, especially at the point that more reliable—such as psycho-physiological—
measures of anxiety are not taken in an online survey setup, I will be able to use Study 2
as robustness check of results in Study 1 and potentially clear up if differences between
state anxiety and testing anxiety were purely methodological or more substantive.
5.2 Study 2: Experimental anxiety as mediator
Most studies test underlying mechanisms by observation. In randomised trials, following
treatment delivery, it is very straightforward to collect measures not only on a hypothe-
sized effect but on a hypothesized mediator as well and compare both across treatment
groups to infer on mediation. In Study 1, this meant looking at self-assessed anxiety,
measured after delivery of picture stimuli, and I concluded they lent support to the hy-
pothesis that role models increased women’s confidence about their political knowledge
via successfully alleviating anxieties over political knowledge testing.
There were, however, a number of limitations I identified. First, while the causal
mechanism seems, on the surface, tenable because of treatment randomization, there is
no comparable randomization inference applicable to anxiety; anxiety levels were self-
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reported but not experimentally manipulated. Without an element of randomization on
anxiety alternative and unobserved mediators affecting both emotion and the dependent
variable cannot be ruled out.
Second, though my analysis found ‘testing anxiety’ to mediate stereotype effects, it
failed to uncover effects through more diffuse ‘state anxiety’ self-reports which would
lend further support to the anxiety hypothesis altogether. I concluded that differences
between testing and state anxiety may lie in one of them including a reminder of the
upcoming political knowledge test, which may have ‘helped’ self-report in giving an as-
sessment of anxiety, while the other did not include anything to assess anxiety about,
which may have prevented accurate appraisal of emotion. Nevertheless, further tests on
anxiety are needed to clarify why the discrepancy between these two measures emerged.
Third, I pointed out that in the web survey context I could only collect self-report
measures about anxiety, though across multiple emotion markers. There are a number of
obvious limitations relying on these variables, and in the stereotype threat literature these
issues have repeatedly emerged when self-report led to inconsistent or null results while
physiological measures often revealed heightened anxiety [34].
Though statistical adjustments are available to reduce bias stemming from failure to
include unobserved variables, [172],[173] in Study 2 I overcame the first problem via
research design, rather than post hoc adjustments, and introduced randomisation on the
mediator variable itself. Essentially, treated subjects—viewers of role model pictures with
at least a token woman in them—are randomly reassigned into a control and an anxiety
group carrying out two writing tasks that were meant to induce state anxiety. By reflecting
on anxious experiences, I obtain a re-induced anxiety group where role model effects may
vanish, if the anxiety mediation hypothesis stands.
The second and third problems are addressed partially via a different measurement
strategy where self-report is not used. Strict separation between state anxiety and testing
anxiety also disappears and the focus in the writing task is on state anxiety in general.
The next sections review this design and the results. Table ?? below shows possible
combinations of treatment and mediation groups. Within the framework of Chapter 5, see
also ‘Chapter 5—Overview of studies’ on page 93 for a better comparison with the rest
of the studies.
Table 5.7: Chapter 5 Study 2—Experimental design
Picture treatment
Control
‘Men only’
Treatment
≥ ‘Token’
Control Confidence – Confidence +
Mediation
Anxiety x Confidence –
Treatment is exposure to pictures of groups of politicians featuring 0% men only, 20% token, 30% critical mass, or 50% parity
presence of women. Randomised mediation induces state anxiety: anxiety group carried out two writing tasks reflecting on ‘things
that make [them] anxious’, control group on items recently bought online. Dependent variable is confidence about political
knowledge, +/- signal hypothesized direction of effects on women.
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5.2.1 Data & procedures
This study uses survey experiment data from the ‘replication round’ of data collection
where mediation was also investigated, overlapping with the previous study with one
important distinction: here I am able to use a larger sample of N = 471 respondents,
keeping a near equal gender split. By contrast, by the end of Study 1 sample sizes for
both state anxiety models and testing anxiety models were below 150 as those numbers
were exclusive of the number of participants analysed here in the ‘anxiety group’, see
below and Chapter 3 Figure 3.4 on page 3.4 depicting sample management.
Table 5.8: Descriptive statistics: Respondent N & Mean Conf. in political know.
Treatment Mediation Gender Respondent N Mean confidence (1–10) St.Dev.
Men only (Control) Men 38 7.13 3.47
Token Control 36 7.83 3.06
Token Anxiety 34 7.43 3.25
Critical mass Control 35 7.33 3.22
Critical mass Anxiety 33 7.39 3.34
Parity Control 31 6.04 3.64
Parity Anxiety 32 7.32 3.26
Men only (Control) Women 41 5.72 3.65
Token Control 31 5.68 3.60
Token Anxiety 31 6.37 3.63
Critical mass Control 28 6.08 3.58
Critical mass Anxiety 33 5.94 3.77
Parity Control 36 6.76 3.28
Parity Anxiety 32 6.89 3.27
After picture exposure, participants were randomly reassigned into a control and an
anxiety group28. All of them had to carry out two writing tasks: in the control group,
participants were invited to first list a few things they had recently purchased online, and
then were asked to describe one of those items more in detail. In the anxiety group,
participants were invited to list a few things that make them anxious, and were then asked
to elaborate on one of the things/experiences listed. This basic writing task was meant to
induce state anxiety, a method to create experimental emotion with relatively consistent
results or ‘compliance’ rates in previous studies [174].
An important detail is that, due to sample size limitations, participants in the ‘men
only’ picture-viewing groups did not get sorted into an anxiety group. Besides opera-
tional reasons, this is also defensible on theoretical grounds: via mediation I test how
and why treatment works, rather than the absence of the treatment. The hypothesis about
mediation is that role models alleviate anxieties, however, there is no explicit hypothesis
about mediation in the de facto ‘control’ or untreated group, which here is viewers of
‘men only’ pictures. It is this group where highest anxiety levels by women are hypoth-
esized (and also observed in Study 1), and treatment is concerned with the removal of
this negative emotion. Rather than inducing anxiety, it would have made sense to remove
anxiety experimentally in this group, which remains outside of the scope of this study.
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Experimentally created anxiety is hypothesized to re-induce anxiety in the treated
(viewers of role model pictures) and thus diminish role model effects on test answer
confidence. The group not receiving experimental anxiety induction would then perform
as expected in Chapter 5 Study 1 and Chapter 4: women viewing role model pictures
would give more confident test answers, while those viewing men only pictures would
give less confident answers.
Table 5.8 is an overview of test answer confidence descriptively per combinations of
treatment x mediation categories. These averages suggest that maybe mediation effects
do not follow the hypothesized path: looking at women, though control group averages
follow the role model effect (peaking at parity), the anxiety group averages show that
perhaps (a) ‘anxious’ women were more confident under token woman presence than in
the control group and that (b) ‘anxious’ women may be comparably confident to their
control counterparts under parity presence in the picture stimuli. While options (a) and
(b) both suggest that role model effects prevail despite re-induced anxiety, these averages
across all confidence ratings may hide important variations and thus I will look at the
model-based answers to determine if state anxiety stands as a mediator.
The basic analytical strategy to follow may be simpler than the strategy introduced
in the previous, regression-based mediation study in that it is feasible in single step of
estimation to derive 2 x 7 group means: for each gender, one 0% or men only group
mean (the baseline, control group), and for 20% or token, 30% or critical mass, and 50%
or parity treatment groups, a group mean under control (online shopping) and one under
anxiety. To be able to make the appropriate comparisons of treatment and anxiety effects
within gender (and foremost women), however, I am presenting results step-by-step in
smaller and simpler models, namely
1. Model 22 estimating the effect of anxiety on all treated women across treatment
groups, where baseline treatment category (intercept) is 20% token;
2. Model 23 estimating the effect of anxiety on all treated women within treatment
groups, , where baseline treatment category (intercept) is 20% token;
3. Model 24.1 predicting all (treated as well as untreated) 7 group averages for women
respondents, , where baseline treatment category (intercept) is 0% men only;
4. Model 24.2 predicting all (treated as well as untreated) 7 group averages for men
respondents, , where baseline treatment category (intercept) is 0% men only.
All key quantities above are estimated via MCMC in multilevel models where 10
confidence ratings are nested within respondents and test questions to account for depen-
dence among observations within individuals and within particular questions. Note that
the dependent variable cannot be estimated via three-way interaction between treatment,
gender, and mediator: Such model would be ‘rank deficient’ because not all possible
combinations of these three grouping factors are populated as men only control group
respondents never got to be assigned into the anxiety group but only in the control group.
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5.2.2 Results
Model effects are interpretable on the original confidence scale with a range of 1–10.
Table 5.9 on 111 lists the full results of all models fitted in this section. The baseline
category of the multi-category treatment variable varies: the model looking at mediation
effects only on the treated subsample of women uses 20% token as baseline category thus
Beta ‘Intercept’ in Models 22 and 23 shows average confidence under token presence
in the control (online shopping) group. In subsequent models using both treated and
untreated samples of men and women, this baseline category remains the men only picture
viewing group.
Overall, my results suggest that the anxiety manipulation did not diminish role model
effects, contrary to theoretical expectations, but consistent with Study 1 findings about
state anxiety. All anxiety group predictions about test answer confidence average higher
than that of the men only group (the stereotype threat context) and the differences between
anxiety and control within each treatment category are negligible, at least for women.
This section elaborates on these findings, the next section extends analysis for potential
problems in random group assignment, and the last section draws conclusions.
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Figure 5.6: Randomised mediation study, Model 24.1
Anxiety effect on the treated.
Women’s mean confidence, not accounting for nesting, across all treatment groups not
receiving an anxiety manipulation is 6.21 (SD = 3.50) as opposed to 6.39 (SD = 3.58)
if receiving anxiety manipulation, suggesting either null effects or that women were very
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slightly more confident under anxiety, pointing in a direction opposite to the hypothe-
sis. An exploration of the number of responses within each confidence level reveals that
anxiety if anything polarised responses, while in the control group 90 respondents (10%
of total) selected the middle point of the confidence scale, only 54 did so in the anxiety
group and most of that differential went either in the lowest confidence category (+14
people) or the highest (+30 people). No comparable movements are detectable within
men in terms of polarisation but their mean confidence level also increased somewhat by
anxiety (M = 7.11 and M = 7.38, respectively, SD = 3.38 and SD = 3.28).
Model 22 teases out the anxiety effect on women in a multilevel model accounting for
individual and test-question level nesting and finds a near zero effect within wide credible
intervals (-0.45 to 0.82) suggesting that the manipulation had no effect on confidence.
Anxiety effects within treatment groups.
Model 23 elaborates on the anxiety effect allowing that it differs depending on the treat-
ment group. Table 5.8 shows mean confidence levels where anxiety is associated with
somewhat lower confidence only in the critical mass group for women, further suggest-
ing that any differences between treatment and mediation groups are in fact randomly
distributed. The pattern of polarisation on the confidence scale is mostly driven by move-
ments in the critical mass group as well, where about 50% less women selected the middle
point of the scale, but two-thirds more selected the lowest point.
The model fails to detect anxiety effects within treatment groups where women are
predicted to be comparably confident to the respective control groups. The anxiety x treat-
ment interaction terms are negative, consistent with the hypothesized direction (though
leaving predicted anxiety higher within token) but falling within very large credible inter-
vals. Residual variance is estimated exactly at the same value as in Model 22 suggesting
no improvements in model fit.
Anxiety effects benchmarked against the untreated.
Finally, Models 24.1 and 24.2 fit the fully specified models using the subsamples of
women and men, respectively, where the group means include those under men only
picture exposure as well. Presentation of model output changes in the table: while every-
where else, categorical treatment and categorical gender (and categorical anxiety) vari-
ables are ‘interacted’ in the model formula resulting in a prediction at each possible com-
bination, here such categories are combined by hand because some analytically possible
combinations are missing, namely, there is no anxiety x men only category. Therefore, in
these models the independent variable is a 7-category variable benchmarked to the control
(online shopping) x men only picture treatment group.
Figure 5.6 shows the predictions based on Model 24.1 (women) and reveals that the
anxiety group predictions closely follow the control group predictions where confidence
gradually increases women’s confidence by Parity with a marginal effect of β = 1.02
in the control group and β = 1.18 in the anxiety group both within positive credible
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intervals suggesting consistently positive effects. Because a 7-category variable as solo
independent variable has very little hope to predict any dependent measure well, residual
variance actually increases compared with the previous models.
Model 24.2 on men’s confidence ratings shows that these same group averages are
more sensitive to anxiety than women’s. While control group averages mirror the findings
in Study 1, in that men’s confidence decreased as a function of treatment, it seems that if
anything men remained confident if state anxiety was introduced, a rather atypical pattern
of performance under anxiety.
Table 5.9: Models 22–23 and 24.1–24.2, Randomised mediation study
beta m22 m23 m24.1 m24.2
treated WOMEN treated WOMEN all WOMEN all MEN
DV Confidence in test answer, scaled 1–10
Type Linear / MCMC Linear / MCMC Linear / MCMC Linear / MCMC
Stacked N 1910 1910 2320 2390
Subject N 191 191 232 239
Item N 10 10 10 10
DIC 9005.92 9006.55 11007.2 10952.94
Beta [95% CI] Beta [95% CI] Beta [95% CI] Beta [95% CI]
Intercept 6.21[5.13;7.23] 5.68[4.43;7.12] 5.76[4.59;7.15] 7.15[5.83;8.49]
Mediator: s. anxiety 0.18[-0.45;0.82] 0.69[-0.39;1.85]
Treatment: 30% 0.40[-0.82;1.60]
Treatment: 50% 1.09[0.06;2.30]
Anx x 30% -0.80[-2.38;0.78]
Anx x 50% -0.55[-2.01;1.14]
Group 20 & Control -0.02[-0.98;1.13] 0.71[-0.19;1.65]
Group 20 & Anx 0.66[-0.42;1.62] 0.29[-0.70;1.13]
Group 30 & Control 0.37[-0.52;1.50] 0.21[-0.71;1.02]
Group 30 & Anx 0.21[-0.78;1.17] 0.25[-0.67;1.14]
Group 50 & Control 1.02[0.14;2.01] -1.08[-2.04;-0.15]
Group 50 & Anx 1.18[0.18;2.22] 0.19[-0.68;1.09]
Gamma [95% CI] Gamma [95% CI] Gamma [95% CI] Gamma [95% CI]
Subject var 4.62[3.52;5.70] 4.57[3.55;5.73] 4.26[3.44;5.17] 3.41[2.69;4.14]
Item var 2.97[0.68;6.24] 3.11[0.91;6.62] 3.36[0.79;7.40] 3.60[0.85;7.08]
Residual var 5.96[5.57;6.37] 5.96[5.62;6.37] 6.14[5.78;6.49] 5.24[4.95;5.54]
5.2.3 Measurement validity: Emotion through self-report and text
Given anxiety’s null effects on women, and its atypical effects on men, questions arise
as to the success of the randomised writing task, namely about success in randomisa-
tion, about success in creating experimental anxiety, and about respondents’ motivation
to control behaviour.
To address the first concern, I am able to use self-reported test anxiety measures, taken
before randomised anxiety induction, to predict anxiety or control group membership. I
use testing anxiety self-assessment, rather than state anxiety assessment, having proved
to be the only relevant predictor of testing confidence (Model 21.2 see page 103). While
state anxiety may also be associated with anxiety group membership, its impact on testing
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confidence seemed negligible and would thus be an irrelevant confounding factor for the
models above.
If testing anxiety is associated with anxiety group membership, randomisation ‘failed’
to create balanced groups, or more precisely, allowed that low anxiety individuals were
sorted disproportionally into the anxiety group and, holding everything else constant, this
group would appear more confident about political knowledge testing.
A Welch Two Sample t-test using the treated subsample of women suggest that this
suspicion may be warranted (t(98.15) = 1.98, p = 0.05) where self-assessed anxiety is
the scaled latent variable generated via an IRT model for use in Models 20.1 and 20.2
(Study 1 ‘Interim link 2’). Above-average anxiety women (M = 0.27 amounting to one-
third of a standard deviation) were sorted into the control group while near-average or
below (M = −0.03) into the anxiety group. There may be no comparable sorting effect
for men (t(104.19),0.96, p= 0.34) but the observed mean confidence in the anxiety group
(M =−0.14)does appear lower than mean confidence in the control group (M =−0.01).
Discarding the success of the emotion manipulation itself, this may be read as evidence
that the anxiety group’s higher-than-expected predicted testing confidence may be par-
tially due to lower prior testing anxiety, at least for women.
Successful emotion manipulation is often checked with similar self-report of emotion
following manipulation, however, due to limitations in survey length, the self-assessment
questions were not re-asked after emotion manipulation. Instead, I am looking at the
only available data directly relating to the less ambitious concept of ‘compliance’ with
the writing task: the written answers themselves.
Dictionary-based methods are often used in quantitative text analysis to count the
frequency of words and expressions relating to a concept defined as a list of relevant
word stems or a particular combination of them. While the construction and basic valid-
ity of these dictionaries itself is an active area of research, especially the measurement
of emotion in texts [141],[175], I am using here, rather heuristically, a large and rela-
tively well established dictionary designed to measure psychological states in text, LIWC
[140],[141]. LIWC defines ‘affect’ broadly through 915 word stems taken from ‘com-
mon emotion rating scales such as the PANAS, Roget’s Thesaurus, and standard English
dictionaries’ [176], from which 91 are meant to directly tap into anxiety (such as worr,
fear, nervo etc.).
Using the frequency distribution of these word stems in the user-generated text re-
sponse, each respondent gets a numerical proportion score that reflects the observed per-
centage of hits under the affect and anxiety categories. In practice, all respondents carried
out two writing tasks, one when anxiety targets (or online shopping items) are listed and
one when they selected one of these targets for further elaboration. Exploring these tex-
tual answers reveals that the list of anxiety targets, taken out of context, may themselves
not convey anxiety:
“Money! My son living in London. My daughter staying out late”
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Anonymous subject 1.
“Meeting new people. Ringing HMRC. Strange noise from car engine”
Anonymous subject 2.
but the follow-up text after each list may be more useful to pick up on affect and more
specifically, anxiety:
“I worry about my son living and working in London due to the recent
terror attacks”
Anonymous subject 1.
“Meeting new people and having to talk to them. I can feel them assessing
me, and judging me, and although I know that I am every bit as good as they
are, I am almost guaranteed to say something stupid, or not know what they
are talking about. I feel they are looking down on me for the way I look,
dress and generally come across.”
Anonymous subject 2.
Looking at women’s textual answers, ‘affective’ word stems range between propor-
tions of 0 and 16% in the control group, and 0 to 41.67 % in the anxiety group. There are
no hits for the narrower category, ‘anxiety’ word stems, in the control group that wrote
about items bought online. Hits under ‘anxiety’, however, range between 0 and 25% in
the anxiety group. To illustrate these numbers using the two examples above: the first
elaborate answer by Anonymous subject 1 is assessed to contain 18.75% of words with
affective component and 12.50% falls specifically under anxiety, while only 3.03% affect
in the second elaborate response by Anonymous subject 2. and 0% anxiety specific. This
shows that the more explicit anxiety is on the level of diction, the better the software
performance: Subject 2 has clearly complied with the anxiety task.
While admittedly rough measures, I used both affect and anxiety as word stem propor-
tions as a proxy measure of affect and anxiety on the subject-level. Welch’s Two Sample
t-tests reveal differences in average affect between the anxiety group (M = 7.16) and the
control group (M = 1.37, t(146.6) = 9.18, p < 0.01) as well as differences in average
anxiety between the anxiety group (M = 3.22) and the control group (M = 0.00,t(103) =
8.54, p < 0.01) suggesting at least basic compliance with the emotion induction tasks,
or more specifically, that the anxiety group used words and phrases explicitly relating to
anxiety and a range of its synonyms.
An option would be to re-fit the previous models selecting only ‘compliant’ subjects
using > 0% anxiety words. The second example above, however, demonstrates that com-
pliant subjects managed to describe anxieties without using the expected vocabulary, thus
exclusion may be unwarranted. And while I used emotion in text as a proxy of the in-
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duced anxiety level, the two are not the same thing. Anxiety may be present in text but
may not have enduring impact on state anxiety.
Further measures at this point are not readily available to test for the success of emo-
tion manipulation. I will take up the suggestion about ‘controlled behaviour’ mentioned
at the beginning of this section later in the conclusions.
5.2.4 Section Conclusions
My hypothesis was that political role models increase confidence in political knowledge
via alleviating implicit anxieties stemming from negative stereotypes. In a 4 (ordinal
picture treatment) by 2 (anxiety/control) experimental design, the expectation was that
confidence would increase following the picture treatment only in the control groups,
but flattens out in the anxiety groups. I introduced a few analytical steps to review the
results and concluded that they do not follow this hypothesized mechanism, as the anxiety
induction appeared to leave confidence unaffected and role model effects prevailed despite
induced state anxiety.
Investigating this further, additional tests showed that the experimental anxiety group
was composed of a greater number of low testing anxiety individuals, leaving the option
open that state anxiety manipulation did not overwrite prior levels of testing anxiety. State
anxiety itself may have been successfully induced: text analysis shows at least some basic
level of its validity, participants did reflect on anxiety sufficiently. Based on my results,
it seems possible that state anxiety does not relate to confidence in the way prescribed by
a generalised theory of stereotype threat in politics, and more specific, situational anxiety
matters, such as testing anxiety.
5.3 Study 3: Experimental affect and attentional bias
This study enables me to address some of the questions outside of the scope of the Studies
1 and 2. Drawing and expanding on stereotype threat theory, the studies above kept
focused on anxiety, being central in previous literature. I did experiment with some degree
of differentiation in anxiety type, to find no evidence of mediation using a state anxiety
approach, but more evidence using a situation-specific, testing anxiety approach. This led
me to further conclude that there is place for introducing more complexity in affect when
examining responses to stereotype threat.
Another limitation was testing effects only on confidence about test answers as depen-
dent variable. At the point of drawing conclusions in Chapter 4, I distinguished between
(i) attention and election interest-related effects dominated by tokenism, in whereby a
single (novel) woman’s ‘striking minority’ presence may draw attention but not a greater
presence of women; and (ii) confidence and self-efficacy related effects described by lin-
ear effects in which the greater women’s numerical presence, the greater women’s con-
fidence and political efficacy. Studies 1 and 2 use the online experiment data, where I
could only detect effects of the latter, linear type of role model effect on confidence and I
was yet unable to test mediation related to tokenism.
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In this study, I address these two points by going back to the lab experiment data
where tokenism was first detected, and introduce a randomised mediation study on emo-
tion drawing broadly on the framework of introduced in the theoretical framework, in
which some emotions motivate approach and avoidance of threat, and introduced litera-
ture where extreme aversion or anger was a ‘coping strategy’ with stereotypes that did not
result in a turn away from the source of stereotype threat but resulted in more engagement
and confrontation. Based on this component of action, I hypothesised that anger may re-
verse political disengagement from male dominated politics, while the absence of this
component: sadness and helplessness may result in disengagement (and perhaps more
reliance on external ‘help’ such as role models).
5.3.1 Data & procedures
In the lab experiment, a small student sample of 28 women viewed pairs of pictures while
wearing head-mounted eye tracker devices. 8 picture pairs, randomly presented 20 times
in total, featured groups of politicians on the campaign trail, virtually identical except that
women were cropped out in varying proportions, thus one of each pair featured a group
with improved gender balance, the role model picture; and one with comparably worse
gender balance, the contrast picture. The task was to identify a ‘dot probe’ replacing either
type within each pair as quickly as possible with the aim of investigating attentional bias
to role model pictures through performance on this task as well as through a number of
measures generated by the eye tracker. More details on the experimental design are given
in Chapter 3, and an extensive analysis of attentional bias to gender balance, broken down
by specific numerical proportions, is presented Chapter 4 Section 4.1. Example screens
featuring picture contrasts are shown in Figure 3.2 on page 3.2, the full pool of pictures
is shown in Figure 3.3.
Randomisation inference is generated from the random shuffling of the 8 possible im-
age pairs across trials and from the random presentation of the balance-improved picture
on either the left or the right side of the computer screen. In this study, however, these
manipulations are coupled with an experimental manipulation on emotion. Prior to pic-
ture presentation, participants were randomly assigned to reading-and-writing tasks con-
nected to emotions experienced regarding everyday sexism. One group read and wrote
about anger, another about sadness and helplessness, and a third, control group, read
about product reviews and then described recently bought items online.
Chapter 2 Section 2.1.3 elaborates on the theoretical foundation behind the working
hypotheses: that cueing sadness and a feeling of helplessness motivates avoidance of the
source of stereotype threat because individual action to circumvent negative stereotypes
seems infeasible. These participants may rather approach role models to avoid the source
of stereotype resulting in attentional bias. On the other hand, cueing anger may motivate
approach of the source of stereotype threat because individual action seems more likely,
even unavoidable under extreme aversion, resulting in no attentional bias to role models.
Thus emotion may help us understand more about heterogeneity in individual responses
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to political stereotypes.
The result is a 2x3 design in which subjects’ attention is measured on a (1) contrast
image featuring unfavourable gender balance and on a (2) role model picture featuring
favourable gender balance, broken down by the (a) anger, (b) sadness/helplessness, and
(c) control (emotion irrelevant) groups.
The control group serves two purposes: a benchmark to evaluate emotion effects on
those reported in Chapter 4, and more importantly, similarities between either emotion
groups and the control group may be suggestive of that emotion being relevant mediator of
‘naturally observed’ tokenism. In other words, if cueing helplessness motivates approach
of role models, then it is possible that effects on the ‘helpless’ may be key drivers of role
model effects. Note, however, that a crucial comparison group is missing due to study
limitations in a lab experiment: gender, as only women participants were recruited.
Table 5.10: Chapter 5 Study 3—Experimental design
Picture pairs
Contrast img.
‘Men only’
Role model img.
‘Token’
Approach Attention + Attention +
Avoidance Attention – Attention +Negative affect
Control∗ Attention – Attention +
* This group has been analysed more thoroughly in Chapter 4 Section 4.1.
Hypothesized attentional bias across image pairs where Contrast image shows no women politicians and the Role model image has
improved gender balance, in this study only Token presence (one woman or 20%) analysed.
Attention measures mostly follow those presented in Chapter 4. Dot probe task re-
sponse latency variable shows, in milliseconds, the lag of probe detection, and has an
empirical range of 57–997 ms. I am inferring an attentional bias to unfavourable or
favourable gender balance pictures based on whichever received systematically quicker
response times. Further attention measures are extracted from the eye tracker, single
fixations—gaze kept on a single location—along with their duration in milliseconds are
counted on each picture. Fixation durations range between 66.5 and 865.2 ms, and counts
between 0 and 5. A greater count or duration of these fixations is read as evidence of
attentional bias. Saccadic movement data, however, is discarded from this study for two
reasons. Firstly, there was a strong similarity between duration and count measures across
saccades and fixations, suggesting that these measures tap into similar attentional patterns
strictly speaking in the context of my experimental design. Secondly, there were no clear
hypotheses on saccades but my investigation in Chapter 4 was exploratory, looking at
similar measures for cross-validation purposes rather than to learn about unique results.
Thus to keep the study concise, I will not fit the emotion models on saccadic data as
dependent measures.
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As the part of the rationale behind this study was to investigate mediation of tokenism,
explaining token effects on attention attention, I am discarding 4 picture pairs not featur-
ing token presence of women but some other proportions. The remaining 4 picture pairs
all contrast a token woman to men only politicians. I do, however, perform checks on the
remaining groups and will report these as secondary findings.
After discounting trials that are not token versus men only pairings, incorrect sub-
missions on the dot probe task, and missing data due to software error (poor tracking) or
non-compliance with instructions to observe both pictures, I am working with the follow-
ing sample sizes: N = 261 response latencies on the dot probe task nested within 27 sub-
jects and N = 368 image-level observations across 184 trials (pairs presented, discounting
practice trials) nested within 18 subjects in the eye-tracking data. A more detailed account
on missing data management was introduced in Chapter 4 Section 4.1.
Similarly to Study 2, estimation is possible in a single step. There being only two
picture treatment groups, and no three-way interaction to include participant gender, I am
able to present the model directly and draw appropriate comparisons without the need
to present intermediate models, as before. I continue using multilevel models fitted via
MCMC to account for nesting within trials and participants on response latency and fix-
ation duration dependent variables. Fixation count is modelled via multilevel Poisson
regression fitted via MCMC.
5.3.2 Results
Table 5.11 presents group means descriptively. Control group means through all measures
restate findings of attentional bias to tokenism reported extensively in Chapter 4: that
pictures featuring women at this proportion receive quicker response times (and those re-
sponse times have decreased variance), longer gaze duration, but only marginally greater
number of fixations. Latter is consistent with studies documenting that in some cases,
after attending to threat, disengagement proved difficult and attention remained fixed on
targets [135].
The anger figures seem to support the hypothesis of approach: response times are
down at levels comparable to control groups both for role model and contrast images,
suggesting that the attentional bias disappears under anger. Further support comes from
one of the eye tracker-generated measures as both pictures received increased gaze dura-
tion. There are no obvious effects on fixation counts but they do appear closer to each
other than in the control group.
Sadness figures, finally, resemble those under control more than they do the anger pre-
dictions, confirming the hypothesis of avoidance, however, attentional bias seems much
more modest, at least if measured through fixation duration. The gap appears sharp in
probe response time, but contrast picture variance decreased compared with the control
group.
The fitted models are Models 25, 26, and 27, for response latency, fixation duration,
and fixation count, respectively. In these, 6 coefficients add up to the 6 group-level pre-
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Table 5.11: Descriptive statistics: Respondent N & Attention measures.
Pairs feature ‘Contrast’ image with men & ‘Role model’ image with a token (=20–25%) woman
Affect Picture N Mean St.Dev.
Response latency probe detection (ms),
total N = 261 test responses by 27 subjects.
Control Contrast 38 416.97 134.15
Control Role model 29 378.21 89.15
Anger Contrast 53 389.98 101.49
Anger Role model 52 382.98 90.20
Sadness Contrast 42 402.85 84.85
Sadness Role model 47 380.57 87.37
Fixation duration (ms),
total N = 368 trials by 18 subjects.
Control Contrast 55 197.84 151.31
Control Role model 55 268.01 193.86
Anger Contrast 80 226.69 231.44
Anger Role model 80 226.27 215.67
Sadness Contrast 49 248.55 190.80
Sadness Role model 49 268.26 196.77
Fixation count
total N = 368 trials by 18 subjects.
Control Contrast 55 1.24 0.92
Control Role model 55 1.51 1.00
Anger Contrast 80 1.20 1.06
Anger Role model 80 1.23 1.04
Sadness Contrast 49 1.31 1.04
Sadness Role model 49 1.57 1.21
dictions as shown in the tables above (and an extra, seventh coefficient controls for probe
location in gaze data to account for ‘lagged’ gaze from previous trials, as introduced in
Chapter 4 in more detail, not used for making predictions).
Model-based predictions (Table 5.12) are largely confirmatory of these observations.
The three figures below show the predicted response times, fixation durations, and fixation
counts holding random effect variation constant as well as the (now weak or null) effect of
probe location (an additional variable introduced in Chapter 4 to control for the possibility
of ‘lagged’ gaze location due to probe presentation in the previous trial).
Looking at dot probe response latency (Model 25 and Figure 5.7), expressed in stan-
dard deviation terms, attentional bias to role model pictures is large in the control group
(the distance between Intercept of .37 and ‘Role mod pic.’ Beta of -.42, over two thirds
of a standard deviation) and translates into a predicted 40 milliseconds shorter response
time on pictures featuring a token woman. By contrast, the coefficients associated with
the impact of anger add up to an even attention, predicted at 379.86 and 384.69 millisec-
onds and visualised in the middle panel of Figure 5.7, to contrast and role model pictures,
respectively. Compared across emotion groups, anger’s effect may be a mixture of it
decreasing response time to contrast pictures (-0.48), and increasing response times to
role model pictures (+0.45) but these coefficients keep their negative or positive valence
signs within wider credible intervals, 85% and 90%, respectively. There is a very small
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probability of a sadness effect, the predicted Contrast response latency being decreased
by about 20 milliseconds and the role model response latency virtually unaffected.
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Figure 5.7: Attentional bias across picture contrasts, Model 25
The fixation duration model results (Model 26) are comparable to response latency
results in that they are also expressed in the dependent variable’s standard deviation terms
(but inference changes as larger fixation duration, as opposed to shorter response time,
is indicative of attentional bias). In the control group, the role model effect decreases
somewhat to a third standard deviation, which is a weaker effect this time, but remaining
positive within 90% credible intervals. The anger effect evened out attention where pre-
dictions are at 380 and 385 ms. Similarly to the dot-probe results, the posterior probability
of the anger effect, increasing attention to Contrast pictures and decreasing attention to
role models, decreases somewhat and remains around 85% also in the extended models.
There are no sadness effects detected in these models either.
Finally, exploring Poission models on fixation count (Model 27), the model confirms
that despite the very narrow range of the count variable, there may be a small marginal
effect of the role model picture predicting, on average, a quarter more fixations but staying
within non-zero positive 95% CIs. Under anger, the two picture types are predicted at 1.05
and 1.10 fixations where the probability of anger decreasing the count of fixations for
role model pictures is 80%, while there is very little evidence that anger would increase
fixations on the contrast images themselves. While these go parallel with the previous
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Figure 5.8: Attentional bias across picture contrasts, Model 26
models, there is a similar 80% probability of a sadness effect decreasing fixations on the
role model picture suggesting that attention may be even under sadness as well.
5.3.3 Measurement validity
Similarly to Section 5.2.3 above, where I gave more details on the procedures, and another
section on affect in text in Chapter 3 Section xx, here I report text analysis of written
answers in the control, anger, and sadness groups using the LIWC dictionary.
The difference here, however, is that there is no meaningful inference due to low
subject-level sample sizes. Through N = 9 Anger responses, affect averages at M = 5.61
per cent of total words, anger at M = 2.82 per cent, and no hits under sadness; N = 7
Sadness responses average M = 5.36 per cent of total words for affect, M = 0.48 per
cent for anger, M = 1.89 per cent for sadness; and N = 7 Control responses (missing
data is highest at Control, product review group perhaps not surprisingly) average at a
surprisingly high M = 4.93 per cent of total words for affect, although M = 4.28 per cent
of this is labelled ‘positive emotion’, no hits for anger, M = 0.32 per cent for sadness (due
to one observation that used 3 per cent of total words sorted under sadness). Descriptively,
this suggests at least compliance with the affect induction task.
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Figure 5.9: Attentional bias across picture contrasts, Model 26
5.3.4 Section Conclusions
Affect and attentional bias
Through three measures of attention, in Study 3 I first restated that, without emotion
manipulation, there is a natural tendency to direct attention to token presence of women as
opposed to ‘men only’ political groups on a student sample of women, using manipulated
campaign images from the 2015 General Elections.
I then proceeded to analyse this bias given experimental emotion: anger and sad-
ness/helplessness, where the hypotheses were an approach of the source of stereotype
threat in the anger group but avoidance in the sadness group. I thus evaluated the differ-
ences in predicted attention across contrast and role model pictures to infer on attentional
bias, and within picture types I looked at emotion effects, to make appropriate compar-
isons with the control group.
An attention gap seems to disappear entirely under anger. This is often due to a
mixture of increasing attention to Contrast, ‘men only’ image and decreasing attention to
the role model image. Perhaps due to these simultaneous smaller movements, I did not
have sufficient power in my tests to find conventional (i.e. 95%) certainty around these
estimates but the probability of effects in the hypothesized, non-zero directions ranged
between 80–85%. Given very similar movements across different measures of attention
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Table 5.12: Models 25–27, Randomised affect study
m25 m26 m27
DV
Resp. latency,
standardised (z)
Fixation duration,
standardised (z)
Fixation count
Type Linear / MCMC Linear / MCMC Poisson / MCMC
Stacked N 261 368 368
Subject N 27 18 18
Trial N 20 20 20
DIC 684.52 989.11 984.65
Beta [95% CI] Beta [95% CI] Beta [95% CI]
Intercept 0.37[-0.12;0.84] -0.22[-0.70;0.29] 0.14[-0.29;0.56]
Anger -0.47[-1.17;0.21] 0.11[-0.49;0.83] -0.09[-0.66;0.46]
Sadness -0.26[-0.89;0.44] 0.22[-0.54;0.94] 0.12[-0.59;0.69]
Role model pic. -0.42[-0.88;0.02] 0.32[-0.01;0.72] 0.25[0.13;0.36]
Role m. x ang. 0.45[-0.07;1.04] -0.32[-0.75;0.18] -0.14[-0.30;-0.01]
Role m. x sad 0.22[-0.35;0.80] -0.22[-0.70;0.28] -0.05[-0.20;0.12]
Probe lag 0.09[-0.09;0.28] -0.06[-0.12;-0.03]
Gamma [95% CI] Gamma [95% CI] Gamma [95% CI]
Subject var 0.33[0.13;0.59] 0.27[0.07;0.51] 0.27[0.10;0.49]
Trial var 0.00[0.00;0.00] 0.00[0.00;0.00] 0.00[0.00;0.00]
Residual var 0.73[0.60;0.86] 0.82[0.70;0.94] 0.00[0.00;0.00]
(fixation duration, count, and performance on a dot-probe task), I do treat this as at least
preliminary evidence that anger resulted in approach of contrast images.
Sadness shows very small movements compared to the Control group, with much
small posterior probabilities, however, this also means that the token bias prevails. Pos-
terior predictions are somewhat closer than in the Control group with their variances
increased.
Finally, textual responses to the emotion manipulation task suggested compliance with
the reading and writing task, although a small N of responses left no room for population-
level inference. I found, however, that the dominating valence of emotion in the control
group was positive, which may itself have implications for response and attention strate-
gies.
Mediation of role model effects
As I outlined earlier, I can treat likeness of either emotion group’s profile with the control
group’s profile as suggestive of mediation. Rather than treating it as a trade-off between
anger and sadness, or approach and avoidance strategies, the purpose of this is to point at
relevant emotions explaining tokenism, or perhaps excluding some.
In this framework, sadness emerges as another likely emotion describing tokenism,
besides anxiety in the previous studies. It seems likely that, within a potentially rich range
and mixture of emotions describing the experience of stereotype threat, sadness and the
feeling of helplessness are emotions motivating avoidance of stereotyping political stimuli
(or politics itself), and, at the same time, directing attention to role models, as external
actors to resolve threat.
Anger, may not be to blame for withdrawal from politics, despite its relatively neg-
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ative standing in political science literature. High aversion has been found in previous
literature to describe how partisans feel about outgroup members, labelled ‘expressive
partisanship’ [88]. Unlike anxiety, it has been found to decrease information search from
a variety of sources [76],[177] but it was linked with mobilisation including protests and
demonstrations [87],[178]. In my framework, anger motivates approach of threat, with
the potential of more political engagement.
5.4 Chapter Conclusions
Exploiting three experimental designs, I found that a situation-specific approach to anxi-
ety, namely ‘testing anxiety’, as well as other affect motivating withdrawal, namely sad-
ness and helplessness, captured emotions under stereotype threat. Especially Study 2
excluded the possibility that a diffuse ‘state anxiety’, in which survey question nothing
is ‘at stake’ explicitly but simply inquires emotion after treatment delivery, is a powerful
mediator of role model effects. In my treatment, threat is relatively subtle, compared with
the original stereotype threat paradigm where African American participants were explic-
itly told that their peers performed worse than White Americans. It was at the moment of
testing—or its prospect, in the testing anxiety question—, where anxiety emerged, in turn
explaining test answer confidence.
My studies further show the power of role models in two ways: firstly, in increas-
ing proportions, women in politics alleviate situation-specific anxiety when it comes to
assessing one’s own skills (and, perhaps, efficacy in general); and secondly, my eye-
tracking study on attention shows that at least a single standing, token woman may be
sought out in contexts where one does not take action to confront stereotypes herself. By
contrast, I found that in the presence of anger, women confronted stereotypes, and did not
turn away from politics.
Notes
22Note that within the BES political efficacy questions, items about subjective assessments of political
knowledge dominated as well.
23As explained in Chapter 3, participants randomly received either of the two questions, my intention
being that one emotion is not projected over another.
24A third group carried out another task to reflect on women’s efficacy in politics, analysed in Chapter 6,
this group of people is excluded from analysis of this study.
25Attentional engagement with pictures of improved gender balance.
26Everyday sexism blog entries write up later.
27As well as to minimise the burden on test subjects, to keep the survey short and manageable within few
minutes.
28As well as a policy ‘Expectations lowered’ group, participants not included here but in Chapter 6 Study
2 randomised mediation study, see Figure 3.4 on 40.
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Chapter 6
Understanding the role model effect:
Expectations about policy competence and substantive
representation
As much as I believe in the power of role models, [...] I suspect that
the greatest contribution Obama will make to narrowing the achievement gap
will be his policies, not his persona. [179]
There are, in the words of Theresa May, ‘girl jobs and boy jobs’. She’s a
girl in a boy job. Make it count. [180]
This chapter investigates a causal mechanism in which women form more
optimistic expectations about public policy with an increasing number of
women representatives in government, a factor that motivates more politi-
cal engagement instrumentally. Leveraging two experimental designs, I find
that though such instrumental links exist, they are unlikely to mediate role
model effects; if anything, those more optimistic about policy demonstrate
lower self-efficacy.
Looking at literature on women’s political representation, two linkages continue to
dominate scholarly interest: whether ‘descriptive’ or numerical representation leads to
better substantive representation in terms of public policy; and whether descriptive repre-
sentation brings non-policy or ‘symbolic’ benefits to citizens such as a sense of empow-
erment, evidenced typically by greater political engagement. While the second linkage is
of interest in my thesis, I outlined a causal mechanism that brings together both elements:
seeing women succeed in office, in terms of delivering better or more relevant policy, citi-
zens may become more optimistic or confident about their own voice or self-efficacy in the
political domain. A similar mechanism has been proposed behind ‘Black Empowerment’
where Black voters see improved chances of realising self-interest through appointing
Black executive leaders [22]. Correspondingly, Burns and colleagues hypothesise in-
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strumental links between women in the electorate and women as political candidates as
former expects latter to implement ‘woman friendly’ policies [17, p.352].
Empirical support for the full causal chain, down to the level of political engagement,
is scant. The studies referenced above carry out no formal test of this mechanism. The
first and only test of a relevant mechanism, a cross-sectional study on adolescent girls’
anticipated political involvement measuring perceptions of government responsiveness,
finds no evidence [19].
These theoretical and empirical approaches face a number of limitations. Firstly, ex-
isting theory is often restrictive in that it does not discuss motivations other than those of
pure self-interest, or policy other than ‘woman friendly’. Secondly, if taken seriously, the
notion of a ‘woman friendly’ output implies that women prefer policies based on some
degree of gender identification. At least in terms of voting behaviour, however, studies
show that gender is rarely a relevant social identity driving choice [29],[181]. Finally,
the attempt above to measure government responsiveness as a mediator may capture a
holistic judgement of policy—but it may be more than that. Beliefs about government
responsiveness, asked often as a single survey question, is likely to be less sensitive to
expectations about individual candidates or the composition of legislatures but may in-
fluenced by a number of more stable individual attitudes, on the one hand, and citizens’
‘baseline’ psychological engagement with politics: the dependent variable itself. Thus
even if detected, evidence of an effect on government responsiveness may expand the
host of dependent variables, but may not reveal much about the underlying mechanisms.
In this chapter, I describe the results of two studies investigating how gender, and
gender balance in political groups, relate to expectations about the collective competence
of political groups in delivering good policy in general, and to a generalised notion of
delivering women-friendly policies more specifically. In Study 1, survey respondents
are invited to “rate how well groups of politicians would manage given issues”. Group
competence ratings gathered this way are then linked with the experimentally manipu-
lated gender balance in picture stimuli on the one hand, and political engagement, on the
other. In this classical, regression-based approach to mediation analysis, mirroring that of
Chapter 5 Study 1 where the mediator variable is observed after treatment delivery, rather
than itself experimentally manipulated, the hypothesis is that an improving gender bal-
ance leads to an increased political engagement because of improved group competency
judgements.
Instead of defining women-friendly policies, I explore two key policies: healthcare
and finance, understood generally and kept broad enough to accommodate self-interest or
group-based interest, but specialist in the sense that stereotypes may prevail in how well
suited politicians of either gender are in managing them [182][183]. I cite relevant litera-
ture about public views of competencies in Chapter 2 Section 2.2.1, showing that though
men’s and women’s issues vary across contexts, depending, crucially, on the distribution
of labour, public opinion in Western democracies tends to subscribe to issue stereotypes
linking women politicians with ‘compassion’ issues such as healthcare, childcare, and
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issues related with welfare provision. By contrast, many form associations automatically
between men and economics, finances, military and defence. Furthermore, these areas
are also meant to cue separate dimensions of policy making in terms of ideology, while
finance may remind people of more conservative ideas of policy making in the context
of a small state, healthcare may remind people of welfare provision in the context of the
welfare state, argued to be more conductive to gender equality [184].
In Study 2, the crossover experimental approach, I seek confirmation that an increase
in political engagement is in fact due to those improvements in expectations about policy,
but this time specifically about women friendly policies, by introducing ‘negative’ ma-
nipulation on the mediator (see also Chapter 5 Study 2). By citing an accessibly written
academic study casting doubt on whether women—by the sole virtue of being women—
pursue different policy than men, my aim is to explicitly remove or lower those expec-
tations hypothesized under role model effects. I thus obtain treated groups, viewing an
increasing number of women in picture stimuli, who are hypothesized to be putting faith
in female politicians enacting women friendly policies; as well as treated groups, also
viewing an increasing number of women in pictures, but expectations explicitly removed
in this regard. My study compares political engagement under both scenarios to make an
improved causal inference on mediation. The next sections elaborate on these procedures
and report findings.
It is important to note that, similarly to my mediation studies in Chapter 5, I am tied
to study mediation of role model effect that were detected in the second round of sur-
vey experiments. Being unsuccessful in detecting effects on political interest, external
efficacy, and trust, I am only able to test mediation on test answer confidence as a de-
pendent variable. Looking at the core literature cited above, however, I can maintain that
instrumentalism is relevant for confidence, if interpreted as part of self-efficacy in pol-
itics, in that holding optimistic views about the success of ‘descriptive representatives’,
one might become more confident about her own skills and voice in the political domain.
Though imperfect, test answer confidence is meant to be a proxy of political self-efficacy
understood this way.
6.1 Study 1: Perceived group competence as mediator
6.1.1 Data & Procedures
Similarly to the first two studies on mediation looking at anxiety, see Chapter 5 Study
1 on page 94 and Chapter 5 Study 2 on page 94, I am now working with data collected
through the second or ‘replication’ round of survey experiments, specifically designed
to investigate the underlying mechanisms of role model effects. An N = 667 sample of
men and women viewed and rated pictures of politicians depicted on the campaign trail,
manipulated to feature either only men or 0%, or a token presence or near 20%, a critical
mass presence or near 30%, or a parity presence of women or 50%. Each participant
viewed a series of 5 different pictures that belonged to either of these gender split options,
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that is, no one received picture stimuli where gender balance varied across these options.
While all studies thus far take advantage of randomised exposure to these images,
this is the first that looks at how participants rated picture stimuli. Under each picture
in a series of 5, participants were asked to submit a rating of 1 to 5 stars to indicate
how well they thought the group would manage a given policy area. Two possible policy
areas, finance and healthcare, were displayed randomly under the picture stimuli thus one
participant could rate a particular picture on healthcare while another would rate the same
picture on finance. The image pool is shown in Chapter 3, Figure 3.3 on page 39, and the
question wording is shown in the Appendices (first in questionnaire).
Along with group-level sample sizes, Table 6.1 shows average ratings per treatment
group and participants gender descriptively, averaged within the two policy areas. There
are only a third as many participants assigned to ‘men only’ picture viewing and rating
tasks than to the rest of the gender balance setups: the extra respondents in the treated
groups other than ‘men only’ participated in additional randomised mediation studies
reported in Chapter 5 Study 2, and later in Chapter 6 Study 2. When comparing average
ratings across treatment groups, participants receiving those further manipulations can be
included in the analysis as the randomised mediation tasks were carried out after picture
rating. These participants will be, however, excluded when looking at measures taken
after further manipulations, including confidence during the political knowledge test.
Table 6.1: Descriptive statistics: Sample sizes & Mean policy ratings.
Policy Women pct Gender Resp. N Stacked N Mean rating(1–5) St.Dev.
Finance 0 Men 37 86 3.03 1.11
Token 20 92 252 3.01 1.11
Cmass 30 100 257 3.11 1.02
Parity 50 98 271 3.00 1.05
0 Women 41 104 2.81 1.06
Token 20 89 203 3.00 1.08
Cmass 30 96 254 3.12 0.94
Parity 50 95 245 3.14 1.00
Healthcare 0 Men 37 104 2.57 1.07
Token 20 93 218 2.95 0.96
Cmass 30 99 253 3.28 1.08
Parity 50 98 243 2.90 1.09
0 Women 38 101 2.61 1.09
Token 20 89 252 3.12 0.99
Cmass 30 94 236 3.17 1.02
Parity 50 93 250 3.05 1.03
“You’ll be looking at five campaign pictures, all from the UK. Under the pictures, you will find an option to rate how well the
politicians as a group would possibly manage given issues. The more stars you give the better job you think they would do. You are
welcome to rely on your gut feelings or whatever impressions you may extract from the imagery”
Looking at descriptive statistics, finance ratings submitted by men do not fluctuate
across treatment groups, suggesting that gender composition was irrelevant for their per-
ceptions of policy competence on the collective group level. This is not the case for
women respondents, whose ratings of group competence gradually improve with the ad-
dition of more women. Gender balance seems to matter in perceptions about healthcare
policy both for men and women, both rating group competence higher as gender balance
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approaches 50% parity. Interestingly, baseline expectations are comparable in healthcare
suggesting no persistent gender gaps in rating policy efficacy, whereas the gender gap
is more prevalent if only men are seen to manage finance. A more thorough inspection
of the distribution of ratings reveals that high scale points (four and five stars) and low
scale points (one and two stars) are often equally distributed, suggesting that participants
may not have distinguished them and I thus decided to recategorise my rating scales into
simpler, low-medium-high ordinal scales.
The next sections follow an analytical path mirroring that in Chapter 5 Study 1, pre-
sented visually in ‘Chapter 5 Study 1—Steps of mediation analysis’ on page 97. The
first section re-states the ‘direct link’ between treatment and effect, as demonstrated in
Chapter 4 Section 4.2.2. (pooled samples through two data collection rounds) and Chap-
ter 5 Section 5.1.2. (current, ‘replication round’ sample only), namely that gender bal-
ance in picture stimuli increased women’s confidence in their answers on the political
knowledge test, in both sections presented as part of political efficacy. Then I examine
the first ‘interim link’ to mediation, that is, if men’s and women’s ratings of group-level
competence in managing finance and healthcare policies follow gender balance seen in
the picture stimuli. I then proceed to test the ‘second interim link’ to see if variations
in participants’ rating of group competence explain differences in test answer confidence.
Finally, a fully mediated path regresses both treatment and mediator on testing confidence
in which suggestive of mediation may be group competence ratings capturing treatment
effects entirely, as found in Chapter 5 Study 1 with testing anxiety.
6.1.2 Results
Direct path: From treatment to effect
Chapter 4 Section 4.2.2. and Chapter 5 Section 5.1.2 report evidence behind a role model
hypothesis on test answer confidence, namely that women gave consistently more confi-
dent answers on the 10-question political knowledge test as they viewed more women in
the picture stimuli, replicated in two data collection rounds and different test types. For
this study, the direct path model is identical to Model 18, reported in Chapter 5 Study 1,
restated below.
Test answer confidence is measured after each answer on a 1-10 scale, and test ques-
tions in this round of data collection (used in further sections of this chapter) were about
matching domestic and foreign leaders with their jobs with varying difficulty (the ex-
tremes being the leader of the Labour party, and the Prime Minister of Italy).
The data structure is hierarchical in that confidence ratings are nested within individu-
als as well as test questions. The fitted model is thus a multilevel MCMC regression with
flat priors where the random effects terms are of test subjects (respondents) and test ques-
tions. The treatment effect is teased out via an interaction term of women’s proportion in
picture stimuli (0%, 20% token, 30% critical mass, 50% parity) and respondent gender.
Results are plotted in ‘‘Direct path’ results, Model 18’ on page 98 while the full model
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Figure 6.1: ‘Interim link 1’ results, Model 28.1
results are in Table 6.3 on page 133.
Interim link 1: From treatment to mediator
This link explores the relationship between gender balance in picture stimuli, as indepen-
dent variable and survey respondents’ ratings of group competence in managing finance
and healthcare policies, as dependent variables. Observed averages presented in Table 6.1
indicate that women, not men, rate group competence in finance higher as gender balance
approaches parity, and that both genders will infer higher group competence in healthcare
policy with more women on board.
The models, Model 28.1 (finance) and 28.2 (healthcare), are fitted on the ordinal,
low–moderate–high group competence rating variables as multilevel ordered probit29 re-
gressions (via MCMC) where up to 5 picture ratings are nested within individuals (thus
sample sizes vary according to how many pictures respondent rated, see group N’s in Ta-
ble 6.1), accounting for similarities in ratings given by the same individual. I use weakly
informative ‘Gelman priors’ [185] recommended for better convergence of generalised
linear models30.
All model coefficients cumulatively designate a value on the z distribution, which can
in turn easily be translated into a predicted probability that the dependent variable takes
a ‘higher’ value on the rating scale, fixed across cutpoints meaning that it remains con-
stant regardless whether looking at the probability of rating group competence ‘moderate’
rather than ‘low’, or ‘high’ rather than ‘moderate’. A z score of 0 means 50-50% probabil-
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Figure 6.2: ‘Interim link 1’ results, Model 28.2
ity of either low or high ratings. Positive coefficients will predict increasing probability of
higher ratings across any cutpoint, and negative coefficients predict increasing probability
of lower ratings across any cutpoint.
Looking at the finance model results, the intercept of β = .84 predicts that relatively
high finance ratings are likely in the baseline category, namely those submitted by men
looking at only male politicians (predicted probability shown in Figure 6.1). Treatment
coefficients are suggestive that men’s ratings of group competence in finance do not
change as a function of gender balance in picture stimuli. The single standing coefficient
associated with ratings submitted by women is negative within 95% credible intervals,
lending high certainty to the hypothesis that women rate group competence in finance
lower if group members are all men, with a marginal effect corresponding to -12%. The
interaction effects show that those ratings will, however, increase by parity. The predicted
percentages of women submitting a higher group competence rating are as follows: 45%
in the men only condition, 54% in 20% token, 59% in 30% critical mass, and 58% in
parity, thus average treatment effects go up to +13%, about evening out the initial gender
gap.
Treatment effects look different in the healthcare model. Both men and women get z
scores nearer the 50-50 cutpoint (in other words, the intercept is closer to 0) when looking
at picture stimuli with only male politicians suggesting that ratings are not consistently
high. Treatment effects are all positive: with the addition of a token woman in picture
stimuli, group competence in healthcare policy is rated better. The wide credible intervals
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Figure 6.3: ‘Interim link 2’ results, Models 29.1 (left) & 29.2 (right panel)
around the interaction effects suggest that this pattern may not get reversed for women
respondents either. Figure 6.2 visualises the predicted probability of a higher rating, for
both gender, starting at approximately 40% in the men only condition, peak above 60%
by critical mass, and decrease only a few percentage points by parity.
Both models were unable to calculate a residual variance component, but they detected
larger subject-level variation in the healthcare model than in the finance model. Full
results are presented in the first two columns of Table 6.2.
Interim link 2: From mediator to effect
The second interim link tests directly for effects of group competence ratings on testing
confidence, discussed within the group of indicators relating to self-efficacy.
Descriptively, confidence levels averaged within low, moderate, and high group com-
petence ratings, suggest that higher perceptions of group competence predict, if anything,
lower levels of confidence, Mlow = 7.14, Mmod = 6.44, Mhigh = 6.36; contrary to the hy-
pothesis of mediation predicting high self-efficacy once politics itself seems more effica-
cious with better instrumental reasons to engage with.
Models 29.1 (finance) and 29.2 (healthcare) provide confirmation of this inverse mech-
anism. Both models use test answer confidence as a dependent variable, nested within
respondents and questions. The intercept may be interpreted as the expected value of test
answer confidence if group competence is rated low, in both models near 7 on a 10-point
scale. Two dichotomous variables identify the effect of ‘moderate’ and ‘high’ ratings
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against this baseline. In both the finance and the healthcare models, these higher ratings
translate into drops in confidence, β =−0.73 and β =−0.80 on the 10 point scale, small
effects but comfortably within 95% credible intervals. Figure 6.3 shows the posterior
distribution of these predictions. Table 6.2 shows the complete model results.
Table 6.2: Models 28.1–28.2 and 29.1–29.2, ‘Interim links’
m28.1 m28.2 m29.1 m29.2
DV
Competence in finance
Pr(Y) = Higher
Competence in healthc.
Pr(Y) = Higher Confidence in test answer, scaled 1–10
Type
Ordered probit /
MCMC
Ordered probit /
MCMC Linear / MCMC Linear / MCMC
Stacked N 1673 1657 2700 2650
Subject N 648 641 270 265
Item N 3 3 10 10
DIC 3368.19 3205.00 12.691
Beta [95% CI] Beta [95% CI] Beta [95% CI] Beta [95% CI]
Intercept 0.84[0.48;1.25] 0.15[-0.24;0.53] 7.16[5.76;8.38] 7.19[5.97;8.47]
Gender: Woman -0.51[-1.00;0.02] -0.01[-0.53;0.57]
Treatment: 20% -0.04[-0.51;0.39] 0.62[0.15;1.12]
Treatment: 30% 0.08[-0.36;0.51] 1.15[0.66;1.61]
Treatment: 50% -0.07[-0.50;0.39] 0.58[0.14;1.09]
Woman x 20% 0.43[-0.17;1.02] 0.23[-0.43;0.87]
Woman x 30% 0.58[0.00;1.16] -0.10[-0.73;0.55]
Woman x 50% 0.66[0.09;1.21] 0.16[-0.43;0.85]
Rating: moderate -0.73[-1.33;-0.10] -0.75[-1.44;-0.15]
Rating: high -0.80[-1.57;0.00]
Gamma [95% CI] Gamma [95% CI] Gamma [95% CI] Gamma [95% CI]
Subject var 0.38[0.19;0.58] 0.71[0.46;1.03] 4.11[3.34;4.97] 4.12[3.22;4.96]
Item var 3.44[0.92;7.66] 3.34[0.81;7.28]
Residual var 1.00[1.00;1.00] 1.00[1.00;1.00] 5.88[5.57;6.21] 5.87[5.52;6.18]
Theta [95% CI] Theta [95% CI]
Cutpoint 1.45[1.34;1.56] 1.51[1.40;1.63]
Two follow up analyses confirm that firstly, this mechanism stands after accounting
for respondent gender, with the magnitude of the fixed effect predictors somewhat in-
creased (β = −0.78 of moderate ratings, and β = −0.91 of high ratings), and secondly,
this mechanism does not differ across the two genders. Regardless of policy area, the
interaction effect of moderate ratings with gender is estimated to be zero. There may be
an interaction effect of high ratings with gender, suggesting that unlike men’s, women’s
confidence did not decrease while giving high competence ratings, but these coefficients
have very high posterior variance thus unlikely to provide a convincing model of test
answer confidence.
Fully mediated path
The fully mediated models fit treatment and mediator (Model 30.1 finance, and Model
30.2, healthcare) effects simultaneously on testing confidence, taking the same functional
form as the direct path but extended with the group competence rating variables, two
dichotomous variables showing the effect of ‘moderate’ and the effect of ‘high’ ratings
against ‘low’ rating.
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In these extended models, negative effects of perceived group competence on testing
confidence gain magnitude and both moderate and high ratings now correspond to one
point (a third standard deviation) decrease on the confidence scale, regardless of whether
the mediator variable measures finance or healthcare policy ratings.
Treatment effects prevail and the group estimates gain precision in terms of posterior
variance, instead of disappearing altogether if mediation was detected. Identical to the
direct path model, the key finding remains that men’s testing confidence decreased, and
women’s confidence increased when viewing 50% parity images, as opposed to their
baseline confidence when viewing men only groups. The predictions further suggest
that men’s confidence benefited from a slight boost, and women’s confidence decreased
slightly under token presence of women politicians suggesting a sense of curvilinearity in
role model effects.
Jointly, these two movements do not support the hypothesis of mediation. Demon-
strated by the results of Study 1 in Chapter 5, the regression-based approach would treat
vanishing treatment effects with enduring mediator effects as evidence that expectations
about group level competence in at least two domains would mediate role model effects
on confidence. By contrast, I obtained some parallel effect of treatment and mediator
in which the two, improving gender balance in politics and perceptions of group compe-
tence, have opposing effects on confidence and perhaps on self-efficacy in general.
The magnitudes of these effects are comparable. The role model effect in parity ap-
pears to be only somewhat larger than that of group competency ratings by about a quarter
point: while women’s average predicted confidence increases from 6.32 to 7.55, the av-
erage predicted decrease in confidence as ratings get higher amounts to about 1 point.
Table 6.3: Models 18 & 30.1–30.2, Direct and mediated (‘full’) paths
m18 m30.1 m30.2
DV Confidence in test answer, scaled 1–10
Type Linear / MCMC Linear / MCMC Linear / MCMC
Stacked N 2760 2700 2650
Subject N 276 270 265
Item N 10 10 10
DIC 12958.73 3368.19 3205.00
Beta [95% CI] Beta [95% CI] Beta [95% CI]
Intercept 7.17[5.93;8.68] 7.88[6.64;9.31] 7.92[6.49;9.25]
Gender: Woman -1.42[-2.27;-0.48] -1.56[-2.35;-0.61] -1.60[-2.58;-0.67]
Mediator: ‘moderate’ rating -1.02[-1.61;-0.32] -0.96[-1.51;-0.36]
Mediator: ‘high’ rating -1.13[-1.86;-0.44] -1.08[-1.76;-0.38]
Treatment: 20% 0.68[-0.21;1.61] 0.88[0.08;1.86] 0.79[-0.19;1.71]
Treatment: 30% 0.18[-0.73;1.10] 0.34[-0.60;1.27] 0.22[-0.72;1.21]
Treatment: 50% -1.13[-2.08;-0.24] -1.26[-2.24;-0.22] -1.12[-2.06;-0.19]
Woman x 20% -0.74[-2.04;0.60] -0.60[-1.93;0.61] -0.54[-1.91;0.82]
Woman x 30% 0.17[-1.16;1.57] 0.26[-1.14;1.58] 0.34[1.05;1.68]
Woman x 50% 2.17[0.88;3.40] 2.49[1.26;3.88] 2.36[1.09;3.68]
Gamma [95% CI] Gamma [95% CI] Gamma [95% CI]
Subject var 3.68[2.97;4.45] 3.57[2.91;4.32] 3.55[2.82;4.24]
Item var 3.47[0.99;7.17] 3.50[1.05;7.59] 3.34[0.77;6.99]
Residual var 5.86[5.53;6.20] 5.88[5.57;6.21] 5.87[5.53;6.21]
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6.1.3 Section Conclusions
This study investigated mediation of role model effects on women’s psychological en-
gagement with politics, more specifically confidence in political knowledge, introduced
in Chapter 4 within a host of measures tapping into one’s self-efficacy in politics. The
working hypothesis was that women in visible positions may be perceived to implement
better policies, contributing via a more diverse set of competencies, the success of role
models positively impacting one’s self-efficacy.
In a survey experiment, the three key concepts were operationalised as follows: treat-
ment was experimentally manipulated gender balance in picture stimuli featuring political
campaign groups; the mediator was perceived group competence, provided via ratings un-
der each picture, in implementing finance or healthcare policies; and the effect was test
answer confidence, measured through a 10-question political knowledge quiz, each ques-
tion followed by a rating of confidence about the answer.
Mediation
Overall, my results do not support the hypothesis of mediation as laid out in Chapter
2 Section 2.2, ‘Policy competence’. When respondents judged groups to do better on
either finance or healthcare, their own confidence in political knowledge decreased. This
suggests there may be a trade-off between group-efficacy and self-efficacy in politics, in
which skills or knowledge about governance attributed to (female) politicians as external
actors decreases one’s self-evaluation on those skills and knowledge.
Further tests confirmed that this mechanism may not depend on gender, suggestive of
a psychological mechanism not related to (perceptions about) descriptive representation.
There is weak evidence that women’s confidence is not implicated when they give higher
group-level competence ratings as much as men’s confidence, however, there is no evi-
dence that their confidence would increase. Furthermore, averaged across the two policy
domains, the effect appears ‘linear’ meaning that in the higher the group competence rat-
ing, the lower the confidence rating. This is thus a potential area of future research in
political psychology, with or without an emphasis on gender.
Expectations about substantive representation
Perceptions about group-level competence in executing policy does, however, relate to
gender balance, and only partially follows issue stereotypes. My models find evidence
that women judge group competence higher when gender balance improves, regardless
of policy area. A token presence was enough to improve competence judgements sig-
nificantly, but further, smaller improvements happened beyond token, peaking at criti-
cal mass proportion. Note that women’s policy competence judgement in finance goes
against gender–issue stereotypes, confirming a working hypothesis laid out in Chapter 2
stating that, with more female politicians on board, women become more optimistic about
policy outcomes in areas where issue stereotypes would traditionally disadvantage (and
exclude) them.
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Men mirrored women’s judgements on healthcare, but they judged group level compe-
tence in finance with no regard to gender, rating it high already when men were present.
Thus men seem to take cues from politician’s gender to judge policy, following issue
stereotypes: rating a policy area associated with women’s competence better if female
politicians seem to contribute, but any proportion of men’s presence was enough to con-
vince them of good finance policy.
My results are suggestive, if not explicit, of an instrumental link between women in
the electorate and female politicians. These group competence ratings are consistent with
the view that women expect better policies from women, whether that’s based on a shared
notion of a ‘woman-friendly’ policy or entirely up to individual taste.
Furthermore, this could possibly link back to psychological engagement with politics
through an indicator other than self-efficacy in politics. Positive feedback to policy may
indicate greater satisfaction with governance, which has been linked causally to trust with
democracy [186]. These options were, however, not ready for exploration as the current
round of data collection was unsuccessful in detecting effects on trust, See Chapter 4
Section 4.2.4.
6.2 Study 2: Expectations about women-friendly policy
6.2.1 Data & Procedures
In this study, I am able to use a larger sample of survey respondents who participated in
the randomised mediation study. An N = 471 sample of men and women with near-equal
gender split received picture treatment identical to those reported above: respondents
viewed (and rated) pictures of political campaign groups where gender balance was ma-
nipulated to feature only men, or a token/20%, critical mass/30%, or parity/50% presence
of women politicians. To simplify, latter three groups are referred to as the ‘treated’
sample of respondents.
Before taking dependent measures of political engagement, treated participants were
reshuffled in another round of randomisation, relating to the mediator variable. Accord-
ing to the hypothesis of mediation through better policy expectations, women who viewed
female politicians are more optimistic about the course of policy and thus show increased
political self-efficacy. The current study removes these expectations for a randomly as-
signed half of the treated sample by citing an accessibly written study that argues for no
difference between men and women politicians in terms of policy output:
Please take a moment to think about the following two findings taken from a
recent expert study about women in politics in the UK.
The notion of women’s feminizing of politics is controversial [...] im-
plying that as a group, they inherently share a set of policy preferences or
ideology. Women are not a monolithic entity with a collective set of interests
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and beliefs. One could cite many examples of female political figures who
represent the antithesis of what many regard as “women’s interests” (e.g.,
Margaret Thatcher). Representation [...] is not a guarantee that women rep-
resentatives will act for women. [...] In finance debates, findings show that
the most significant [factors in] debate participation are relevant committee
membership, Conservative party [membership], and seniority, holding other
explanatory variables at constant. Sex was not significant.
This mirrors negative manipulation in Chapter 5 Study 2 where anxiety is re-induced
by participants having to first think about things making them anxious, with the important
difference that there was no text to read about anxiety31. Here the text is meant to help
respondents think about the policy output of women and men, the topic being less easily
accessible than personal anxieties.
The hypothesis of mediation in this case is tested similarly to that in Chapter 5 Study
2: improved policy expectations may be responsible for women’s increased testing con-
fidence if it remains low also when those expectations are experimentally lowered. Thus
women’s testing confidence is expected to remain flat even if they viewed women in the
picture stimuli. There are no explicit hypotheses relating to men, whose confidence has
previously been shown to decrease when pictures featured more women.
To finish, participants carried out a writing task similar to the one in the anxiety study.
Here they had to briefly reflect on what the main argument was in the excerpt. Partici-
pants in the control group, as well as all participants that viewed pictures with only male
politicians in them, had to think about and reflect on grocery items recently bought.
Once they completed these tasks, respondents proceeded to answer the political knowl-
edge test familiar from the studies above, pairing political office with UK and interna-
tional politicians. The dependent variable of this study is self-assessed confidence on the
political knowledge test, rated after each of the 10 test questions.
Table 6.4 below shows pooled, average confidence by treatment and mediation groups.
Confidence in the control groups writing about groceries instead of women in politics was
analysed already in Section 4.2.2 and restated in Sections 5.1.2. and 6.1.2. above.
The descriptive findings do not support the mechanism regarding mediation: women’s
expectation-lowered averages do not remain flat, on ‘men only’ levels but increase along
with control group averages, suggesting that role model effects prevailed. In all cases,
expectation-lowered averages are above control group averages. Interestingly, men’s
expectation-lowered averages do remain flat, comparable to their ‘men only’ exposure
levels. This suggests that perhaps men’s decrease in testing confidence is due to expecta-
tions about women pursuing different policy, once in office.
The models below tease out these group averages accounting for the hierarchical
structure of the data, in multilevel regressions fitted via MCMC, where 4,710 confidence
ratings are nested within 471 individuals and 10 political knowledge test questions of
varying difficulty. To make sure appropriate comparisons are not missed, I am presenting
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Table 6.4: Descriptive statistics: Sample sizes & Mean confidence ratings.
Women pct Mediator Gender Resp. N Stacked N Mean conf.(1–10) St.Dev.
0 Control Men 38 380 7.13 3.47
Token 20 Control 36 360 7.83 3.06
20 ‘Expectation lowered’ 24 240 7.41 3.17
Cmass 30 Control 35 350 7.33 3.22
30 ‘Expectation lowered’ 34 340 7.52 3.11
Parity 50 Control 31 310 6.04 3.64
50 ‘Expectation lowered’ 39 390 7.30 3.30
0 Control Women 41 410 5.72 3.65
Token 20 Control 31 310 5.68 3.60
20 ‘Expectation lowered’ 29 290 6.13 3.63
Cmass 30 Control 28 280 6.08 3.58
30 ‘Expectation lowered’ 36 360 6.60 3.42
Parity 50 Control 36 360 6.76 3.28
50 ‘Expectation lowered’ 30 300 6.92 3.38
these results step by step: the first two models estimate mediator effects on testing confi-
dence using the treated subsample only, with and without an interaction with respondent
gender; then I derive treatment x mediator group averages for men and women, separately.
6.2.2 Results
The first model regresses the mediator on testing confidence of all treated respondents
that is, men and women viewing pictures with at least a 20% or token presence of women
in them. The key parameter estimate in Model 31, presented in Table 6.5, is of ‘Medi-
ator: Expect.lwrd’ finding no evidence for the hypothesis that removing the expectation
about ‘women acting for women’ decreases performance on the political knowledge test
(or self-efficacy in politics in general). The coefficient itself is positive, consistent with
descriptive findings—and with Study 1 findings, see Chapter Conclusions—but a mere
quarter of confidence point with large posterior variance.
The second model, Model 32 refines this analysis by conditioning mediator effects
on gender, failing to detect further evidence. Comparing the single standing and the
interacted mediator effects (interpreted as added differential if respondents are women)
shows no or negligible differences in mediator effects across the two genders. There
are no notable differences between variance components either except somewhat smaller
individual-level variation, likely due to baseline gender differences in testing confidence,
absent from the previous model.
Models 33.1 and 33.2 are identical in specification, aiming to tease out mediator ef-
fects jointly with specific treatment effects (i.e. gender balance in pictures), compared to
those participants who viewed men only picture stimuli. A problem introduced in Chap-
ter 5 Study 2 is that a model specifying an interaction with treatment and mediator would
be ‘rank deficient’ meaning not all combinations of treatment and mediator categories are
populated—those receiving men only picture stimuli were always in the control group,
see also Chapter 3 Section 3.1.2. Thus groups of treatment and mediator combinations
are created by hand, resulting in 7 groups:
1. men only & control,
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Women subsample only. Group-level predictions and 95% CIs at discrete proportions in picture stimuli: near 20% or token, near
30% or critical mass and 50% or parity.
Figure 6.4: Randomised mediation study, Model 33.1
2. token or 20% & control,
3. token or 20% & exp. lowered,
4. critical mass or 30% & control,
5. critical mass or 30% & exp. lowered,
6. parity or 50% & control,
7. parity or 50% & exp. lowered.
Keeping it as a categorical predictor, each coefficient compares the effect of group
membership being (2) to (7) to the baseline, (1) men only control group, the estimate of
latter being the Intercept. Model 33.1 uses the subsample of women, and Model 33.2 uses
the subsample of men.
Looking at women, evidence consistent with the mediation hypothesis would be if
any of treatment + ‘exp.lwrd’ coefficients were near zero (meaning no deviation from
the baseline 0% men only exposure), paired with positive treatment + ‘ctrl’ coefficients,
which would be the role model effect on subjects whose woman-friendly policy expec-
tations were not removed. This is not the case. Parity effects prevail whether or not the
mediator is introduced, the estimate in the mediation group being somewhat higher than
in the control group (β = 1.21 and β = 1.05, respectively). These results are plotted in
Figure 6.4 in terms of predicted probabilities.
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Looking at men, whose average parity effect was a 1 point decrease in confidence, the
negative manipulation on the mediator did have an effect, namely it reversed the parity
effect: average confidence being not any longer different from that under men only picture
stimuli. Complete model results are in Table 6.5).
Table 6.5: Models 31–32 and 33.1–33.2, Randomised mediation study
beta m31 m32 m33.1 m33.2
subsample Treated women Treated women All women All men
DV Confidence in test answer, scaled 1–10
Type Linear / MCMC Linear / MCMC Linear / MCMC Linear / MCMC
Stacked N 3920 3890 2310 2370
Subject N 392 389 231 237
Item N 10 10 10 10
DIC 18249.10 18118.69 11002.18 10828.38
Beta [95% CI] Beta [95% CI] Beta [95% CI] Beta [95% CI]
Intercept 6.70[5.68;7.85] 7.09[5.99;8.33] 5.74[4.336.92] 7.13[5.70;8.47]
Mediator: ‘Exp.lwrd’ 0.28[-0.08;0.69] 0.28[-0.26;0.94]
Gender: Woman -0.89[-1.50;-0.30]
‘Exp.lwrd’ x Woman -0.07[-0.77;0.84]
Group 20 & Ctrl. -0.02[-0.93;1.02] 0.70[-0.07;1.66]
Group 20 & ‘Exp.lwrd’ 0.44[-0.59;1.42] 0.27[-0.71;1.21]
Group 30 & Ctrl. 0.35[-0.73;1.37] 0.23[-0.65;1.13]
Group 30 & ‘Exp.lwrd’ 0.90[-0.01;1.81] 0.39[-0.50;1.32]
Group 50 & Ctrl. 1.05[0.09;1.98] -1.07[-1.98;-0.19]
Group 50 & ‘Exp.lwrd’ 1.21[0.26;2.16] 0.17[-0.65;0.97]
Gamma [95% CI] Gamma [95% CI] Gamma [95% CI] Gamma [95% CI]
Subject var 4.03[3.45;4.71] 3.76[3.17;4.38] 4.00[3.18;4.87] 3.27[2.58;3.95]
Item var 3.01[0.84;6.63] 2.96[0.92;6.08] 3.13[0.82;6.60] 3.49[1.14;7.40]
Residual var 5.62[5.34;5.88] 5.64[5.37;5.94] 6.25[5.87;6.64] 5.16[4.84;5.46]
6.2.3 Section Conclusions
This study exploited another crossover experimental approach to investigate mediation
of role model effects on women’s confidence about their political knowledge, discussed
earlier as part of self-efficacy in politics, testing the hypothesis that female politicians are
perceived to implement ‘woman-friendly’ policies.
Treatment was randomisation of gender balance in picture stimuli featuring groups of
politicians on the campaign trail. The dependent variable, confidence in test answers, was
measured on a 10-question political knowledge quiz after each test question. According
to the hypothesis, women were expected to form more optimistic expectations about the
course of policy, thus the negative manipulation on the mediator concerned the removal
of these expectations. Participants read about, and reflected on theoretical arguments
outlining why women would not act on behalf of other women, once in office. In the
control group, they wrote about grocery shopping.
My models tested, by making a number of comparisons, if testing confidence de-
creased in this expectation-lowered group compared to the control groups. I found no evi-
dence of an overall difference between expectation-lowered and control group confidence,
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averaged across gender balance scenarios. Small differences pointed to the direction op-
posite to the hypothesis. Looking at group averages broken down by gender balance in
picture stimuli, however, I found that although role model effects still prevail for women,
the mediator manipulation did impact men’s confidence. Though not hypothesized ex-
plicitly, this suggests that men lose confidence (and perhaps political self-efficacy) only
if women in office are expected to act for fellow women in the electorate. If that default
expectation is removed, men remain confident (and perhaps efficacious).
This approach to mediation, evidently, faces a number of limitations. While the com-
ponent of randomisation improves inference, it is difficult to manipulate a hypothesized
psychological mechanism in a strictly controlled way. In this vein, the first limitation
is that a check on compliance is difficult to carry out. While the textual responses are
available to analyse in terms of grammatical structure, even sentiment and elements of
cognition via dictionary-based methods, such dictionaries evaluating if respondents have
adopted a particular view about the subject (i.e. women carrying out policies to help other
women) would be more difficult to build. We cannot be sure that participants reading and
reflecting on the text have lower expectations regarding feminist policy than those in the
control group.
A second limitation is that behaviour measured after manipulation on the mediator
may not be directly due to changes in expectations about policy, but something else, such
as cueing the relevance of gender in politics, or maybe the fact that these participants
were reminded to think about policy output (regardless if by men or women) in the first
place while the control group was left to follow implicit evaluations.
Finally, this study also faces limitations given the specificity of the dependent vari-
able, testing confidence: it is possible that effects would be detectable on other indicators
of political engagement with a more explicit focus on policy expectations, such as satis-
faction with governance or external efficacy. In this round of data collection, however, I
was unable to detect role model effects on these variables, see Chapter 4 Section 2.
6.3 Chapter Conclusions
Chapter 6 investigated mediation of role model effects through a more instrumental mech-
anism, namely that women’s political engagement is driven by expectations about the
efficacy of politics itself, improving when more women hold visible political office. My
studies looked at this idea first through broad policy areas, of finance and healthcare, look-
ing for holistic judgements about group competence in groups of politicians as a function
of their gender balance. Aiming to provide more detail on this broad mechanism, a second
study looked at specifically whether women form expectations about female politicians
enacting ‘woman friendly’ policy.
Both studies are based on a survey experiment where participants viewed and rated
a series of pictures featuring 2015 campaign groups of unknown politicians with gender
balance manipulated to feature only men, a token or 20% presence, a critical mass or 30%
presence, or a parity or 50% presence of women. Study 1 analysed the rating of these
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groups on ‘how well [they] would manage finance/healthcare policy’, and linked this to
the gender balance in picture stimuli on one hand, and performance on the 10-question
political knowledge test on the other. The key dependent variable was participants self-
assessed confidence after each test answer given on a 10-point scale, thus I analysed an
N = 2,700 confidence ratings nested within 270 respondents with near equal gender split,
and within 10 test questions.
The second study introduced randomisation on the mediator itself, and motivated a
randomly selected sample of people to consider that women may not act for other women
as policy makers. Using the same dependent variable, here I analyse an N = 4,680 confi-
dence ratings, accounting for the same nesting as a function of gender balance in picture
treatment and across the mediator (where expectation is lowered) and control groups. In
this setup, women viewing more women in picture stimuli are hypothesized to be more
politically ‘efficacious’ because of specific expectations from women in politics if the
expectation-lowered subsample give less confident answers, despite viewing more women
in picture stimuli.
Based on these studies, I draw a number of conclusions about mediation and con-
nected mechanisms as summarised below.
Mediation through instrumental links
While theoretical work has used instrumental considerations as a point of departure link-
ing descriptive representation and political engagement [22] including psychological en-
gagement with politics [30], there is as yet no empirical evidence of instrumental medi-
ation of role model effects on self-efficacy in politics. My studies attempted to expand
on the initial attempt failing to detect such a link in survey data [19] using more direct
measures and a ‘two-fold’ experimental design randomising both treatment and mediator,
to improve causal inference.
I do, however, report evidence of instrumental links between descriptive representa-
tives and voters. When women see women politicians in political groups, their judgement
of (finance and healthcare) policy is more optimistic, the effect size being enough to
close the gender gap in performance evaluations when politicians are only men. This
is an important finding itself as it may have important implications for satisfaction with
governance or with democratic institutions in general. Furthermore, improved policy
evaluations may link to indicators of political engagement other than self-efficacy: ex-
ternal political efficacy (where the link is almost definitional, rather than causal), or trust
(where evidence exist of causality [186]).
Group level competence versus self-efficacy?
Both studies suggest that confidence about political knowledge, an important part of sur-
vey inventories measuring internal political efficacy, is if anything inversely related to
how much efficacy is attributed to politicians in executing policy. Looking at women, the
effect size of attributing higher competence to groups is small but consistent across my
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studies (a quarter confidence point differential higher versus lower picture rating in Study
1, control group versus mediator group membership in Study 2).
This may be indicative of a trade-off between self-efficacy and group competence,
regardless of gender. In Study 1, effect sizes were comparable between men and women.
Perhaps due to its specificity about woman friendly policy, Study 2 found large posterior
variance for women while the mediator’s effect size was more robust for men. As the
current literature used in this work does not suggest hypotheses about this mechanism,
future research might take it up to theorise how voters relate to elites when comparing
policy competence: my initial evidence suggests politicians’ competence judgements will
peak when one’s own competence is evaluated as low. The direction of causality here is
unclear.
Outgroup effects
Study 2 suggests that, perhaps surprisingly, the instrumental mediation hypothesis stands
if looking at men, not at women. Chapter 4 found evidence that men feel less confident
about their own political knowledge and less efficacious when there are more women in
visible political office. The current study suggests that some of these movements may
be due to men’s expectations about women empowering fellow women through substan-
tive representation. This thinking is instrumental in that it disappeared when men were
provided theoretical arguments that this may not be the case.
Notes
29There is no substantive reason why the link function is probit, rather than logit. In the R package used
to fit Bayesian multilevel models, MCMCglmm[187], binomial logistic and ordinal probit options are readily
available.
30Without prior specification, my estimates of effect sizes including their credible intervals are identical
except an unrealistically large intercept making predicted probabilities very high in all categories (i.e. >99),
making groups indistinguishable despite marginal effects.
31In the lab experiment, Chapter 5 Study 3, there was a reading task to complement emotion induction,
about everyday sexism specifically.
142
Chapter 7
Conclusions
My thesis is motivated by questions about the role model effect: does an increasing pres-
ence of female politicians inspire women in the electorate to engage more with politics?
What are the underlying mechanisms explaining why role models matter on the individual
level? While empirical evidence exists answering the former question affirmatively, (a) it
is predominantly observational, with uncertain claims of causality; (b) it often fails to ex-
plore a wide range of aspects of political engagement systematically, but reports isolated
findings instead, such as a positive impact on political discussion; (c) if experimental,
it is often reported in isolation from the insights provided by the more canonical public
opinion surveys, with uncertain implications for electoral behaviour. My first empirical
chapter thus sets out to contribute to the literature on descriptive representation by adding
to the body of empirical evidence of role model effects and, uniquely, by bringing to-
gether experimental and observational approaches to measurement, reporting effects on
a number of comparable dependent variables, with an emphasis on consistency across
different approaches.
Turning to the second question, of why women in politics may serve as powerful
role models when it comes to voter psychology, I first develop two sets of hypotheses:
firstly, that the presence of women alleviates stereotype threats that harm women’s do-
main identification, evidenced by state- and situation-specific anxieties; and secondly, that
the presence of women in politics improves public expectations about policy outcomes,
evidenced by competence judgements on the group level, and by specific expectations
of women-friendly policies. Two empirical chapters test these hypotheses, using experi-
mental methods that either allowed observation of the mediator variable’s presence after
randomised treatment delivery, or allowed randomisation of both treatment and mediator
variables to improve causal inference.
My contributions here come against a background in previous literature in which first
attempts tackling mediation were purely theoretical but untested, such as the role of self-
interest and cost-benefit calculations [22],[30], while rare empirical contributions have
failed propose a ‘full’ account of the causal chain, such as pointing at role of political
discussion as a mediator role model effects, leaving further links between the presence of
female politicians and the frequency of political discussion unexplored [19].
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More detailed conclusions of the individual studies are available at the end of each
section, as well as at the end of each chapter. In Chapter 4, Section 4.1.3 describes the
results of an eye-tracking study, investigating attentional bias to gender balance in ma-
nipulated picture stimuli across a series of picture pairs, identical in details except that
one was a ‘contrast image’ featuring predominantly or exclusively male politicians, and
the other a ‘role model image’, always featuring an improved numerical balance. Sec-
tion 4.2.5 draws joint conclusions from an investigation of psychological engagement
with politics from a survey experiment and the British Election Study, where treatment
or key predictor was exposure to manipulated gender balance in picture stimuli, or cam-
paign exposure to gender balance among the 2010 and 2015 general election candidates,
respectively.
In Chapter 5, Sections 5.1.3 and 5.2.4 infer anxiety mediation from two different
experimental designs, while Section 5.3.4 isolates the differential impact of anger under
stereotyping. In Chapter 6, Section 6.1.3 summarises the findings of my study exploring
whether women’s policy competence judgements of a political group improved when
viewing an increasing proportion of women in them, across the issue areas of healthcare
and finance. Section 6.2.3. summarises the findings of my investigation whether women’s
psychological engagement followed their expectations about substantive representation
by female politicians. In the following sections, I assess evidence in support of the role
model effect and of mediation, as well as interpret my results in terms of their broader
theoretical and policy implications, concluding with suggestions of future studies that
may address unexplored areas of my research.
Role model effects
Reviewing observational and experimental evidence, I concluded that attention and re-
lated variables were sensitive to ‘tokenism’, while a more linear role model effect de-
scribed variables related to self-efficacy. Women’s attention in the lab, or election interest
and learning in the field, peaked under women’s striking minority presence in campaign
pictures or real-life campaigns; whereas female candidates failed to draw comparable at-
tention if present in increasing proportions. By contrast, women became more and more
confident in their own political awareness and voice in the 2015 constituencies where
an increasing proportion of women ran, and became more and more confident in their
political knowledge test answers in the survey experiment when viewing an increasing
proportion of women in the campaign pictures.
My results thus point to a plurality, rather than a singularity, of role model effects thus
far not reported in the empirical literature. A number of previous studies look at variation
in candidate gender across time and space within American politics, where, often unin-
tentionally, the only possible effect is that of tokenism. For example, studies looking at
the gender composition of major party races are bound to observe only two candidates
running in all male, mixed gender, or all female races [24], but latter at most time points
is unobserved thus role model effects are in reality token effects. Another study counting
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the number ‘viable’ women candidates in House, Senate, and governor elections admits
that the observed range of their variable is merely 0 to 2, rather than six or above32. If
very few races featured 2 viable women (the authors don’t report this descriptively), their
predictions are driven by token races as a simple measurement artefact33[19]. By con-
trast, comparative studies such as those looking at the proportion of women in national
legislatures evidently use linear predictors [26],[18], which are unable to detect tokenism,
any other discrete effect, or even curvilinearity34.
Importantly, my findings of tokenism are consistent with recent studies that are more
explicit about women’s novelty as a condition or moderating factor behind role model
effects. One study finds that candidates needed to be new, challenging incumbents, and
electorally viable, with a significant share of the popular vote (over 45%), to act as role
models for young girls [21]. Another recent study attempts to isolate the novelty factor
(being a new face in the race) from sheer ‘presence’ (category including also returning
candidates) with weak or no evidence behind novelty but ‘presence’ still meant tokenism
as a proportion of all candidates [188]. Looking at US House races, but this time at the
discrete categories of men only, mixed-gender, and women only races, another recent
study finds that only mixed-gender races increased political interest and decreased ‘indif-
ference’ to candidates, but not women only races [129]. Across all three investigations,
key effects impacted political interest, following the news, and the frequency of polit-
ical discussion: all consistent with the findings in my thesis suggesting token spike of
attention and its likely consequences.
Admittedly, the message of tokenism is not the most normatively appealing one. In
motivating my research, I drew on theories praising women’s greater presence in politics
for its empowering effect. Tokenism, by contrast, may imply that rather than acting on
a substantive mechanism of empowerment, women only drew attention as unique figures
perceived to be ‘out of place’ or as political ‘outsiders’. In the eye tracking study, I
found preliminary evidence that men in striking minority position received a comparable
attention surplus.
There are at least two reasons, however, why pessimism may not be warranted. Firstly,
my linear role model effects positively impacted women’s internal political efficacy and
confidence, negatively impacted women’s testing anxiety, and made women more opti-
mistic about finance and healthcare policy outcomes, suggesting that there is still plenty
of space for empowerment. Secondly, while there is greatest democratic potential in
a politically interested and informed citizenry, also men fall short on this ideal despite
masculine politics being ‘descriptively’ representative of them, suggesting only limited
potential of a straight link between descriptive representation and political interest. Men
and women both respond to novelty: a recent surge in the electoral success of political
outsiders, both parties and candidates, shows that large segments of the vote are driven by
newness and being ‘out of place’, without necessarily impacting alternative dimensions
of candidate evaluations such as competence or general likeability.
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Mediation
One out of four studies showed that a situation-specific ‘testing anxiety’, rather than dif-
fuse state anxiety, explained why exposure to role models increased women participants’
confidence in their test answers. This is consistent with the definition of stereotype threat
that is explicit about situational factors, increasingly finding that performance under pres-
sure is particularly sensitive to the effects of stereotyping. In my survey experiment, the
testing anxiety item was was more explicit about the upcoming political knowledge quiz,
whereas the state anxiety item was not, suggesting that ‘men only’ politics is a high threat
context if women are prompted to evaluate their own skills (or efficacy, as found in the
BES), but this threat was gradually alleviated once more and more women were present
in campaign imagery.
A small study in Chapter 5 looked at unexplored affective dimensions of stereotype
threat, finding that, besides anxiety, another likely emotion describing experience under
stereotype threat are sadness and the feeling of helplessness. In these cases, women
increasingly relied on role models, and avoided masculine politics. I isolated a different
impact of anger, however, which itself motivated participants to confront the source of
threat, ‘men only’ politics, without needing to rely on external actors.
My experiments looking at ‘instrumental mediation’ suggest that an explicit consid-
eration of women’s success in policy is not explanatory of role model effects. Women did
become more optimistic about policy outcomes, and so did men at least when looking at
issue areas where women are stereotypically seen as ‘competent’, but attributing better
competence to politicians seems to have, if anything, decreased women’s own confidence
about political knowledge. This may be in line with literature on self-deflating social
comparisons [69] documenting evidence that women make a series of strategic compar-
isons when exposed to the success of women as elites, importantly those who have high
self-efficacy in leadership themselves would deny that they would draw inspiration from
role models. Following this logic, it makes sense to interpret my results as those having
higher political self-efficacy giving lower competency ratings to external actors.
Outgroup effects
Throughout my studies, I detected interesting outgroup effects. On the one hand, men’s
survey answers served as an important framework of comparison as the role model ef-
fect is about empowering women, relative to men, suggesting that a uniform effect on
both genders may not be a case of a role model effect. On the other hand, my analyses
showed patterns not hypothesised by the role model literature, by which null effects on
men’s political engagement would be sufficient against positive effects on women’s polit-
ical engagement. Instead, I detected negative role model effects on men’s confidence and
testing anxiety, suggesting sensitivity to losing a dominant position in politics or ‘gen-
der resentment’. Before these effects emerged under women’s greater presence at critical
mass and parity, however, I found minimal though consistent evidence of tokenism, sug-
gesting that men first experienced a stereotype boost once reminded that women are only
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present in politics in a small minority—this may have strengthened dominance orienta-
tions. Latter finding is consistent with literature engaging with the possibility that if group
members who are advantaged by stereotypes receive reminders of this, may perform bet-
ter [157]. Finally, Chapter 6 Study 2 found that expectations about women implementing
women-friendly policies explained why men’s confidence decreased, suggesting that if
not women themselves, men do operate on this assumption, with consequences on politi-
cal engagement.
Further contributions
My studies reported in Chapter 5 have implications to the stereotype threat scholarship
itself, which among many other theories in social psychology faced criticism in the recent
‘replication crisis’ of experimental work. The early studies using the stereotype threat
paradigm, cited in Chapter 2, are underpowered on small student samples. The empirical
literature on stereotype threats is prone to publication bias which makes it very difficult
to assess replicability [189]. One way the theory is able to defend itself is by showing a
wide range of applications across domains, types of measures and types of samples, such
as the studies I reviewed in my theoretical framework. My studies show, for the first time,
that the stereotype threat framework works on women’s political engagement. While
political figures such as Barack Obama or Hillary Clinton have been hypothesised to alter
perceptions of stereotype threat, the dependent variables were outside of the realm of
politics. Chapter 5 Study 1 makes and explicit link between women’s numerical balance
in political office, and confidence about political knowledge, replicated across two data
collection rounds, and consistent with self-efficacy effects detected in the BES.
Limitations and further work
There are a number of limitations to highlight. The scope of my thesis is limited to
psychological engagement with politics, already a large set of potential dependent vari-
ables. The theoretical and empirical tools I introduced are, however, applicable to political
engagement in general including participation such as voting, campaigning, contacting
politicians, and not the least, ambition to run for office. Especially latter is an impor-
tant avenue of future research to expand on—there is a very recent, unpublished study
linking stereotype threat to ambition [190] yet with inconsistent effects—, with a recent
significant contribution in research pointing out that the gap in political ambition opens
up in adolescence [14], while perhaps not coincidentally recent role model papers report
strongest subgroup effects on the younger segments as well [19],[21].
Another aspect I chose not to scrutinise is partisanship. While American parties are
frequently included in inquiries of the role model effect with a hypothesis that co-partisan
role models engage more [25], I was aiming at a more general argument about psycholog-
ical engagement with politics. Partisans are likely to be more politically interested, and/or
aware of their options and the candidates, which in turn may be explained by a host of
other variables such as partisanship in social networks, the relevance of competing social
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identities such as religion, values and programmatic congruence with parties (agreement
on policies). An investigation of partisan ‘moderators’ might be novel in a comparative
context looking at, for example, the relevance of incumbent or challenger support. In my
chapter using the British Election Study, however, isolating partisans may risk losing the
politically disengaged from my focus, which is exactly where role models are expected
to be powerful.
Finally, another possibility of future research would be innovation in research design.
I introduced the approach of combining observational and experimental evidence by com-
parison, and measuring similar variables looking for consistency, however, more formal
linkages may facilitate this approach. Bayesian methods are increasingly used to com-
bine insights from different studies, in which experimental findings may serve as priors, a
formal hypothesis to be tested in observational studies. Another route is improving causal
inference in observational studies by using quasi-experiments. The introduction of quota
policies is a potential ‘treatment’ assignment, although rarely randomised like the Indian
experience reported in Chapter 2 [61]. Redistricting has been used in the United States
to show if minority turnout is boosted once, for instance, Latino seats are created, finding
modest impacts [191],[192]. I used the BES panel design to control for pre-campaign
interest, but panel designs may have further potential to study role model effects. Long-
running panel studies may capture a small but significant portion of the citizenry moving
across constituencies with different experiences, either historic or recent, with political
role models. Exploiting such designs may give further evidence to the role model hy-
pothesis while reserving very high external validity. Furthermore, the time component
may allow further observation of role model effects embedded within contexts or shaped
by changing gender roles.
Notes
32The theoretical maximum is above six if the three offices are contested by all female major party
candidates (2) plus any independents or third party candidates.
33Rather than treating the variable, which takes values of either 0, 1, or 2, as a discrete or ordinal variable,
the authors use it as a continuous predictor. A few number of 2s in the data set will at best moderate the
effect of the 1s, insensitive to differential impacts.
34Theoretically it would be possible to tweak the functional form, such as including a square term, to test
for a specific type of curvilinearity. Discrete spikes are, however, virtually impossible to model this way.
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Appendix 1—Survey experiment
questionnaire
Content starts on new page.
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x2---In the first section, you'll be looking at five campaign pictures, all from the UK. Under the pictures, you will find an option to rate how well the politicians as a group would possibly manage given issues. The more stars you give the better job you 
think they would do. You are welcome to rely on your gut feelings or whatever impressions you may extract from the imagery. OPTIONS RANDOMISED: 
- Healthcare.(1) 
- Finance.(2) 
 
Thank you. The next sections cover a mixture of political topics, including a test of political knowledge. 
 
BLOCK STARTING HERE ASKED ONLY IN SECOND ROUND OF DATA COLLECTION. 
 
a1 OR a2 RANDOMISED.  
 
a1. Would you say you are experiencing any these emotions right now? 
 
 
 
a2 Regarding the test of political knowledge, would you say you are experiencing any these emotions right now? 
 
 No Yes 
Pleasant (1)   
Relaxed (12)   
Calm (4)   
Uncomfortable (5)   
Uneasy (6)   
Worried (7)   
Nervous (8)   
Jittery (9)   
Indecisive (10)   
Anxious (20)   
Uncertain (21)   
 
t1 & t1_text, t2 & t2_text, ctrl & ctrl_text RANDOMISED.  
 
t1 Please take a moment to think about and briefly describe 3-5 things that do make you anxious. You don't need to take too long on this one. Few words or a sentence would suffice. 
 
t1_text Please describe in more detail the one situation that makes you the most anxious so that someone reading will become anxious.    A few sentences would suffice here. 
 
t2 Please take a moment to think about the following two findings taken from a recent expert study about women in politics in the UK. Once you're done, type 'done' in the text box below and click the arrow to continue. “The notion of women’s 
feminizing of politics is controversial [...] implying that as a group, they inherently share a set of policy preferences or ideology.  Women are not a monolithic entity with a collective set of interests and beliefs. One could cite many examples of female 
political figures who represent the antithesis of what many regard as “women’s interests” (e.g., Margaret Thatcher). Representation [...] is not a guarantee that women representatives will act for women. [...] In finance debates, findings show that the 
most significant [factors in] debate participation are relevant committee membership, Conservative party [membership], and seniority, holding other explanatory variables at constant. Sex was not significant.” 
 No Yes 
Pleasant (1)   
Relaxed (12)   
Calm (4)   
Uncomfortable (5)   
Uneasy (6)   
Worried (7)   
Nervous (8)   
Jittery (9)   
Indecisive (10)   
Anxious (20)   
Uncertain (21)   
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t2_text How would you describe the main finding of the authors? Should you need to read the text again, navigate back below.   A few sentences would suffice here. 
 
ctrl Please take a moment to think about and briefly describe 3-5 grocery items or food you bought this week. You don't need to take too long on this one. Few words or a sentence would suffice. 
 
ctrl_text Please describe in more detail one of those products so that someone reading will better know its properties (such packaging, colour, size etc.)   A few sentences would suffice here. 
 
BLOCK ENDS HERE. NEXT ITEMS APPLY TO BOTH ROUNDS OF DATA COLLECTION UNLESS STATED OTHERWISE. 
 
 Not interested at all (1) Fairly uninterested (2) Neither interested, nor uninterested (3) Fairly interested (4) Very interested (5) 
How interested would you say you are in 
national politics?           
 
A4/1 ASKED IN FIRST ROUND OF DATA COLLECTION. A4/2 ASKED IN SECOND ROUND OF DATA COLLECTION. 
 
a4/2 Please tell us if you think that the following statements are true or false. If you are not sure, use your best guess. 
 
 On a scale from 1 to 10, how confident are you in this answer?   
 
Not 
confident at 
all (1) 
2  3  4 5 6 7 8 9 
Very 
confident 
(10) 
True  
(1) 
False  
(2) 
Members of the European Parliament are elected 
directly (1) o  o o o o o o o o o  o  o  
Not all members of Cabinet are MPs (2) o  o o o o o o o o o  o  o  
Registering to vote is optional (3) o  o o o o o o o o o  o  o  
The European Union consists of 12 member states (4) o  o o o o o o o o o  o  o  
The House of Commons has more power than the 
House of Lords (5) o  o o o o o o o o o  o  o  
There has to be a general election every 4 years (6) o  o o o o o o o o o  o  o  
You can only vote in your local election if you pay 
council tax (7) o  o o o o o o o o o  o  o  
Local councils have the power to set the school leaving 
age in their own area (8) o  o o o o o o o o o  o  o  
The Prime Minister is not an MP (9) o  o o o o o o o o o  o  o  
Every problem a constituent takes to an MP is debated 
in the Commons (10) o  o o o o o o o o o  o  o  
Councils can set the school leaving age (11) o  o o o o o o o o o  o  o  
You have to be on the electoral register to vote in the 
UK (12) o  o o o o o o o o o  o  o  
 
a4/2 Please match the following people to their jobs. Please note that this refers to Theresa May's current government since 2016 summer, discarding any impact the Snap Elections may bring in after 8 July 2017. 
 
 On a scale from 1 to 10, how confident are you in this answer? Pick answer (RANDOMISED order) 
 Not confident at all (1) 2  3  4 5 6 7 8 9 
Very confident 
(10) 
Philip 
Hammond 
(1) 
Boris 
Johnson (2) 
Jeremy 
Corbyn (3) 
Amber 
Rudd (4) 
John 
Bercow (5) 
Catherine 
Ashton  
(6) 
Vladimir Putin 
(7) 
Angela 
Merkel (8) 
Paolo Gentiloni 
(9) 
Matteo 
Renzi (10) 
Bashar al-
Assad (11) 
Jean-Cl 
Juncker (12) 
None listed 
(13) 
Chancellor of the 
Exchequer (1) o  o o o o o o o o o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
Deputy Prime 
Minister  
(2) 
o  o o o o o o o o o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
Leader of the Labour 
Party (3) o  o o o o o o o o o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
Home secretary (4) o  o o o o o o o o o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
Speaker of the HoC  
(5) o  o o o o o o o o o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
President of Russia  
(6) o  o o o o o o o o o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
Chancellor of 
Germany  
(7) 
o  o o o o o o o o o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
Prime minister of 
Italy  
(8) 
o  o o o o o o o o o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
President of Syria  o  o o o o o o o o o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
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(9) 
President of the EU  
(10) o  o o o o o o o o o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
 
a5 To what extent do you agree with the following statements? 
 
 Strongly disagree (1) Rather disagree (2) Neither agree nor disagree (3) Rather agree (4) Strongly agree (5) 
I understand the important political issues facing 
our country. (1)           
It takes too much time and effort to be active in 
politics. (2)           
It is often difficult for me to understand what 
happens in government and politics. (3)           
Politicians don't care what people like me think. 
(4)           
 
a6 How much do you trust the following people? 
 
 A great deal (5) A lot (4) A moderate amount (3) A little (2) 
Absolutely no trust 
at all (1) 
Members of Parliament in 
general? (1)           
The MP of your local 
constituency? (2)           
The UK police? (3)           
People in general? (4)           
 
2ND ROUND ONLY. a8 How important is your gender to your sense of who you are?______   (1) 
 
2ND ROUND ONLY. a9 How much do you agree with the following two statements? 
 
______ In general, things would improve if there were more women in politics. (1) 
______ Women should be given preferential treatment when applying for jobs and promotions. (2) 
 
a10 How much do you agree with the following two statements? 
 
 Strongly disagree (1) Rather disagree (2) Neither agree nor disagree (3) Rather agree (4) Strongly agree (5) 
If certain groups 
stayed in their place, 
we would have 
fewer problems (1) 
          
It’s probably a good 
thing that certain 
groups are at the top 
and other groups are 
at the bottom (2) 
          
Group equality 
should be our ideal 
(3) 
          
We should do what 
we can to equalise 
conditions for 
everyone (4) 
          
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a11 Please indicate your attitude towards the following issues by giving thumbs up, thumbs down, or 'unsure'. 
 Thumbs down 👎 (1) Unsure ? (2) Thumbs up 👍 (3) 
Abortion (1)       
Limited government (2)       
Military and national security (3)       
Religion (4)       
Welfare benefits (5)       
Gun ownership (6)       
Traditional marriage (7)       
Traditional values (8)       
Fiscal responsibility (9)       
Business  (10)       
The family unit (11)       
Britishness (12)       
Queen Elizabeth II. (13)       
Brexit (14)       
 
 
a12 What year were you born? 
 
a13 What is the highest educational qualification you have? 
 Incomplete Secondary Education (below GCSE/ O-Levels)  (1) 
 Secondary Education Completed (GCSE / O Level / CSE or equivalent)  (2) 
 Secondary Education Completed (A Level or equivalent)  (3) 
 Some vocational or Technical Qualifacations  (4) 
 University Education Completed (First Degree, e.g. BA or BSc)  (5) 
 Vocational or Technical Qualifications (e.g. HND or NVQ)  (6) 
 Postgraduate Degree or equivalent  (7) 
 Doctorate, Post-doctorate or equivalent (Higher Degree)  (8) 
 Prefer not to answer () 
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Appendix 2—Model diagnostics
The upcoming plots show convergence of both fixed- (in all tables labelled as Betas) and
random effects (in all tables labelled as Gamma) in 33 selected models. In Chapter 4, my
analytical strategy was to first fit uninformative or ‘null’ models, later expanded to include
gender, treatment, and all covariates; in these cases, I only generated a convergence plot
for the largest extended model.
Convergence itself is necessary to interpret point estimates: if the trace plots show a
trend such as an increase or a decrease, the reported posterior means (the point estimates
in my model tables) are not (yet) reliable. For example, a mean β of ‘Gender’, estimated
at 1.00 but calculated from a posterior sample where trace plot shows an increasing trend,
is likely to be converge later at a higher value.
There are two general remarks to make. Fixed-effects convergence is acceptable in all
models except in some of my generalised linear models, such as my poisson models 3.2,
and 5.2. This was part of my reasoning not to continue fitting models on saccadic data in
Chapter 5 but concentrate on fixation duration. Nevertheless, in extensions of this study I
may experiment with longer Markov Chains to see if convergence is satisfactory, before
concluding on null results. Another option would be to experiment with informative
priors, on a case by case basis. This approach may belong in shorter reports, as here I
aimed at uniform solutions to increase comparability across models.
Random effects convergence is very often unsatisfactory. This is a heavily debated is-
sue in the multilevel modelling literature: with only a few groups such as data collection
rounds, it is increasingly difficult to estimate variance components. At the problematic
models, however, random effects convergence is not a major issue because they accom-
panied large, often 99% residual variances with an upward trend. In these cases I merely
concluded that those variances are likely to be negligible, and I explicitly reported if I
obtained models that have low explanatory powers. Nevertheless, in later explorations, I
may need to experiment on a case-by-case basis to use informative priors that might fix
this problem.
Content starts on new page.
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Convergence of fixed effects, Model 1.2.
Intrcpt Wmn 20pct 30pct 50pct Wx20 Wx30 Wx50
Convergence of random effects, Model 1.2.
subject trialnum units
Convergence of fixed effects, Model 2.2.
Intrcpt 30pct 50pct 60pct Contr Prbe Cntrx30 Ctrx50 Ctrx60
Convergence of random effects, Model 2.2.
subject trial units
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Convergence of fixed effects, Model 3.2.
Intrcpt 30pct 50pct 60pct Contr Prbe Cntrx30 Ctrx50 Ctrx60
Convergence of random effects, Model 3.2.
subject trial units
Convergence of fixed effects, Model 4.2.
Intrcpt 30pct 50pct 60pct Contr Prbe Cntrx30 Ctrx50 Ctrx60
Convergence of random effects, Model 4.2.
subject trial units
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Convergence of fixed effects, Model 5.2.
Intrcpt 30pct 50pct 60pct Contr Prbe Cntrx30 Ctrx50 Ctrx60
Convergence of random effects, Model 5.2.
subject trial units
Convergence of fixed effects, Model 6.2.
Intrcpt Wmn 20pct 30pct 50pct 60pct WinMar Age Edu Wx20 Wx30 Wx50 Wx60
Convergence of random effects, Model 6.2.
pa year units
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Convergence of fixed effects, Model 7.2.
Intrcpt Wmn 20pct 30pct 50pct Wx20 Wx30 Wx50
Convergence of random effects, Model 7.2.
collyear sample units
Convergence of fixed effects, Model 8.2.
Intrcpt Wmn 20pct 30pct 50pct 60pct WinMar Age Edu Wx20 Wx30 Wx50 Wx60
Convergence of random effects, Model 8.2.
variable subject pa units
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Convergence of fixed effects, Model 9.2.
Intrcpt Wmn 20pct 30pct 50pct Wx20 Wx30 Wx50
Convergence of random effects, Model 9.2.
variable subject sample units
Convergence of fixed effects, Model 10.2.
Intrcpt Wmn 20pct 30pct 50pct 60pct WinMar Age Edu Wx20 Wx30 Wx50 Wx60
Convergence of random effects, Model 10.2.
pa units
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Convergence of fixed effects, Model 11.2.
Intrcpt Wmn 20pct 30pct 50pct Wx20 Wx30 Wx50
Convergence of random effects, Model 11.2.
collyear sample units
Convergence of fixed effects, Model 12.2.
Intrcpt Wmn 20pct 30pct 50pct Wx20 Wx30 Wx50
Convergence of random effects, Model 12.2.
variable subject collyear sample units
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Convergence of fixed effects, Model 13.2.
Intrcpt Wmn 20pct 30pct 50pct 60pct WinMar Age Edu Wx20 Wx30 Wx50 Wx60
Convergence of random effects, Model 13.2.
pa units
Convergence of fixed effects, Model 14.2.
Intrcpt Wmn 20pct 30pct 50pct 60pct WinMar Age Edu Wx20 Wx30 Wx50 Wx60
Convergence of random effects, Model 14.2.
variable subject pa type units
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Convergence of fixed effects, Model 15.2.
Intrcpt Wmn 20pct 30pct 50pct Wx20 Wx30 Wx50
Convergence of random effects, Model 15.2.
variable subject type collyear sample units
Convergence of fixed effects, Model 16.2.
Intrcpt Wmn 20pct 30pct 50pct 60pct WinMar Age Edu Wx20 Wx30 Wx50 Wx60
Convergence of random effects, Model 16.2.
pa year units
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Convergence of fixed effects, Model 17.2.
Intrcpt Wmn 20pct 30pct 50pct Wx20 Wx30 Wx50
Convergence of random effects, Model 17.2.
collyear sample units
Convergence of fixed effects, Model 18.
Intrcpt Wmn 20pct 30pct 50pct Wx20 Wx30 Wx50
Convergence of random effects, Model 18.
subject variable units
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Convergence of fixed effects, Model 19.2.
Intrcpt Wmn 20pct 30pct 50pct Wx20 Wx30 Wx50
Convergence of random effects, Model 19.2.
subject variable units
Convergence of fixed effects, Model 20.1.
Intrcpt S.anx
Convergence of random effects, Model 20.1.
subject variable units
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Convergence of fixed effects, Model 20.2.
Intrcpt T.anx
Convergence of random effects, Model 20.2.
subject variable units
Convergence of fixed effects, Model 21.1.
Intrcpt 30pct 50pct 60pct Contr Prbe Cntrx30 Ctrx50 Ctrx60
Convergence of random effects, Model 21.1.
subject variable units
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Convergence of fixed effects, Model 21.2.
Intrcpt 30pct 50pct 60pct Contr Prbe Cntrx30 Ctrx50 Ctrx60
Convergence of random effects, Model 21.2.
subject variable units
Convergence of fixed effects, Model 22.
Intrcpt S.anx
Convergence of random effects, Model 22.
subject variable units
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Convergence of fixed effects, Model 23.
Intrcpt Med:S.anx 30pct 50pct Medx30 Medx50
Convergence of random effects, Model 23.
subject variable units
Convergence of fixed effects, Model 24.1.
Intrcpt 20xCtr 20xAnx 30xCtr 30xAnx 50xCtr 50xAnx
Convergence of random effects, Model 24.1.
subject variable units
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Convergence of fixed effects, Model 24.2.
Intrcpt 20xCtr 20xAnx 30xCtr 30xAnx 50xCtr 50xAnx
Convergence of random effects, Model 24.2.
subject variable units
Convergence of fixed effects, Model 25.
Intrcpt Ang Sad RM RMxA RMxS
Convergence of random effects, Model 25.
subject trialnum units
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Convergence of fixed effects, Model 26.
Intrcpt Ang Sad RM RMxA RMxS Prbe
Convergence of random effects, Model 26.
subject trial units
Convergence of fixed effects, Model 27.
Intrcpt Ang Sad RM RMxA RMxS Prbe
Convergence of random effects, Model 27.
subject trial units
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Convergence of fixed effects, Model 28.1.
Intrcpt Wmn 20pct 30pct 50pct Wx20 Wx30 Wx50
Convergence of random effects, Model 28.1.
subject units
Convergence of fixed effects, Model 28.2.
Intrcpt Wmn 20pct 30pct 50pct Wx20 Wx30 Wx50
Convergence of random effects, Model 28.2.
subject units
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Convergence of fixed effects, Model 29.1.
Intrcpt Rat-mod Rat-hi
Convergence of random effects, Model 29.1.
subject variable.pkc units
Convergence of fixed effects, Model 29.2.
Intrcpt Rat-mod Rat-hi
Convergence of random effects, Model 29.2.
subject variable.pkc units
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Convergence of fixed effects, Model 30.1.
Intrcpt Rat-mod Rat-hi Wmn 20pct 30pct 50pct Wx20 Wx30 Wx50
Convergence of random effects, Model 30.1.
subject variable.pkc units
Convergence of fixed effects, Model 30.2.
Intrcpt Rat-mod Rat-hi Wmn 20pct 30pct 50pct Wx20 Wx30 Wx50
Convergence of random effects, Model 30.2.
subject variable.pkc units
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Convergence of fixed effects, Model 31.
Intrcpt Exp-lwr
Convergence of random effects, Model 31.
subject variable units
Convergence of fixed effects, Model 32.
Intrcpt Med:Exp 30pct 50pct Expx30 Expx50
Convergence of random effects, Model 32.
subject variable units
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Convergence of fixed effects, Model 33.1.
Intrcpt 20xCtr 20xExp 30xCtr 30xExp 50xCtr 50xExp
Convergence of random effects, Model 33.1.
subject variable units
Convergence of fixed effects, Model 33.2.
Intrcpt 20xCtr 20xExp 30xCtr 30xExp 50xCtr 50xExp
Convergence of random effects, Model 33.2.
subject variable units
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